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DATA PRIVACY AND DIGNITARY PRIVACY: 
GOOGLE SPAIN, THE RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
ROBERT C. POST† 
ABSTRACT 
  The 2014 decision of the European Court of Justice in Google Spain 
controversially held that the fair information practices set forth in 
European Union (EU) Directive 95/46/EC (Directive) require that 
Google remove from search results links to websites that contain true 
information. Google Spain held that the Directive gives persons a 
“right to be forgotten.” At stake in Google Spain are values that involve 
both privacy and freedom of expression. Google Spain badly analyzes 
both.  
  With regard to the latter, Google Spain fails to recognize that the 
circulation of texts of common interest among strangers makes possible 
the emergence of a “public” capable of forming the “public opinion” 
that is essential for democratic self-governance. As the rise of American 
newspapers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries demonstrates, the 
press underwrites the public sphere by creating a structure of 
communication both responsive to public curiosity and independent of 
the content of any particular news story. Google, even though it is not 
itself an author, sustains the contemporary virtual public sphere by 
creating an analogous structure of communication. 
  With regard to privacy values, EU law, like the laws of many 
nations, recognizes two distinct forms of privacy. The first is data 
privacy, which is protected by the fair information practices contained 
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in the Directive. These practices regulate the processing of personal 
information to ensure (among other things) that such information is 
used only for the specified purposes for which it has been legally 
gathered. Data privacy operates according to an instrumental logic, 
and it seeks to endow persons with “control” over their personal data. 
Data subjects need not demonstrate harm in order to establish 
violations of data privacy. 
  The second form of privacy recognized by EU law is dignitary 
privacy. Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union protects the dignity of persons by regulating 
inappropriate communications that threaten to degrade, humiliate, or 
mortify them. Dignitary privacy follows a normative logic designed to 
prevent harm to personality caused by the violation of civility rules. 
There are the same privacy values as those safeguarded by the 
American tort of public disclosure of private facts. Throughout the 
world, courts protect dignitary privacy by balancing the harm that a 
communication may cause to personality against legitimate  
public interests in the communication.  
  The instrumental logic of data privacy is inapplicable to public 
discourse, which is why the Directive contains derogations for 
journalistic activities. The communicative action characteristic of the 
public sphere is made up of intersubjective dialogue, which is 
antithetical both to the instrumental rationality of data privacy and to 
its aspiration to ensure individual control of personal information. 
Because the Google search engine underwrites the public sphere in 
which public discourse takes place, Google Spain should not have 
applied fair information practices to Google searches. But the Google 
Spain opinion also invokes Article 7, and in the end the decision creates 
doctrinal rules that are roughly approximate to those used to protect 
dignitary privacy. The Google Spain opinion is thus deeply confused 
about the kind of privacy it wishes to protect. It is impossible to 
ascertain whether the decision seeks to protect data privacy or dignitary 
privacy. 
  Google Spain is ultimately pushed in the direction of dignitary 
privacy because data privacy is incompatible with public discourse, 
whereas dignitary privacy may be reconciled with the requirements of 
public discourse. Insofar as freedom of expression is valued because it 
fosters democratic self-government, public discourse cannot serve as 
an effective instrument of self-determination without a modicum of 
civility. Yet the Google Spain decision recognizes dignitary privacy 
only in a rudimentary and unsatisfactory way. If it had more clearly 
focused on the requirements of dignitary privacy, Google Spain would 
not so sharply have distinguished Google links from the underlying 
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websites to which they refer. Google Spain would not have blithely 
outsourced the enforcement of the right to be forgotten to a private 
corporation like Google.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Lying at the intersection of big data and mass communication, the 
Internet has become the site of furious tension between data privacy 
and freedom of expression. The conflict is especially acute in the 
European Union (EU), which highly prizes the protection of personal 
information. 
Data privacy is typically secured by “fair information practices” 
that seek to ensure the accuracy, transparency, and instrumental 
rationality of data processing.1 Article 40 of the 1978 French Privacy 
 
 1. David H. Flaherty, Governmental Surveillance and Bureaucratic Accountability: Data 
Protection Agencies in Western Societies, 11 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 7, 8 (1986). “The West 
German state of Hesse passed the first general data protection law in 1970,” followed by “Sweden 
(1973); United States (1974); Federal Republic of Germany (1977); Canada (1977); France (1978); 
and the United Kingdom (1984).” Id. at 7–8. “The influential [1981] OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data summarize the basic principles for 
national application in the following terms: collection limitation, data quality, purpose 
specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual participation, and 
accountability.” Id. at 8. 
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Law2 established “the central principle of the right to be forgotten,”3 
providing that “[e]very data subject can . . . require the data controller 
to rectify, complete, update, lock out or erase personal data relating to 
him or her, where the data is inaccurate, incomplete, ambiguous, 
expired, or whose collection, use, communication or storage is 
forbidden.”4  
Fair information practices were consolidated in the EU in 1995 
with the adoption of Directive 95/46/EC5 (Directive), which “is 
probably the most influential data privacy text in the world.”6 The 
Directive requires Member States to protect the privacy of “data 
subjects” by enacting laws that require personal data be “collected 
[only] for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes”; that the 
processing of data be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation 
to the purposes for which they are collected”; that personal data be 
maintained accurately and “kept up to date”; and that personal data be 
“kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no 
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were 
 
 2. Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés [Law 
78-17 of January 6, 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 7, 1978, 
art. 40. 
 3. DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 180 
(1989). Writing in 1989, Flaherty praised the right to be forgotten as of “inestimable importance 
for data protection in every country.” Id. at 210. He listed “[t]he right to be forgotten, including 
the ultimate anonymization or destruction of almost all personal information,” in his table of 
“Data Protection Principles and Practices for Government Personal Information Systems.” Id. at 
380 tbl.7.  
 4. Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés [Law 
78-17 of January 6, 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 7, 1978, 
art. 40. “The Computer, which has a power and memory so superior to man, must be made to 
forget.” FRENCH NAT’L COMM’N ON INFORMATICS & FREEDOMS, REPORT 98 (1981). 
 5. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter Directive]. The Directive was 
designed to implement the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention of 1981. Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 1, 
1981, E.T.S. No. 108.  
 6. Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the 
Right To Be Forgotten in Europe, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY (Jules 
Polonetsky, Omer Tene & Evan Selinger eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 14), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652171 [https://perma.cc/T72H-EVG5].  
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collected.”7 The Directive provides that data subjects can rectify, erase, 
or block the use of data processed in ways that violate its 
requirements.8 
A decade after the promulgation of the Directive, the EU 
entrenched its commitment to data privacy by ratifying Article 8 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter),9 
which came into effect with the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon.10 Article 8 is 
entitled “Protection of Personal Data,” and it provides that: 
1.  Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her. 
2.  Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on 
the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other 
legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to 
data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to 
have it rectified. 
3.  Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority.11  
Article 8 codifies the essence of fair information practices and in effect 
mandates that they be enforced by independent data protection 
agencies. 
Although there was always a potential contradiction between data 
privacy and freedom of expression, that tension remained largely latent 
until it burst into public view in 2014 when the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) decided the monumental case of Google 
 
 7. Directive, supra note 5, art. 6(1). 
 8. Id. art. 12(b). 
 9. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8, December 7, 2000, 2000 
O.J. (C 364) 1, 10 [hereinafter Charter].  
 10. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing European Community, Dec. 13 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of 
Lisbon]. The Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 reiterates: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them. 
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies, and by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the 
scope of Union law, and the rules relating to the free movement of such data. 
Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities.  
Id. at 55.  
 11. Charter, supra note 9, art. 8.  
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Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos.12 The CJEU 
held that the Directive, as well as Articles 713 and 8 of the Charter, 
authorize a “data subject” to require the operator of a search engine 
“to remove from the list of results displayed following a search made 
on the basis of his name” links to web pages published lawfully by third 
parties and containing true information relating to him, “on the ground 
that . . . he wishes it to be ‘forgotten’ after a certain time.”14 
Google Spain did not focus on the processing of personal data 
collected by the Google search engine (Google) from its own 
customers.15 It instead applied the right to be forgotten to constrain 
Google’s public communication of public information. Insofar as 
Google Spain relied on Article 8 and the Directive, the decision vastly 
expanded the reach of fair information practices. This expansion was 
reaffirmed in April 2016 when the EU promulgated the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR),16 which will become the law of all EU 
member states on May 25, 2018.17 The GDPR replaces the Directive 
 
 12. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317 [hereinafter Google Spain]. For a discussion of previous tension between data 
protection laws and new digital media, see David Erdos, Data Protection Confronts Freedom of 
Expression on the “New Media” Internet: The Stance of European Regulatory Authorities, 40 EUR. 
L. REV. 531 (2015).  
 13. Article 7 is entitled “Respect for private and family life,” and it provides that “[e]veryone 
has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.” Charter, 
supra note 9, art. 7.  
 14. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 89; see id. at para. 99. In January 2012, the European 
Commission had proposed to the European Parliament fair information practices that included a 
“Right to be forgotten and to erasure,” essentially based upon the French right to be forgotten 
described in supra note 2 and accompanying text. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 
17, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed GDPR].  
 15. On Google’s collection of data about its customers, see Elisabeth A. Jones & Joseph W. 
Janes, Anonymity in a World of Digital Books: Google Books, Privacy, and the Freedom To Read, 
2 POL. & INTERNET 43 (2010) and Bart van der Sloot & Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Google 
and Personal Data Protection, in GOOGLE AND THE LAW: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF KNOWLEDGE-ECONOMY BUSINESS MODELS 75 (Aurelio Lopez-Tarruella ed., 
2012). On the application of the Directive to Google’s gathering of “user data,” see ARTICLE 29 
DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, OPINION 1/2008 ON DATA PROTECTION ISSUES RELATED TO 
SEARCH ENGINES (2008), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/ 
opinion-recommendation/files/2008/wp148_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C23U-B9WB]. 
 16. A version of the right to be forgotten had already been included in previous drafts of the 
GDPR. See Proposed GDPR, supra note 14, art. 17.  
 17. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 43–45, 87 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
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and contains a right to be forgotten that will likely be interpreted in 
light of Google Spain.18 The GDPR marks the triumph of a distinctive 
EU variant of the right to be forgotten that derives directly from data 
privacy and that can be expected to have massive international 
consequences.19 It sharply poses the general theoretical question of 
how fair information practices can be reconciled with freedom of 
expression.20 
 
 18. Article 17 of the GDPR, which is entitled “Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’),” is 
an explicit gesture toward the holding of Google Spain. It provides: 
1. The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of 
personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have 
the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following 
grounds applies: 
(a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which 
they were collected or otherwise processed; 
(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according 
to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other 
legal ground for the processing; 
(c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there 
are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects 
to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); 
(d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; 
(e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in 
Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject; 
(f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information 
society services referred to in Article 8(1). 
2. Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to 
paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available 
technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including 
technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that 
the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy 
or replication of, those personal data. 
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the extent that processing is necessary: 
(a) for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information; 
(b) for compliance with a legal obligation which requires processing by Union or 
Member State law to which the controller is subject or for the performance of a 
task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested 
in the controller; 
(c) for reasons of public interest in the area of public health in accordance with 
points (h) and (i) of Article 9(2) as well as Article 9(3); 
(d) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research 
purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) in so far as the 
right referred to in paragraph 1 is likely to render impossible or seriously impair 
the achievement of the objectives of that processing; or 
(e) for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. 
Id. art. 17. 
 19. On the international consequences of European data privacy regulations, see 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Exchanging 
and Protecting Personal Data in a Globalised World, COM (2017) 7 final (Jan. 10, 2017).  
 20. Google Spain strongly suggests that the GDPR will be interpreted to control the use of 
Internet search engines. See Recent Case, C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (May 13, 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 735, 742 (2014). 
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Google Spain’s extension of fair information practices to Internet 
search engines has been intensely controversial.21 Since June 2014, 
Google Spain has prompted Google to process at least 703,910 requests 
to remove 1,948,737 URLs from its search engine, and to erase from 
searches made under the name of the person requesting removal at 
least 43.2 percent of those URLs.22 In the past several years, the right 
to be forgotten has been asserted by a vicar who resigned after villagers 
accused him of standing naked at a vicarage window and swearing at 
children; by a doctor convicted of attempting to spike his pregnant 
mistress’ drinks with drugs to cause a miscarriage of their son; and by 
a butcher convicted of blackmail for threatening to send his estranged 
wife’s wealthy parents videos of her participating in group sex.23 The 
right to be forgotten has even been asserted against articles about the 
right to be forgotten.24 
 
 21. Steptoe Cyberlaw Podcast – Interview with David Hoffman, STEPTOE CYBERLOG (Sept. 
3, 2014), at 00:34:39, http://www.steptoe.com/staticfiles/SteptoeCyberlawPodcast-032.mp3 
[https://perma.cc/U3A9-F99H] (providing a breakdown of Google Spain with one commentator 
calling it “clinically insane”); see also Michael Wolff, Wolff: The Right To Be Forgotten by Google, 
USA TODAY (May 18, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/wolff/ 
2014/05/18/a-big-setback-for-google-in-europe/9172941 [https://perma.cc/8DJT-XXRJ] (“The 
world reaction, or at least the reaction among the technologically elite and ambitious, is that this 
is merely a spasm from European Luddites and protectionists.”).  
 22. Google used to provide a detailed report describing its efforts to comply with EU data 
protection law. See Search Removals Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE, https:// 
www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/D5E7-
GEVT ] (last updated Sept. 28, 2017).  
 23. Rhiannon Williams, Telegraph Stories Affected by EU ‘Right to be Forgotten,’ 
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 3, 2015, 9:52 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/11036257/ 
Telegraph-stories-affected-by-EU-right-to-be-forgotten.html [https://perma.cc/J2NM-RCWN]; 
see James Ball, EU’s Right To Be Forgotten: Guardian Articles Have Been Hidden by Google, 
GUARDIAN (July 2, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/02/eu-right-to-
be-forgotten-guardian-google [https://perma.cc/UQ4N-ZRL5]; Caitlin Dewey, Pianist Asks The 
Washington Post To Remove a Concert Review Under the E.U.’s “Right To Be Forgotten” Ruling, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/10/31/ 
pianist-asks-the-washington-post-to-remove-a-concert-review-under-the-e-u-s-right-to-be-forgot
ten-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/Z5H3-XUZM]. 
 24. The right was asserted by the plaintiff in the Google Spain decision to suppress links to 
comments about the opinion. Miquel Peguera, No More Right-to-be-Forgotten for Mr. Costeja, 
Says Spanish Data Protection Authority, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Oct. 3, 2015, 8:24 AM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/no-more-right-be-forgotten-mr-costeja-says-spanish-
data-protection-authority [https://perma.cc/M2ZC-VD7J]; see also Mike Masnick, Google 
Disappears Techdirt Article About Right To Be Forgotten Due to Right To Be Forgotten Request, 
TECHDIRT (Aug. 25, 2015, 8:35 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150824/13495432050/ 
google-disappears-techdirt-article-about-right-to-be-forgotten-due-to-right-to-be-forgotten-
request.shtml [https://perma.cc/4P56-5SDS] (describing how shortly after posting an article about 
Google “being asked to ‘forget’ articles,” Techdirt was itself notified that the same article “has 
been similarly stuffed down the memory hole.”). 
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The Index on Censorship denounced Google Spain as “akin to 
marching into a library and forcing it to pulp books.”25 The European 
Union Committee of the British House of Lords responded to Google 
Spain by concluding (in bold-faced type) that “the ‘right to be 
forgotten’ . . . must go. It is misguided in principle and unworkable in 
practice.”26 Jimmy Wales, the cofounder of Wikipedia, condemned the 
right to be forgotten as “deeply immoral” because “[h]istory is a human 
right.”27 The American legal scholar Jeffrey Rosen has observed that 
Google Spain and the GDPR portend a “titanic clash” with American 
free speech principles.28  
 
 25. Index Blasts EU Court Ruling on “Right to be Forgotten,” INDEX (May 13, 2014), 
https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/05/index-blasts-eu-court-ruling-right-forgotten [https://
perma.cc/Y4EG-YW9W]. 
 26. EUROPEAN UNION COMM., 2D REPORT, EU DATA PROTECTION LAW: A ‘RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN’?, 2014–15, HL-40, ¶ 62 (UK).  
 27. Sophie Curtis & Alice Philipson, Wikipedia Founder: EU’s Right To Be Forgotten Is 
‘Deeply Immoral,’ TELEGRAPH (Aug. 6, 2014, 12:07 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/ 
wikipedia/11015901/EU-ruling-on-link-removal-deeply-immoral-says-Wikipedia-founder.html 
[https://perma.cc/7VMU-KAWJ]. 
 28. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right To Be Forgotten, ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2012), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/the-right-to-be-forgotten/309044/ [https://perma. 
cc/RV4F-8WVC]. The clash with First Amendment values is especially stark in light of the 
decision of the French Data Protection Agency, the Commision Nationale de l’Informatique et 
des Libertés (“CNIL”), that the right to be forgotten requires Google universally to delist links 
in every domain served by Google, and not, as is presently the case, merely in domains governed 
by EU law. Compare Search Removals Under European Privacy Law, supra note 22 (“We delist 
URLs from all European Google Search domains (google.fr, google.de, google.es, etc.).”), and 
Samuel Gibbs, Google To Extend ‘Right to be Forgotten’ to All Its Domains Accessed in EU, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 11 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/11/google-extend-
right-to-be-forgotten-googlecom [https://perma.cc/92LQ-3LZQ] (“If a German resident 
successfully requests Google remove a search result under queries for their name, the link will 
not be visible on any version of Google’s website, including Google.com, when the search engine 
is accessed from Germany. Google will use the browser’s IP address to determine their 
location.”), with Press Release, Commision Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, CNIL 
Orders Google To Apply Delisting on All Domain Names of the Search Engine (June 12, 2015), 
https://www.cnil.fr/fr/node/15790 [https://perma.cc/F8GR-W3P9] (“Although the company has 
granted some of the requests, delisting was only carried out on European extensions of the search 
engine and not when searches are made from ‘google.com’ or other non-European extensions.”). 
Google appealed the CNIL decision to the highest French administrative court, the Conseil 
d’Etat, see Alex Hern, Google Takes Right To Be Forgotten Battle to France’s Highest Court, 
GUARDIAN (May 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/19/google-right-
to-be-forgotten-fight-france-highest-court [https://perma.cc/P6G3-8RS9], which has in turn 
referred the question to the CJEU. See Alex Hern, ECJ To Rule on Whether ‘Right To Be 
Forgotten’ Can Stretch Beyond EU, GUARDIAN (July 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2017/jul/20/ecj-ruling-google-right-to-be-forgotten-beyond-eu-france-data-removed 
[https://perma.cc/E7DU-E7XC]. For a recent world-wide injunction against Google affirmed by 
the Canadian Supreme Court, see Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. Inc., 2017 S.C.C. 34 (Can.). 
The right to be forgotten has already spread to Argentina, Edward L. Carter, Argentina’s 
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In this Article, I shall not seek to resolve this epic clash. I shall 
instead defend two limited claims about the application of the right to 
be forgotten to Internet search engines. First, I shall argue that critics 
of Google Spain are correct to be alarmed about the conceptual 
architecture of the decision, because the CJEU misunderstands the 
relationship between Google and the construction of the contemporary 
public sphere. Google Spain dismisses Google as a mere profit-making, 
data-processing corporation. But that interpretation of Google fails to 
appreciate how Internet search engines underwrite the virtual 
communicative space in which democratic public opinion is now 
partially formed. Google should have been accorded the same legal 
status as print media. I support this assertion by offering a brief history 
of how newspapers created the modern democratic public sphere in the 
United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Second, I shall claim that Google Spain misunderstands the nature 
of the privacy rights that should apply to the public sphere. Insofar as 
it is engaged in public communication, the press ought not to be 
constrained by data privacy. Instead it may be controlled by the kind 
of privacy protected in Article 7 of the Charter, which provides that 
“[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private and family 
life, home and communications.”29 The text of Article 7 of the Charter 
essentially reproduces Article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention),30 which indicates that it is meant to be interpreted in the 
same way that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
interprets Article 8 of the European Convention.31 
 
Right to be Forgotten, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 23 (2013); Robert Krulwich, Is the ‘Right To Be 
Forgotten’ The ‘Biggest Threat To Free Speech On the Internet’?, NPR: KRULWICH WONDERS 
(Feb. 24, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/krulwich/2012/02/23/147289169/is-the-
right-to-be-forgotten-the-biggest-threat-to-free-speech-on-the-internet [https://perma.cc/3TY6-
3MSW], and Colombia, Colombia: Constitutional Court Rules on the “Right to be Forgotten,” 
INT’L ACAD. OF COMP. L. (July 14, 2015), http://iuscomparatum.info/colombia-constitutional-
court-rules-on-the-right-to-be-forgotten/ [https://perma.cc/87KL-FAJF]. Japan seems to have 
resisted the trend. Jon Russell, Google Wins ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Battle in Japan, TECHCRUNCH 
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/01/google-japan-negative-comments/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3BSZ-PE6E]. On the potential influence of the right in Asia, see Steven C. Bennett, Is 
America Ready for the Right to Be Forgotten?, 88 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 10, 12 (2016).  
 29. Charter, supra note 9, art. 7.  
 30. Article 8 of the European Convention provides: “Everyone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230.  
 31. Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that “[i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
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Although the ECtHR has sometimes interpreted Article 8 of the 
European Convention to require fair information practices,32 it has 
more frequently interpreted Article 8 to proscribe the communication 
of “personal information which individuals can legitimately expect 
should not be published without their consent”33 because it would 
damage their “honour” or “psychological or moral integrity”34 or 
“prejudice” their “personal enjoyment of the right to respect for 
private life.”35 It has sought to balance the “seriousness” of harms 
caused by publications against their “contribution . . . to a debate of 
general interest.”36 Article 7 of the Charter protects what we may call 
“dignitary privacy.”37 
The dignitary privacy rights created by Article 7 of the Charter 
differ in important ways from the data privacy rights of Article 8 of the 
Charter. If the latter define and enforce the proper bureaucratic 
 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the said Convention.” Charter, supra note 9, art. 52.  
 32. See, e.g., S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 167, 202 (holding that 
Article 8 required that with respect to personal data acquired through government surveillance 
there must be “clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures, as well as 
minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, 
procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for its 
destructions, thus providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness”). In 
contrast to the Charter, the European Convention does not contain any specific right to the 
protection of data privacy.  
 33. Axel Springer AG v. Germany, App. No. 39954/08, para. 83 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109034 [https://perma.cc/64JM-LPNC]. 
 34. A v. Norway, App. No. 28070/06, para 63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 9, 2009), https:// 
lovdata.no/static/EMDN/emd-2011-024130.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5LM-497P]. 
 35. Axel Springer AG v. Germany, App. No. 39954/08, para. 83 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109034 [https://perma.cc/64JM-LPNC].  
 36. Id. para. 83, 89, 90. This is essentially how an American court might recognize the right 
to prevent the public disclosure of private facts. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
provides:  
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that  
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and  
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 37. Robert Kirk Walker, Note, The Right To Be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 270 (2012) 
(“European privacy laws are primarily intended to safeguard an individual’s dignity and public 
image, rather than to protect against governmental intrusions. This attitude is reflected in Article 
8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which . . . . draws its inspiration from the French 
tradition of protecting citizens’ reputations against compromising intrusions by others, 
particularly the media. Because of this tradition, European courts tend to be less preoccupied 
with protecting free speech rights from government interference than American courts, and more 
willing to restrict speech if necessary to protect the dignitary rights of citizens.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
POST IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2018 10:44 AM 
992  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:981 
handling of data, the former define and enforce social norms of 
respectful expression. Although these distinct rights require discrete 
forms of legal analysis, a version of “the right to be forgotten” exists 
within both rights—the right to be forgotten can refer either to the 
need to erase data that are no longer necessary to retain,38 or to the 
need to regulate communications that disrespectfully dredge up old 
events which compromise the dignity of a person.39 In the law of many 
European countries,40 the latter version of the right to be forgotten is 
known as “le Droit à l’Oubli,” which places “a time limit on the 
publication of information: the press . . . cannot continue to publicize 
matters that are no longer in the public interest” and that can 
“relentlessly harm” persons “beyond a period of newsworthy 
relevancy.”41 This is the form of the right to be forgotten that the 
 
 38. See supra notes 3–4. 
 39. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971), overruled by Gates 
v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. App. 
1931); Franz Werro, The Right To Inform v. The Right To Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash, in 
HAFTUNGSRECHT IM DRITTEN MILLENNIUM: LIABILITY IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 285, 285–
86 (Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi et al. eds., 2009); Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: 
Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 169–72 (2012); Ashley 
Messenger, What Would a “Right to Be Forgotten” Mean for Media in the United States?, COMM. 
LAW., June 2012, at 29, 29–30, 32–33.  
 40. Alessandro Mantelero, The EU Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation and 
the Roots of the ‘Right To Be Forgotten’, 29 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 229, 229 (2013). 
 41. Steven M. LoCascio, Forcing Europe to Wear Rose-Colored Google Glass: The “Right to 
be Forgotten” and the Struggle To Manage Compliance Post Google Spain, 54 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 296, 300 (2015). Professor Rolf Weber has written:  
In Continental Europe, the right to be forgotten can be considered as being contained 
in the right of the personality, encompassing several elements such as dignity, honor, 
and the right to private life. Manifold terminologies are used in the context of the right 
of personality—mainly the right for the (moral and legal) integrity of a person not to 
be infringed and for a sphere of privacy to be maintained and distinguished. 
Rolf H. Weber, The Right To Be Forgotten: More Than a Pandora’s Box?, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. 
INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 120, 121 (2011), https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-2-2-
2011/3084/jipitec%202%20-%20a%20-%20weber.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2HD-DJJR]; see also 
Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2012), 
https://review.law.stanford .edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2012/02/64-SLRO-88.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ M3BA-4MDU]. This form of the right to be forgotten is quite relevant to Spanish 
privacy law, which explicitly draws on cases like Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. App. 1931). See 
XAVIER O’CALLAGHAN MUNOZ, LIBERTAD DE EXPRESION Y SUS LIMITES: HONOR E IMAGEN 
54–55 (1991); PABLO SALVADOR CODERCH, ¿QUE ES DIFAMAR? LIBELO CONTRA LA LEY DEL 
LIBELO 97–98 (1987); Patricia Sánchez Abril & Jacqueline D. Lipton, The Right To Be Forgotten: 
Who Decides What the World Forgets, 103 KY. L.J. 363, 367–68 (2014). Section 18 (1) of the 1978 
Spanish Constitution protects “The right to honour, to personal and family privacy and to the 
own image is guaranteed,” and Section 18(4) provides that “The law shall restrict the use of data 
processing in order to guarantee the honour and personal and family privacy of citizens and the 
full exercise of their rights.” C.E., B.O.E. art. 18, Mar. 16, 2016. For French cases, see Tribunal de 
Grande Instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Mar. 25, 1987, D. Somm, 
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ECtHR has read into Article 8 of the European Convention and hence 
that exists in Article 7 of the Charter.42 
In this Article, I use “RTBF” to refer to the distinct bureaucratic 
version of the right to be forgotten created by the Directive to protect 
data privacy, and I use “right to be forgotten” to refer to the more 
traditional version of the right that protects dignitary privacy and that 
is rooted in Article 7 of the Charter and in the tort law of many 
nations.43 Google Spain seeks to support its judgment by invoking both 
Article 8 and Article 7 of the Charter.44 It therefore appeals both to the 
RTBF and to the right to be forgotten. Yet these two rights are based 
upon distinct and antagonistic assumptions about the nature of social 
life. 
The RTBF imagines a bureaucratic world that conforms to an 
instrumental logic in which data are gathered and used for “specified 
purposes.”45 The right to be forgotten, by contrast, presupposes a world 
of public communications governed by norms of propriety in which 
information is the medium of an intersubjective dialogue 
unconstrained by antecedent specified purposes and free to follow an 
ongoing play of ideas and interests. The RTBF applies to data 
management; the right to be forgotten applies to communication. The 
object of the RTBF is to give data subjects “control” over their 
 
198 (“[A]ny person associated with a public event, even if that person were the perpetrator, can 
claim a right to disallow the memory and to oppose any reminder of that event.”); Cour d’Appel 
de Versailles, 14 septembre 1989, Jamet, Tesson et autres c/ consorts Girard: Gazette du Palais, 
1990, n°1, p. 123 (“[T]he passage of a sufficiently long time [between deeds and their becoming 
public again] can, for the person who has been the perpetrator, render these deeds private, 
relegated to secrecy and oblivion.”); Cour D’appel de Montpellier, 8 avr. 1997 (“[I]f no right to 
oblivion can be recognized absolutely, it is the judge’s responsibility to decide in function of the 
circumstances of the case, bearing in mind, certainly, the right of a newspaper to bring forth free, 
complete, and objective information to its readership, but also bearing in mind the relative 
seriousness of the deeds and the time that has elapsed since their having been committed as well 
as the efforts at rehabilitation of those convicted in the past. As soon as they have paid the penalty, 
they can legitimately seek to repress the memory of the deeds.”). Each quotation above was 
translated from the original French by Professors R. Howard Bloch and Patrick Weil. 
 42. Catherine Bratic, Note, A Comparative Approach to Understanding Developments in 
Privacy Rights in the European Court of Human Rights, 19 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 341, 347 (2013). 
 43. On the contrast between the two forms of rights, see MEG LETA JONES, CTRL+Z: THE 
RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 96 (2016) and Aurelia Tamò & Damian George, Oblivion, Erasure 
and Forgetting in the Digital Age, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 71 
(2014), https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-5-2-2014/3997/oblivion%2C%20erasure%20and%20 
forgetting%20in%20the%20digital%20age.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QPS-AG2X]. 
 44. See Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 69.  
 45. Charter, supra note 9, art. 8 (emphasis added).  
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personal data;46 the object of the right to be forgotten is to protect the 
dignity of human beings.47 Although the RTBF makes sense in the 
context of large organizations that assemble big data to accomplish 
explicit purposes, its managerial logic is fundamentally incompatible 
with the communicative action required by the democratic public 
sphere.48 The right to be forgotten, by contrast, has been applied to the 
democratic public sphere in most legal systems for more than a century. 
There is no doubt serious tension between the right to be forgotten 
and freedom of expression, and different legal systems resolve this 
tension in different ways.49 I do not advocate for any single resolution 
of this conflict. Instead the second claim in this Article is that Google 
Spain blurs the instrumental reason of the RTBF with the normative 
logic of the right to be forgotten in ways that are conceptually confused 
and legally undesirable. Google Spain is ultimately an ambiguous and 
opaque decision because it is uncertain whether the CJEU sought to 
preserve the right of data subjects to control personal information or 
instead to safeguard the dignity of human beings. We do not know 
whether the object of the decision is data privacy or dignitary privacy. 
 
 46. “Generally, the ‘privacy-as-control’ approach has manifested in the area of personal 
information protection as a call for awarding individuals the greatest control possible over their 
personal information. This is reflected in what are commonly referred to as Fair Information 
Practices.” Avner Levin & Patricia Sánchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1009 (2009); see also JONES, supra note 43, at 94 (“The right to be forgotten 
represents ‘informational self-determination’ as well as the control-based definition of privacy 
and attempts to migrate personal information from a public sphere to a private sphere.” (footnote 
omitted) (citing VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 126 (2011))). This is also the popular understanding of data privacy. Reporting 
the results of the Google Spain decision, The Guardian proclaimed: “Individuals have right to 
control their data and can ask search engines to remove results.” Alan Travis & Charles Arthur, 
EU Court Backs ‘Right To Be Forgotten’: Google Must Amend Results on Request, GUARDIAN 
(May 13, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/13/right-to-be-forgotten-eu-
court-google-search-results [https://perma.cc/2ENK-WCD3]. In this regard, the right to “control” 
the use of existing personal data may be distinguished from the right to prevent surveillance, 
which consists of the right to prevent companies from augmenting their accumulation of personal 
data. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1961 (2014). 
 47. “Perhaps two of the most prominent conceptions of privacy are the control-based and 
the dignitarian.” Patrick O’Callaghan, The Chance ‘to Melt into the Shadows of Obscurity’: 
Developing a Right To Be Forgotten in the United States, in PRIVACY: CORE CONCEPTS AND 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES (Ann E. Cudd & Mark C. Navin eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 
2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=300925 [https://perma.cc/WTY6DDUE]. 
 48. On the tension between managerial and logic and the public sphere, see generally Robert 
C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 
UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987). 
 49. See generally Robert C. Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123 
(Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009) (discussing how different legal systems differently 
resolve the tension between free expression and hate speech).  
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This deep confusion undermines the doctrinal force and implications 
of Google Spain. 
At the conclusion of this Article, I argue that Google Spain should 
have answered the questions presented to it in a manner that focused 
entirely on the right to be forgotten and on the protection of dignitary 
privacy. I seek to clarify how Google Spain might have been written 
had the CJEU properly understood the doctrinal challenge that lay 
before it. 
I.  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF GOOGLE SPAIN 
A. Data Privacy and Ordinary Life 
In 2010, Mario Costeja González, a Spanish lawyer, filed a 
complaint with the Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), the Spanish Data Protection Agency.50 Twelve years before, 
there had been a public auction to sell property attached during 
proceedings against Costeja’s real estate for recovery of social security 
debts.51 The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs ordered a Spanish 
newspaper, La Vanguardia, to publish an announcement of the auction 
to provide “maximum publicity . . . to secure as many bidders as 
possible.”52 The announcement was put online in 2008 when La 
Vanguardia digitized its files.53 Two years later, when Costeja’s name 
was entered into Google, the announcement turned up prominently in 
the results. Costeja complained that the announcement should be 
erased because it concerned “attachment proceedings . . . [that] had 
been fully resolved for a number of years and that reference to them 
was now entirely irrelevant.”54 
In response to Costeja’s complaint, the AEPD held that La 
Vanguardia should not be required to remove its digitized files because 
“publication by it of the information in question was legally justified” 
insofar as it had been compelled by the Ministry.55 Nevertheless the 
AEPD concluded that the complaint against Google be upheld due to 
the “derecho al olvido,” which is the Spanish form of the right to be 
 
 50. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 14. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. para. 16. 
 53. Julia Powles, The Case That Won’t Be Forgotten, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 583, 587 (2015). 
 54. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 15. 
 55. Id. para. 16. 
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forgotten.56 The AEPD held that even if underlying websites like La 
Vanguardia remain online, search engines can nevertheless be required 
to take down or block access to data whenever “the fundamental right 
to data protection and the dignity of persons” is at risk, which could 
include “the mere wish of the person concerned that such data not be 
known to third parties.”57 
Google appealed the decision to the Spanish high court, the 
Audiencia Nacional, which held that the resolution of the case must 
turn on the interpretation of the Directive. The Audiencia Nacional 
referred questions about the proper interpretation of the Directive to 
the European Court of Justice. The CJEU, interpreting the Directive 
in light of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter,58 held that Google should be 
required to delist links to La Vanguardia’s announcement of the 
attachment proceedings from searches conducted under Costeja’s 
name, even if La Vanguardia’s web page was allowed to remain online. 
The CJEU reasoned that La Vanguardia’s web pages contain the 
“personal data” of Costeja, which the Directive defines as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(‘data subject’),”59 and that Google had become a “controller” of these 
data by processing La Vanguardia’s web pages to include them in 
Google’s list of search results. The Directive defines a controller as an 
entity that determines “the purposes and means of the processing of 
[the] personal data.”60 As a controller of data, Google must assume 
the task of ensuring that personal data are processed ‘fairly and 
lawfully’, that they are ‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those 
purposes’, that they are ‘adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further 
processed’, that they are ‘accurate and, where necessary, kept up to 
 
 56. Id. para. 20. 
 57. Id. para. 17. As with Spanish law generally, see supra note 41, the decision of the AEPD 
unselfconsciously combines the protection of dignitary privacy with that of data privacy. Google 
Spain, supra note 12, para. 17. This same blending of disparate legal theories will eventually 
manifest itself in the CJEU Google Spain opinion. 
 58. The CJEU held that the provisions of the Directive “must necessarily be interpreted in 
the light of fundamental rights, which, according to settled case law, form an integral part of the 
general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures and which are now set out in the 
Charter.” Id. para. 68; see id. para. 69. 
 59. Id. para. 4 (citing Directive, supra note 5, art. 2). The GDPR defines personal data in 
exactly the same way in Article 4(1). See GDPR, supra note 17, art. 4. 
 60. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 4. The GDPR defines “controller” in exactly the same 
words. GDPR, supra note 17, art. 4(7). 
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date’ and, finally, that they are ‘kept in a form which permits 
identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the 
purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are 
further processed’. In this context, the controller must take every 
reasonable step to ensure that data which do not meet the 
requirements of that provision are erased or rectified.61 
The essential question for the CJEU was thus whether Google’s 
processing of the data in the La Vanguardia website was “inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes 
of the processing at issue carried out by the operator of the search 
engine.”62 This question was determinative regardless of whether 
 
 61. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 72. In this paragraph, the CJEU essentially restates 
the terms of Article 6 of the Directive. See Directive, supra note 5, art. 6. In Article 5, the GDPR 
defines the responsibilities of a data controller in this way: 
1. Personal data shall be: 
(a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data 
subject (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’); 
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further 
processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), 
not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes (‘purpose 
limitation’); 
(c) adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes 
for which they are processed (‘data minimisation’); 
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be 
taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the 
purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay 
(‘accuracy’); 
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than 
is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed; personal 
data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be 
processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or 
historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 
89(1) subject to implementation of the appropriate technical and organisational 
measures required by this Regulation in order to safeguard the rights and 
freedoms of the data subject (‘storage limitation’); 
(f) processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, 
including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against 
accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or 
organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’). 
2. The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with, 
paragraph 1 (‘accountability’). 
GDPR, supra note 17, art. 5. 
 62. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 94. The European Commission put out a fact sheet 
summarizing the Google Spain decision, which interprets the decision to hold that “[i]ndividuals 
have the right - under certain conditions - to ask search engines to remove links with personal 
information about them. This applies where the information is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant 
or excessive for the purposes of the data processing . . . .” Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” 
Ruling (C-131/12), EUR. COMMISSION 1–2, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/ files/
factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/QSK7-57UD].  
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processing of these data was harmful to Costeja. The CJEU explicitly 
held that violations of the Directive do not require any showing of 
“prejudice to the data subject.”63 This is because data privacy is 
compromised whenever a data controller processes personal 
information in a manner that is irrelevant or no longer relevant for the 
specified purposes for which the information has been acquired,64 
regardless of the existence of collateral personal or material harm. The 
point of data privacy is to protect the data subject’s control over his 
personal information.  
In the context of the La Vanguardia announcement, this 
instrumental logic may make a certain amount of sense. La Vanguardia 
was ordered to publish notice of the attachment proceedings to 
maximize the number of bidders. Presumably that purpose was 
satisfied many years before Costeja brought his complaint. At the time 
of Google Spain, therefore, there was no longer any reason for La 
Vanguardia to process Costeja’s personal data by posting it online. 
Because official notices tend to serve explicit purposes of this kind, it 
is intelligible to limit the distribution of such notices to a temporal 
duration that corresponds to their objectives.65 
The question is how this instrumental logic applies to Google. The 
purpose served by La Vanguardia’s announcement is explicit and 
official. But what might it mean to conclude that Google’s link to La 
Vanguardia’s website is “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, 
or excessive in relation to the purposes” served by Google? One might 
as well inquire into the “specified purposes”66 for which a newspaper 
or a library circulates information. If personal data are processed 
without clear and explicit purposes, the logic of data privacy simply 
cannot get off the ground. 
This difficulty is fundamental. The Directive applies to all 
“processing” of “personal data,” and personal data is defined as all 
 
 63. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 96; see FLORIDI ET AL., THE ADVISORY COUNCIL TO 
GOOGLE ON THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 5 (2015), http://docs.dpaq.de/8527-report_of_ the_
advisory_committee_to_google_on_the_right_to_be_forgotten.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LFC-5X
VQ] (“[The] right to object to, and require cessation of, the processing of data about himself or 
herself . . . exists regardless of whether the processing at issue causes harm or is prejudicial in 
some way to the data subject.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Viviane Reding, The Upcoming Data Protection Reform for the European 
Union, 1 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 4 (2011). 
 65. It is striking, however, that La Vanguardia was not required to take down its website. 
 66. Charter, supra note 9, art. 8 (emphasis added). 
POST IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2018 10:44 AM 
2018] RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 999 
information “relating” to an identifiable person.67 There is no 
requirement that “personal data” be limited to private information or 
be limited to information that, if released, would be harmful to a data 
subject.68 Taken literally, personal data seem to include even 
“innocuous published information such as the name of an author 
coupled with a book title.”69 
The Directive defines “processing” in equally expansive terms, as 
“any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal 
data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, 
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or 
destruction.”70 Given these capacious definitions, the Directive on its 
face applies to multiple social domains that are not constructed 
according to a narrow instrumental logic. 
So, for example, the Directive applies to the uploading of personal 
data to a website. The CJEU has held that making online references to 
personal information like a “telephone number or information 
regarding . . . working conditions and hobbies . . . constitutes the 
‘processing of personal data.’”71 Those who upload personal data to 
their websites are thus almost certainly “controllers” of data in the 
same sense as Google. 
It is a fair guess that most personal websites are not constructed to 
achieve explicit purposes in the manner of the La Vanguardia 
announcement at issue in Google Spain. If you post a blog entry 
describing your best friend’s birthday party, for example, you are 
processing personal data.72 What might it mean to ask whether your 
 
 67. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 68. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 69. David Erdos, From the Scylla of Restriction to the Charybdis of License? Exploring the 
Scope of the “Special Purposes” Freedom of Expression Shield in European Data Protection, 52 
CAP. MKT. L. REV. 119, 122 (2015).  
 70. Directive, supra note 5, art. 2(b). The GDPR defines “processing” in virtually the same 
way. See GDPR, supra note 17, art. 4(2). 
 71. Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12992, I-
13008 para. 27. Because the GDPR defines the “processing” of data in the same way as does the 
Directive, GDPR, supra note 17, art. 4(2), this conclusion would also presumably apply to the 
GDPR. 
 72. And if your description reveals the racial identity of your friend or the fact that she has 
a cold, you have revealed what both the Directive and the GDPR call special categories of 
personal data, the disclosure of which is flatly prohibited, subject to certain narrowly drawn 
exceptions. See Directive, supra note 5, art. 8; GDPR, supra note 17, art. 9; see also Lindqvist, 
2003 E.C.R. I-12992, I-3014 to I-3015, para. 51 (“[R]eference to the fact that an individual has 
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use of these data is “irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive” in 
light of the “purpose” for which you are writing your blog? 
The question seems categorically misplaced, because you likely do 
not compose a blog to serve any single explicit purpose. You are 
instead probably engaged in what the German philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas would call communicative action.73 You wish to promote a 
dialogue with your friends and readers in ways that coordinate and 
affirm common social understandings. Someone who would ask 
whether processing personal data about your friend’s birthday party 
has become “irrelevant” or “excessive” with respect to this purpose 
shows that they do not understand ordinary social practices. The 
personal data in your blog are not connected to the purpose for which 
you are writing the blog in the same way that a “means” is connected 
to an “end.” In such contexts, the Directive poses unintelligible criteria 
for assessing the legitimacy of processing personal data. 
The point is a deep one. Consider Article 8 of the Charter. It 
provides that personal data must be “processed fairly for specified 
purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or 
some other legitimate basis laid down by law”; that “[e]veryone has the 
right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, 
and the right to have it rectified”; and that “[c]ompliance with these 
rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.”74 Can 
you imagine complying with these bureaucratic rules in the context of 
posting personal data on a personal blog? 
The conceptual architecture of Article 8 makes sense in the 
context of the large agglomerations of data that government or 
commercial organizations accrete and use. For such bureaucracies, 
data are merely a means to what James Rule once aptly characterized 
as “mass surveillance.”75 Organizations compile data to achieve specific 
ends. They engage in mass surveillance to determine creditworthiness 
or to minimize health costs. The structure of Article 8 seems well 
designed to ensure that in such contexts the processing of personal data 
 
injured her foot and is on half-time on medical grounds constitutes personal data concerning 
health within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Directive 95/46.”). 
 73. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (Jeremy J. 
Shapiro trans., Heinemann Educ. Books 1972) (1968); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, TOWARD A 
RATIONAL SOCIETY: STUDENT PROTEST, SCIENCE AND POLITICS 81–122 (Jeremy J. Shapiro 
trans., Beacon Press 1971) (1968).  
 74. Charter, supra note 9, art. 8 (emphasis added).  
 75. See JAMES B. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE: SOCIAL CONTROL IN 
THE COMPUTER AGE 300–58 (1974). 
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be confined to appropriate ends and that they be answerable to the 
legitimate concerns of data subjects.76 
But the intellectual architecture of Article 8 is mismatched to 
many ordinary human practices, even though such practices may 
involve what the Directive and the GDPR define as the processing of 
personal data. So, for example, the Directive and the GDPR provide 
that one “processes” personal data merely by keeping a “filing 
system”77 that is not used “purely” for personal or household activities, 
like an address book that contains both personal friends and business 
acquaintances.78 If you keep such an address book, those you have 
listed are entitled to ask what information you have processed about 
them; to correct that information in your address book; to query 
whether that information is relevant or excessive for the purposes for 
which you have processed it; and to have these rights enforced by an 
independent authority. I find this all but unimaginable. It creates 
exactly the Big Brother that Article 8 is supposed to prevent. 
A powerful government presence may be necessary to manage the 
large bureaucratic organizations that the GDPR and the Directive are 
constructed to regulate. Yet such formal obligations seem plainly out 
of place with respect to how ordinary people live their everyday lives. 
It is mistaken to hypostasize information by separating it from the 
 
 76. “Formal information systems are essential to large scale organizations, whether public 
or private, and these organizations are especially susceptible to the enforcement of information 
regulatory policies . . . .” George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 632 (1980). 
 77. The Directive defines a “filing system” as “any structured set of personal data which are 
accessible according to specific criteria.” Directive, supra note 5, art. 2(c). The GDPR uses the 
same definition. GDPR, supra note 17, art. 4(6). The Directive states that it applies to “the 
processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise 
than by automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to 
form part of a filing system.” Directive, supra note 5, art. 3(1). The GDPR has the same scope of 
application. GDPR, supra note 17, art. 2(1). 
 78. Article 3(2) of the Directive provides that it “shall not apply to the processing of personal 
data . . . by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.” Directive, 
supra note 5, art. 3(2). The GDPR retains this same limitation. GDPR, supra note 17, art. 2(c); 
see id. recital 18 (“This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural 
person in the course of a purely personal or household activity and thus with no connection to a 
professional or commercial activity. Personal or household activities could include 
correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken 
within the context of such activities.” (emphasis added)); Directive, supra note 5, recital 12 
(“[P]rotection principles must apply to all processing of personal data by any person whose 
activities are governed by Community law; whereas there should be excluded the processing of 
data carried out by a natural person in the exercise of activities which are exclusively personal or 
domestic, such as correspondence and the holding of records of addresses.” (emphasis added)).  
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social practices in which it is embedded. If information is used within 
bureaucratic structures that stress instrumental rationality, as happens 
in many large organizations, the deployment of information can 
properly be constrained by rules of instrumental rationality. But if 
information is instead integrated into the ordinary social practices that 
make up everyday life, it is wrongheaded to strangle those practices by 
imposing a procrustean bed of managerial restrictions. Why would we 
wish to imprison ordinary social communications within an “iron cage” 
of instrumental rationality?79 Yet the GDPR and the Directive each 
define “personal data” and data “processing” so abstractly and so 
comprehensively that they apply to aspects of life that no one would 
regard as managerial. 
B. Data Privacy, Dignitary Privacy, and the Public Sphere 
Both the GDPR and the Directive seek to foreclose this possibility 
by providing that their regulations will not apply to the processing of 
data “by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or 
household activity.”80 But the world does not easily divide between a 
noninstrumental sphere that is “purely personal or household” and an 
instrumental sphere that encompasses everything else. To the contrary, 
and most relevant for our purposes, there is a public sphere of 
textuality that includes what we might call the reading public.81 The 
CJEU has held that making data “accessible to an indefinite number 
of people” online cannot be exempted from the requirements of the 
Directive because it is not for “personal” or “domestic” use.82 
The public sphere is characterized by communicative action, not 
 
 79. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181 (Talcott 
Parsons trans., Unwin 1965) (1930); see GIOVANNA BORRADORI, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF 
TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA 71 (2003). 
 80. GDPR, supra note 17, art. 2(2)(c) (emphasis added); Directive, supra note 5, art. 3(2) 
(emphasis added); see supra note 78.  
 81. Consider in this light Opinion 5/2009 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
which provides that those who use social networking sites (SNSs) “as a platform to advance 
commercial, political or charitable goals,” assume “the full responsibilities of a data controller” 
under the Directive. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, OPINION 5/2009: ON ONLINE 
SOCIAL NETWORKING 6 (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documen-
tation/opinion-recommendation/files/2009/wp163_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/824V-PV2P]. SNS 
users who “acquire a high number of third party contacts, some of whom he may not actually 
know,” should be aware “that the household exception does not apply and therefore that the user 
would be considered a data controller.” Id. The household exemption, in other words, stops at 
the threshold of the reading public. 
 82. Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12992, I-
13013 to I-13014, paras. 46–47; see supra note 81. 
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instrumental reason. Google has become an essential resource for the 
public sphere. Consider how I came to write this article, which is meant 
as a contribution to the public sphere. I used Google to access and learn 
from texts all around the world. Some of these texts, such as the GDPR 
and the Directive, did not contain personal data. But many did; they 
offered information about how Google Spain and the Directive have 
affected the behavior of actual people. 
The analytic framework of Article 8 is incompatible with my use 
of these data to engage in public discussion. The point of fair 
information practices is to give ordinary persons “control” over their 
own personal data.83 The GDPR makes this explicit when it affirms that 
“[n]atural persons should have control of their own personal data.”84 If 
the question is whether the personal information produced by 
structures of mass surveillance should be controlled by bureaucratic 
 
 83. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 41 
(2013); Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1325–26 (2000). Orla Lynskey observes that Google Spain “provides 
implicit support for the recognition of ‘individual control over personal data’, irrespective of 
whether these personal data are ‘private’, as a fundamental aspect of the right to data protection. 
Data protection experts have long-suggested that this control, sometimes referred to in stronger 
terms as ‘informational self-determination’, is a central aspect of data of data protection.” Orla 
Lynskey, Control over Personal Data in a Digital Age: Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja 
Gonzalez, 78 MOD. L. REV. 522, 529 (2015). 
 84. GDPR, supra note 17, recital 7. Contemporaneous analysis synthesized the goals of the 
GDPR: 
The other goal of the GDPR is to provide individuals with a stronger control on their 
personal data, so as to restore consumers’ trust in the digital economy. To this end, the 
new legislative framework updates some of the basic principles set out by Directive 
95/46/EC – which are believed to ‘remain sound’ (Recital 9) – and devises some new 
ones, in order to further buttress the position of data subjects with respect to their own 
data. 
The power of individuals to access and control their personal data is strengthened, inter 
alia, by the introduction of a ‘right to be forgotten’ (Article 17) and a right to data 
portability, aimed at facilitating the transmission of personal data between service 
providers (Article 20). The data subject additionally acquires a right to be notified, 
‘without undue delay’ of any personal data breach which may result in ‘a high risk to 
[his or her] rights and freedoms’ (Article 33). 
Pietro Franzina, The EU General Data Protection Regulation: A Look at the Provisions That Deal 
Specifically with Cross-Border Situations, ConflictofLaws.NET (May 10, 2016), http:// conflict
oflaws.net/2016/the-eu-general-data-protection-regulation-a-look-at-the-provisions-that-deal-
specifically-with-cross-border-situations/ [https://perma.cc/MAJ3-AFL3] (alteration in original); 
see also Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American 
Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 1001–02 (“Ultimately this concept of control over 
personal data stems from the influential Census Act Case of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, which created ‘a general right of informational self-determination’ protecting ‘the 
authority of the individual to decide fundamentally for herself, when and within what limits 
personal data may be disclosed.’”). 
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organizations or by the natural persons whose lives are affected by such 
organizations, it may make sense to award the authority of “control” 
to natural persons, subject to a few well-defined exceptions.85 But if we 
imagine a social world that does not consist of persons struggling 
against large, impervious bureaucratic organizations, but instead of 
individuals engaged in continuous dialogue, like the debate I hope will 
be prompted by this article, “control” is simply the wrong metaphor to 
apply.86 The metaphor of “control” almost implies that personal 
information is in some sense “owned” by particular persons.87 
Consider public consideration of Hillary Clinton’s emails or of 
Donald Trump’s connections to Russia. Although discussion of such 
matters would include a great deal of personal data, it makes little 
sense to ask who “controls” those data. In matters of legitimate public 
concern, we wish to promote an ongoing public dialogue that involves 
a common search for meaning in light of shared facts. It would 
effectively shut down this search if personal data were construed to be 
under the “control” of one person or another.88 This is an important 
point for understanding the relationship between data privacy and the 
freedom of speech necessary to sustain democracy. 
We can roughly define democracy as “government by public 
 
 85. I take this to be the central point of Daniel Solove’s argument that the primary metaphor 
for invasions of privacy ought not to be “Big Brother,” but instead “Franz Kafka’s depiction of 
bureaucracy in The Trial—a more thoughtless process of bureaucratic indifference, arbitrary 
errors, and dehumanizations, a world where people feel powerless and vulnerable, without any 
meaningful form of participation in the collection and use of their information.” Daniel J. Solove, 
Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1393, 1398 (2001) (footnote omitted) (citing FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa Muir & 
Edwin Muir trans., 1937)). Solove aptly observes:  
The problem with databases . . . involves power and the effects of our relationship with 
public and private bureaucracy—our inability to participate meaningfully in the 
collection and use of our personal information. As a result, we must focus on the 
structure of power in modern society and how to govern such relationships with 
bureaucracies.  
Id. at 1461; see id. at 1436; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1612, 1641 (1999) (describing how the Internet “permits the creation of a 
new power structure in which scant room exists for privacy”). It might also be the case, however, 
that the law might more effectively address some issues arising from the accumulation of mass 
data through the normative concept of “information fiduciaries” than through the abstract 
principle of “control.” See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016). 
 86. See Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, 
Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743, 760–61. 
 87. Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical Analysis of the 
“Right To Be Forgotten” in Big Data Practice, 8 SCRIPTED 229, 246–47 (2011). 
 88. See Weber, supra note 41, at 125. 
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opinion.”89 It is for this reason that democracy requires the freedom of 
speech necessary to form public opinion.90 I use the term “public 
discourse” to refer to the set of communications constitutionally 
deemed necessary to form democratic public opinion.91 Democracy 
presupposes that dialogue within public discourse is intersubjective 
rather than instrumental.92 The shared facts necessary for such 
dialogue are inconsistent with a legal order that would authorize 
individuals to withdraw personal data from circulation whenever they 
believe it desirable. 
Article 8 of the Charter is written so entirely within a matrix of 
managerial rationality that it effaces every other normative structure 
of communication. It does not recognize public discourse as an 
alternative field of human interaction. Taken literally, therefore, the 
conceptual architecture of Article 8 would eliminate the possibility of 
democratic legitimation. Both the Directive and the GDPR recognize 
this difficulty. Seeking to implement Article 8 in a manner that would 
render it compatible with the Charter’s commitment to “freedom of 
expression” in Article 11,93 they grudgingly exempt some public 
discourse from the reach of their managerial requirements. 
The Directive provides “exemptions or derogations . . . for the 
processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic,” artistic, 
or literary purposes, but these exceptions may be used only when 
“necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing 
freedom of expression.”94 The GDPR more generously instructs 
 
 89. CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 275 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed., trans., Duke Univ. 
Press 2008) (1928). 
 90. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 13–21 (2012). 
 91. Id. at 15. In this article I am not using the term “public discourse” to refer to those speech 
acts that in American constitutional law would create the value of democratic legitimation for 
individual human beings. Contra ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 71–74 (2014).  
 92. See Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1526–27 (1988).  
 93. Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 
2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected. 
Charter, supra note 9, art. 11. 
 94. Directive, supra note 5, art. 9. For an exhaustive and disquieting study of how the 
national law of EU member states seeks (or does not seek) to reconcile the Directive with 
journalistic freedom, see generally David Erdos, European Union Data Protection Law and 
Media Expression: Fundamentally Off Balance, 65 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 139 (2016); David Erdos, 
Statutory Regulation of Professional Journalism Under European Data Protection: Down but Not 
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Member States to “reconcile the right to the protection of personal 
data . . . with the right to freedom of expression and information, 
including processing for journalistic purposes and the purposes of 
academic, artistic or literary expression.”95 
The important theoretical question, then, is how “freedom of 
expression and information”96 may be reconciled with the data privacy 
established by Article 8. Neither the Directive nor the GDPR offers so 
much as a hint.97 When pressed, reconciliation is explained through the 
metaphor of striking “a balance between [data] privacy and freedom 
of expression.”98 But it is hard to understand how balancing can occur 
when data privacy and freedom of expression presuppose mutually 
exclusive social domains. The possibility of public discourse is 
foreclosed if personal data must be processed according to the 
managerial logic of data privacy,99 but fair information practices are 
 
Out? 8 J. MEDIA L. 229 (2016); and David Erdos, European Regulatory Interpretation of the 
Interface between Data Protection and Journalistic Freedom: An Incomplete and Imperfect 
Balancing Act (Cambridge Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 61/2015, 2015).  
 95. GDPR, supra note 17, art. 85(1). 
 96. In the European context, citizens have the right “to receive and impart information.” See 
Charter, supra note 9, art. 11 (emphasis added).  
 97. This is especially disturbing because the GDPR goes out of its way to emphasize that the 
burden of proof is squarely on those who would preserve personal data from the RTBF. Article 
17 provides that a controller “shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue 
delay” unless “processing is necessary for exercising the right of freedom of expression and 
information . . . . [or] for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research 
purposes or statistical purposes . . . .” GDPR, supra note 17, art. 17 (emphasis added).  
 98. WORKING PARTY ON THE PROT. OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING 
OF PERS. DATA, RECOMMENDATION 1/97: DATA PROTECTION LAW AND THE MEDIA 5 (1997), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1997/wp1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH
N8-AMCX]; see Directive, supra note 5, recital 37; David Hoffman, Paula Bruening & Sophia 
Carter, The Right to Obscurity: How We Can Implement the Google Spain Decision, 17 N.C. J.L. 
& TECH. 437, 457–59 (2016). 
 99. See Post, supra note 48, at 1788–90. In Italy, where the national data privacy law does not 
contain an exception for journalistic activities, digital newspaper articles can be assessed damages 
if they are not taken offline when they are posted “for a period of time . . . beyond that which is 
necessary for the purposes for which” they have been written. Athalie Matthews, How Italian 
Courts Used the Right To Be Forgotten To Put an Expiry Date on News, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/sep/20/how-italian-courts-used-the-right-to-be-
forgotten-to-put-an-expiry-date-on-news?CMP=share_btn_tw [https://perma.cc/R9QM-V873] 
(internal quotations omitted). The implications of this policy for public discourse are truly 
terrifying: 
The highest court in Italy recently upheld a ruling that, after a period of two years, an 
article in an online news archive had expired, “just like milk, yoghurt or a pint of ice-
cream”. 
. . . . 
[I]n Italy at least, ‘the right to be forgotten’ now has a new meaning: the right to remove 
inconvenient journalism from archives after two years. 
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eliminated if public discourse is exempted from this logic and allowed 
to follow a free play of ideas and interests. How data privacy might be 
safeguarded within public discourse is unexplained, because data 
privacy exists in a bureaucratic universe that is incompatible with the 
communicative action constitutive of the public sphere.100 
In this respect, the RTBF established by the Directive and the 
GDPR stands in stark contrast to the right to be forgotten. The law of 
the United States101 and of a number of European nations,102 as well as 
that of the European Convention,103 has long used the right to be 
forgotten to reconcile the value of dignitary privacy with public 
discourse. In essence the right to be forgotten asks whether particular 
communications have become so offensive as defined by “community 
mores” that they cannot be said to satisfy “a legitimate interest or 
curiosity”104 of the public.105 Communications that seriously violate 
 
This surely cannot be right. If it was, everyone would demand deletions from news 
websites and online journalism would be decimated.  
. . . . 
[T]he Italian code dictates that ‘data must be kept in a form which allows identification 
for a period of time not beyond that which is necessary for the purposes for which they 
were collected.’ 
However . . . journalism is not exempted from this ‘time limit’ . . . .  
This leaves Italian editors vulnerable to arguments that their product has ‘now been 
published for long enough’ and must be taken down. 
Indeed, the supreme court followed precisely this reasoning in concluding: “The time 
passed between the date it [the article] was first published and the date when its 
removal was requested, sufficed to satisfy the public interest as far as its right to be 
informed was concerned, and that therefore, at least from the date when the formal 
notice was received, that data could no longer be disclosed.” 
Whether the ‘out of date’ stamp issued to a two-year-old article will now be applied 
elsewhere remains to be seen. 
Id. (third alteration in original). 
 100. Our conception of privacy, as Jack Hirshleifer once notably observed, signifies “a 
particular kind of social structure together with its supporting social ethic.” Jack Hirshleifer, 
Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 649, 649 (1980). 
 101. See supra notes 36, 39; infra notes 104–07. 
 102. See, e.g., Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren & Brandeis 
Tort Is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1219 passim (1994); Mantelero, 
supra note 40, at 229 n.1; Basil Markesinis, Colm O’Cinneide, Jörg Fedtke & Myriam Hunter-
Henin, Concerns and Ideas About the Developing English Law of Privacy (and How Knowledge 
of Foreign Law Might Be of Help), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 133 passim (2004); Werro, supra note 39, 
passim; James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
YALE. L.J. 1151 passim (2004).  
 103. See supra notes 32–36; infra note 121. 
 104. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). 
 105. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993). When the first 
Restatement of Torts recognized the tort of invasion of privacy in 1939, it explicitly observed that 
the protection of privacy must be “relative to the customs of the time and place and to the habits 
and occupation of the plaintiff.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 
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norms of privacy are conceived as causing harm like “humiliation and 
mortification.”106 This approach does not focus on personal data per se, 
but instead seeks to ascertain whether specific communications are 
consistent with what I have elsewhere called “civility rules”—
normative standards of behavior that reciprocally define both 
individual and community identity.107 It asks whether communications 
are appropriate, meaning in accordance with “finely calibrated systems 
of social norms, or rules . . . [that] define and sustain essential activities 
and key relationships and interests.”108 Communications that are 
sufficiently outrageous are regarded as damaging to human 
personality. 
The right to be forgotten stands in a different relationship to 
public discourse than does the RTBF. The RTBF is incompatible with 
public discourse because persons do not engage in public discussion for 
predetermined and “specified purposes,”109 and because the 
intersubjective field of public discourse is irreconcilable with the right 
of individual data subjects to “control” personal information “relating 
to” themselves.110  By contrast, although the right to be forgotten may 
constrain what might be said in public discussion, and so be in tension 
with freedom of expression, it is not necessarily incompatible with the 
democratic function of public discourse. 
Freedom of expression empowers persons to participate in the 
formation of public opinion and hence to experience the state as 
potentially responsive to them.111 It is for this reason that freedom of 
 
1939). 
 106. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905). Similarly, courts have 
recognized that:  
[t]here must be . . . some reasonable and plausible ground for the existence of this 
mental distress and injury. It must not be the creation of mere caprice nor of pure fancy, 
nor the result of a supersensitive and morbid mental organization, dwelling with undue 
emphasis upon the exclusive and sacred character of this right of privacy. . . . [A] 
violation of a legal right, must . . . be of such a nature as a reasonable man can see might 
and probably would cause mental distress and injury to any one possessed of ordinary 
feeling and intelligence.  
Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 26 (N.Y. 1895). For a discussion of the sociological interconnection 
between community mores and damage to personality, see Robert C. Post, The Social 
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957 
(1989). 
 107. See Post, supra note 106, at 962–63, 978–87. 
 108. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 2–3 (2010). 
 109. Charter, supra note 9, art. 8. 
 110. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 111. POST, supra note 91, at 39–42. 
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speech is generally regarded as essential to democracy.112 But if public 
discourse becomes sufficiently abusive and alienating, persons are 
unlikely to experience it as a medium through which they might 
influence the construction of public opinion. In such circumstances, 
public discourse will no longer serve the purpose of democratic 
legitimation and hence the democratic justification for freedom of 
speech will pro tanto diminish. 
This creates what I have elsewhere called “the paradox of public 
discourse”—public discourse can sustain democratic legitimation only 
if it is conducted with a modicum of civility, yet the enforcement of 
civility constrains freedom of speech.113 Different legal systems resolve 
the paradox of public discourse in different ways. The very existence 
of the paradox, however, demonstrates that the right to be forgotten 
can be compatible with the democratic function of public discourse in 
ways that the RTBF cannot. 
In almost all its manifestations, the right to be forgotten seeks to 
reconcile dignitary privacy with public discourse by roughly balancing 
harms to personality against harms to public discourse. This is contrary 
to the approach of the Directive, which asks only if data processing is 
“inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation 
to the purposes of the processing at issue carried out by the operator 
of the search engine.”114 Google Spain adopted the Directive’s 
approach when it went out of its way to emphasize that violations of 
the RTBF could be determined independently of any “prejudice to the 
data subject.”115 Without a conception of harm, however, the CJEU 
effectively deprived itself of the most elementary conceptual resource 
for reconciling the RTBF with the public discourse necessary for 
democratic legitimation. 
 
 112. As a constitutional right, of course, freedom of speech is in one sense inconsistent with 
democracy because it is used to invalidate otherwise democratic and majoritarian legislation. 
Some theories of freedom of expression seek to overcome this paradox by stressing the 
importance in a democracy of communicating information to voters. See generally ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965). 
Such theories stress the right of listeners to receive information. By contrast, theories that stress 
the right of speakers to express themselves typically rest on the relationship between speech and 
the underlying responsiveness of a democratic government. See Robert C. Post, Participatory 
Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 484–85 (2011). 
 113. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 640–44, 680–
84 (1990). 
 114. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 94.  
 115. Id. para. 96. 
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C. Ambiguities in the Google Spain Opinion 
The CJEU was therefore caught in an intellectually intolerable 
position. It solved this problem by constructing an analytic framework 
that moved beyond the four corners of the Directive. Seeking to 
explain why the Directive might require the erasure of Google’s listings 
but not of La Vanguardia’s original webpage, which after all contained 
the actual objectionable personal data, the CJEU asserted: 
Indeed, since the inclusion in the list of results, displayed following a 
search made on the basis of a person’s name, of a web page and of the 
information contained on it relating to that person makes access to 
that information appreciably easier for any internet user making a 
search in respect of the person concerned and may play a decisive role 
in the dissemination of that information, it is liable to constitute a 
more significant interference with the data subject’s fundamental 
right to privacy than the publication on the web page.116 
This reasoning turns on the premise that some violations of privacy are 
“more significant” than others. But this premise cannot be found in the 
Directive, which avoids any such concept of harm and seeks instead to 
entrench a data subject’s abstract right to “control” his personal data. 
At a later point in its opinion, the CJEU referred explicitly to “the 
sensitivity for the data subject’s private life of the information 
contained in” the La Vanguardia “announcements.”117 But the idea 
that some personal data are more sensitive than others is not a concept 
contained in the Directive.118 
From what source, then, did the CJEU derive a “fundamental 
right to privacy” that could be violated in more or less “significant” 
ways? As best I can make out, the CJEU seemed to be appealing to the 
dignitary privacy contained in Article 7 of the Charter.119 In striking 
contrast to Article 8, which makes sense only within a social space that 
is bureaucratically organized, Article 7 invokes the contextual civility 
rules that define the right to be forgotten.120 Because Article 7 of the 
 
 116. Id. para. 87. 
 117. Id. para. 98. 
 118. Both the Directive and the GDPR designate certain “special categories of personal 
data,” as to which especially strict regulations apply. Directive, supra note 5, art. 8; GDPR, supra 
note 17, art. 9. These categories may be thought to designate personal data that may cause 
particular harm if misused. The data at issue in Google Spain were not included within these 
“special categories of personal data.” 
 119. The CJEU refers explicitly to the fundamental rights created by Article 7 as one ground 
of Costeja’s complaint. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 99. 
 120. For a discussion of the differences between a right of privacy and an independent right 
POST IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2018 10:44 AM 
2018] RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 1011 
Charter incorporates the ECtHR’s interpretations of Article 8 of the 
European Convention, the right to be forgotten is likely included in the 
Charter. The ECtHR interprets the right to be forgotten to protect 
dignity against violations of civility rules that can cause greater or lesser 
harms.121 Such civility rules might also justify the conclusion that 
disclosure of information about a sensitive and embarrassing 
bankruptcy is more “harmful” than the disclosure of other forms of 
personal data.122 
The difficulty is that the framework of Article 7 is foreign to the 
conceptual architecture of the Directive, which exemplifies the fair 
information practices established by Article 8. The dignitary privacy of 
Article 7 seeks to protect human personality from the damage caused 
by communications that flout essential norms of respect. Because these 
norms are value-laden and contextual, so is the dignitary privacy 
protected by Article 7, which imagines human personality as essentially 
social. By contrast, the data privacy safeguarded by Article 8 creates 
fair information practices that establish bureaucratic rules to structure 
the decisionmaking of persons who are figured as asocial and 
autonomous.123 
 
to data protection, see generally Orla Lynskey, Deconstructing Data Protection: The ‘Added-
Value’ of a Right to Data Protection in the EU Legal Order, 63 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 569 (2014). 
Lynskey concludes that the CJEU has consistently conflated “the rights to data protection and 
privacy.” Id. at 574–75. She notes that “unlike the notion of ‘privacy interference,’ the concept of 
‘personal data’ is not context-dependent.” Id. at 583. Cf. Julia Ballaschk, In the Unseen Realm: 
Transnational Intelligence Sharing in the European Union—Challenges to Fundamental Rights and 
Democratic Legitimacy, 51 STAN. J. INT’L L. 19, 22–24 (2015) (explaining that the right to privacy 
is a broad concept, within which lies the right to data protection—essentially, the right to 
determine which information about oneself is known to others). 
 121. The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the dignitary privacy rights of 
Article 8 of the Convention to be context dependent and to authorize courts to categorize 
communicative invasions of privacy that produce a “more or less strong sense of intrusion.” 
Couderc & Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, Case No. 40454/07, paras. 86–87, 93 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R., Nov. 10, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158861 [https://perma.cc/U7GA-
EXXT]. The ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 8 of the Convention are directly applicable to the 
meaning of Article 7 of the Charter. See supra note 31. 
 122. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 971 (Ky. 1927) (holding actionable a plaintiff’s 
claim for invasion of privacy against a defendant who published information regarding plaintiff’s 
debt); Post, supra note 106, at 979–81. It is fascinating that the Directive does not classify financial 
data of the kind at issue in Google Spain as a special category of personal data. Directive, supra 
note 5, art. 8; see GDPR, supra note 17, art. 9. 
 123. Some have described the right to data privacy as a 
proactive tool to reduce power and information asymmetries as it strengthens the hand 
of the individual vis-á-vis data controllers and processors. In this regard, the regulatory 
origins of the right to data protection become apparent as these power and information 
asymmetries are market failures which data protection legislation seeks to correct.  
Lynskey, supra note 120, at 592. 
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The CJEU never acknowledged this tension. It seemed 
determined to rest Costeja’s claim on the entirely instrumental premise 
that the Google link was “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, 
or excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing at issue 
carried out by the operator of the search engine.”124 The result was 
neither fish nor fowl; the CJEU purported to apply the logic of the 
Directive but in fact smuggled in normative considerations of harm 
appropriate to Article 7. 
The resulting confusion intensified as the CJEU scrambled to 
determine how the bureaucratic logic of the Directive could be 
rendered compatible with the open processes of public opinion 
formation necessary for democratic legitimacy in a modern state.125 In 
negotiating this difficulty, the CJEU was forced to take yet another 
step away from the conceptual architecture of the Directive. It 
explained that a data subject’s control of personal data could be 
overridden when it was found “for particular reasons, such as the role 
played by the data subject in public life, that interference with his 
fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the 
general public in having, on account of inclusion in the list of results, 
access to the information in question.”126 
There is nothing in the conceptual architecture of the Directive to 
suggest that some data subjects ought to have less control over personal 
data than others.127 The CJEU apparently introduced this distinction 
because it believed it necessary to protect freedom of expression.128 But 
 
 124. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 94; see Eloïse Gratton & Jules Polonetsky, Droit à 
l’oubli: Canadian Perspective on the Global ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Debate, 15 COL. TECH. L.J. 
337, 367–68 (2017); Hillary C. Webb, Note, “People Don’t Forget”: The Necessity of Legislative 
Guidance in Implementing a U.S. Right To Be Forgotten, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1304, 1325 
(2017). 
 125. See POST, supra note 90, at 17–18.  
 126. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 97.  
 127. As the former European Data Protection Supervisor, Peter Hustinx, has noted, “the 
right to data protection,” in contrast to the “right to privacy,” is not sensitive to the public figure 
status of a data subject. “The applicability of the law on data protection is not dependent on 
people’s entitlement to privacy in the handling of their personal information.” See Peter Hustinx, 
Informationsfreiheit und Datenschutz in der Europäischen Union, in DATENSCHUTZ: 
GRUNDLAGEN, ENTWICKLUNGEN UND KONTROVERSEN 322, 322–30 (Jan-Hinrik Schmidt & 
Thilo Weichert eds., 2012).  
 128. The Directive provides that “Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations 
from the provisions of [the Directive] . . . for the processing of personal data carried out solely for 
journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression only if they are necessary to 
reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression.” Directive, supra 
note 5, art. 9. Freedom of expression under Article 11 of the Charter refers to the right to receive 
information, see supra note 93, and it is perhaps to that right that the CJEU is referring when it 
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the distinction required the CJEU to explain how the public might 
come to enjoy a “preponderant interest” in the personal information 
of a data subject.129 
Any such explanation must ultimately rest on an account of the 
 
states that: 
inasmuch as the removal of links from the list of results could, depending on the 
information at issue, have effects upon the legitimate interest of internet users 
potentially interested in having access to that information, in situations such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings a fair balance should be sought in particular between that 
interest and the data subject’s fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. 
Whilst it is true that the data subject’s rights protected by those articles also override, 
as a general rule, that interest of internet users, that balance may however depend, in 
specific cases, on the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the 
data subject’s private life and on the interest of the public in having that information, 
an interest which may vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data 
subject in public life.  
Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 81 (emphasis added); see ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING 
PARTY, GUIDELINES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION JUDGMENT ON “GOOGLE SPAIN AND INC. V. AGENCIA ESPAÑOLA DE PROTECCIÓN DE 
DATOS AND MARIO COSTEJA GONZÁLEZ” C-131/12, para. 8 (2014), http://www. 
dataprotection.ro/servlet/ViewDocument?id=1080 [https://perma.cc/GH56-R74K] (“The interest 
of search engines in processing personal data is economic. But there is also an interest of internet 
users in receiving the information using the search engines. In that sense, the fundamental right 
of freedom of expression, understood as ‘the freedom to receive and impart information and 
ideas’ in Article 11 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, has to be taken into 
consideration when assessing data subjects’ requests.”); Joris van Hoboken, Search Engine Law 
and Freedom of Expression. A European Perspective, FUTURE NON STOP (2009), http://future-
nonstop.org/c/ a2ece341ce5fbc00f9fc58151da8f981 [https://perma.cc/9XJD-6LNQ]. 
 129. American courts sometimes conclude that persons who have sought to play a role “in 
public life” waive their right to privacy. “A person—who by his accomplishments, fame, or mode 
of life, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his 
doings, affairs, or character—is said to become a public personage, and thereby relinquishes a 
part of his right of privacy.” Cohen v. Marx, 211 P.2d 320, 321 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); see 
Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 923 (Cal. 1969) (en banc). Such a person cannot “at his will 
and whim draw himself like a snail into his shell and hold others liable for commenting upon the 
acts which had taken place when he had voluntarily exposed himself to the public eye. As to such 
acts he had waived his right of privacy and he could not at some subsequent time rescind his 
waiver.” Cohen, 211 P.2d at 321. 
This reasoning focuses on the nature of the social norms that define the value of dignitary 
privacy; it specifies the relationship between these norms and concepts like waiver and 
assumption of the risk. In a European context, this reasoning might be incorporated into the 
normative interpretations of privacy required by Article 7. But this reasoning tells us nothing 
about how to evaluate “the interest of the general public” in receiving information. As Kenneth 
Karst once trenchantly pointed out, the reasoning is almost certainly inadequate to explain why 
public figures have diminished rights of privacy. It is “surely mistaken,” Karst wrote, to believe  
that the decisions denying public figures damages for invasion of privacy are based on 
a consent theory. . . . If the mayor or the starlet were expressly to withhold consent to 
publication, the result would not be changed. . . . The reason is not that they have 
consented to the publicity but that the publicity is justified in the public interest, 
whether or not they consent.  
Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored 
Personal Data, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 345 (1966). 
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communicative processes required by a democracy. The Directive does 
not offer any assistance in this regard.130 It merely refers to “freedom 
of expression.”131 For its part, the CJEU does not elucidate what it 
means by a “predominant interest of the general public.” It simply 
asserts, in the climactic paragraph of its opinion: 
As the data subject may, in the light of his fundamental rights under 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, request that the information in 
question no longer be made available to the general public on account 
of its inclusion in such a list of results, those rights override, as a rule, 
not only the economic interest of the operator of the search engine 
but also the interest of the general public in having access to that 
information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name. 
However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular 
reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that 
the interference with his fundamental rights is justified by the 
preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of 
its inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in 
question.132 
In this crucial paragraph, the CJEU cites inconsistent sources of 
law to create a truncated, but more or less explicit, balancing inquiry.133 
On one side there are the harms to privacy inflicted by the Google link. 
These harms are defined in ways that echo the civility norms of Article 
7 insofar as the CJEU can characterize them as especially 
“significant.”134 On the other side, there is the absence of “particular 
reasons” to justify a special public interest in securing the information 
that would be produced by “a search relating to the data subject’s 
name.” Google itself, the CJEU is careful to add, has no interest in 
maintaining the link in question apart from its “economic interest.” 
Hence the outcome of the “balance” is that the Google link must be 
removed.135 
 
 130. Neither does the GDPR. 
 131. Directive, supra note 5, art. 9.  
 132. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 99. 
 133. See supra note 128. 
 134. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 87. 
 135. The court concisely articulated this balance, explaining:  
In the light of the potential seriousness of [the interference in the data subject’s privacy 
rights] . . . it is clear that it cannot be justified by merely the economic interest which 
the operator of such an engine has in that processing. However, inasmuch as the 
removal of links from the list of results could, depending on the information at issue, 
have effects upon the legitimate interest of internet users potentially interested in 
having access to that information, in situations such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings a fair balance should be sought in particular between that interest and the 
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The methodology of this paragraph is entirely outside the legal 
universe of the Directive, which is a sure sign that the CJEU is 
attempting to apply the Directive to a domain of social life for which it 
is mismatched. Because the GDPR will inevitably suffer the same 
mismatch when its RTBF is applied to search engine links, it is worth 
thinking carefully about the kind of balance struck by the CJEU in 
Google Spain. For present purposes, I accept the privacy value ascribed 
by the CJEU to Costeja’s particular information. But I interrogate the 
“public interest” attributed by the CJEU to the Google link. 
The CJEU found an insufficient public interest to limit the 
application of the Directive because Costeja had not sought to play a 
role in public life. This is an obviously incomplete account of the public 
interest in the circulation of information.136 The public certainly has 
strong interests in acquiring personal data with respect to persons who 
for malevolent reasons—like the commission of crime—seek to avoid 
the glare of publicity.137 This suggests that the interests of the public 
cannot be confined to the personal data of those who already play a 
large role in public life. In a democracy, the public interest must extend 
to information about anything that can or will become part of the 
agenda of public action.138 This is a far broader interest than that 
acknowledged by the CJEU. It is in fact so broad that it is difficult to 
cabin.  
More subtly, and more importantly, the public also has a 
fundamental interest in maintaining the integrity of the structure of 
communication that makes public discourse possible. This interest 
persists regardless of the specific content of particular communications 
 
data subject’s fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. Whilst it is true 
that the data subject’s rights protected by those articles also override, as a general rule, 
that interest of internet users, that balance may however depend, in specific cases, on 
the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private 
life and on the interest of the public in having that information, an interest which may 
vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public life. 
Id. para. 81. 
 136. On the narrowness of the Google Spain’s conception of freedom of expression, see Jens 
van den Brink, Missed Opportunity: Dutch Supreme Court Copy-Pastes Google Spain Judgment, 
INFORRM’S BLOG (May 6, 2017), https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2017/05/06/missed-opportunity-
dutch-supreme-court-copy-pastes-google-spain-judgment-jens-van-de-brink/ [https://perma.cc/ 
G9VR-HUPW]. 
 137. Cf. Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), 2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 351 (conceptualizing the 
“vital role” of the press as a “public watchdog”). 
 138. Orla Lynskey observes that the CJEU in Google Spain “appears to assume that when 
the rights to privacy and data protection are at stake the right to freedom of expression extends 
only to ‘public interest’ information – as opposed to information in which the public may have an 
interest.” Lynskey, supra note 83, at 531. 
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within that structure. That is why both the Directive and the GDPR 
provide categorical derogations for journalistic purposes insofar as is 
necessary to protect freedom of expression, regardless of the contents 
of any particular newspaper article.139 
Government regulation of the press triggers concerns for freedom 
of expression in Europe and in the United States because everyone 
understands that the press is a structural precondition for the public 
discourse necessary for self-government. The press is indispensable for 
the capacity “of the members of an organized society, united for their 
common good, to impart and acquire information about their common 
interests.”140 The CJEU fails to distinguish between the public interest 
in a particular article in the press, and the public interest in the press 
itself, which is a structure of communication that creates the public 
sphere within which public opinion can be formed. 
The most important question raised by Google Spain, therefore, is 
whether Google has become, like the modern newspaper, an essential 
component of the communicative infrastructure necessary to sustain 
the public sphere. If it has, the CJEU’s reference to Google’s 
“economic interest” is misleading and gratuitous. It is commonly 
acknowledged that “the newspaper is a private enterprise. Its object is 
to make money for its owner.”141 But the public interest in the press is 
not less because the press is run for profit.142 The CJEU has itself 
recognized that the Directive’s exemption for the processing of data 
for journalistic purposes does not depend upon whether the press is a 
commercial enterprise.143 If Google were indeed properly deemed 
 
 139. GDPR, supra note 17, art. 85; Directive, supra note 5, art. 9. 
 140. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936). 
 141. Charles Dudley Warner, The American Newspaper, in 14 J. SOC. SCI. 52, 52 (1881). 
 142. “That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not 
prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First 
Amendment.” Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952). 
 143. In Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy & Satamedia 
Oy, 2008 ECR I–09831, the CJEU held that Article 9 of the Directive exempts from regulation 
the publication in a newspaper and the commercial sale in the form of CD-ROM discs of publicly 
available tax information about named persons when a national court holds that such 
communication serves journalistic purposes. It concluded that 
the fact that the publication of data within the public domain is done for profit-making 
purposes does not, prima facie, preclude such publication being considered as an 
activity undertaken ‘solely for journalistic purposes’. . . . [E]very undertaking will seek 
to generate a profit from its activities. A degree of commercial success may even be 
essential to professional journalistic activity. . . . [T]he medium which is used to transmit 
the processed data, whether it be classic in nature, such as paper or radio waves, or 
electronic, such as the internet, is not determinative as to whether an activity is 
undertaken ‘solely for journalistic purposes’.  
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comparable to a newspaper, its “economic interest” should be 
irrelevant. 
Google Spain holds, however, that because Internet search 
engines are not journalistic enterprises, they are not exempt from the 
fair information practices of the Directive. It states that—although 
“the processing by the publisher of a web page consisting in the 
publication of information relating to an individual may, in some 
circumstances, be carried out ‘solely for journalistic purposes’ and thus 
benefit, by virtue of Article 9 of Directive 95/46, from derogations from 
the requirements laid down by the directive”—the derogation “does 
not appear to” apply to “the processing carried out by the operator of 
a search engine.”144 
To evaluate this holding, we must explore the relationship 
between the links provided by contemporary Internet search engines 
and the news offered by traditional newspapers. In the next Part of this 
Article, I examine the rise of the contemporary American newspaper 
in an effort to articulate why American law came to regard news as 
essential to the maintenance of public discourse. My hope is to enable 
us more clearly to determine whether Google should be invested with 
the same kind of public interest that we accord to the press. 
The argument I pursue is a structural one: The press serves the 
public interest by sustaining public discourse because it disseminates 
news, which is to say because it publishes texts that both respond to 
and incite general public interest. The public interest of Google ought 
to be evaluated according to the same criteria. 
II.  THE RISE OF A “NEWSPAPERIZED WORLD”145 
In Google Spain, the CJEU gave Google the back of its hand, 
brushing it off as nothing more than a commercial entity bent on 
maximizing profits. Although it recognized a public interest in 
receiving information that might override the privacy protections of 
the Directive, the CJEU failed to theorize what that interest might be. 
In this Part, I recount the rise of the contemporary American 
newspaper in an effort to illuminate the nature of the public interest 
that modern democracies attribute to the press. This interest is not 
merely in the receipt of particular kinds of information, as the CJEU 
 
Id. at paras. 59–60. 
 144. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 85. 
 145. HENRY JAMES, THE NOTEBOOKS OF HENRY JAMES 84–85 (Nov. 17, 1887) (F.O. 
Matthiessen & Kenneth B. Murdock eds., Phoenix ed. 1981) (1947). 
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seems to have thought, but in maintaining the discursive preconditions 
for a “public.” 
If democracy is “the organized sway of public opinion,”146 
democracy must presuppose the existence of a “public” capable of 
possessing an “opinion.”147 A “public” is a specific kind of social 
organization that arises within the “public sphere”148 by uniting 
strangers through common exposure to common texts. A public is “not 
localized in space and time.”149 It is defined “by the fact that its 
members ha[ve] access to the kind of publicness made possible by the 
printed word.”150 A public emerges from “the circulation of texts 
among strangers who become, by virtue of their reflexively circulating 
discourse, a social entity.”151 
The literary critic Michael Warner observes that 
[o]ne of the most striking features of publics, in the modern public 
sphere, is that they can in some contexts acquire agency. . . . They are 
said to rise up, to speak, to reject false promises, to demand answers, 
to change sovereigns, to support troops, to give mandates for change, 
to be satisfied, to scrutinize public conduct, to take role models, to 
deride counterfeits.152 
The CJEU itself in Google Spain engages in precisely this kind of 
personification when it speaks of a “preponderant interest of the 
general public in having . . . access to” particular kinds of 
information.153 It is through their identification as a “public” that the 
people of a country exercise the prerogatives of democracy. That is 
why the sociologist Michael Schudson characterizes the “public” as 
“the fiction that brings self-government to life.”154 The public need not 
be especially rational, as some like Habermas have presupposed.155  
 
 146. CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: A STUDY OF THE LARGER 
MIND 118  (1909) (emphasis added). 
 147. See Michael Schudson, Why Conversation Is Not the Soul of Democracy, 14 CRITICAL 
STUD. MASS COMM. 297, 304–05 (1997). 
 148. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 181 (Thomas Burger trans., 
The MIT Press 1989) (1962); CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 257–87 (1995).  
 149. JOHN B. THOMPSON, THE MEDIA AND MODERNITY: A SOCIAL THEORY OF THE MEDIA 
126 (1995). 
 150. Id. at 126–27. 
 151. MICHAEL WARNER, PUBLICS AND COUNTERPUBLICS 11–12 (2002).  
 152. Id. at 122–23. 
 153. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 99. 
 154. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE POWER OF NEWS 32 (1995). 
 155. HABERMAS, supra note 148, passim; see ANTOINE LILTI, THE INVENTION OF 
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But it must exist in the imagination of a population. 
The pioneering French sociologist Gabriel Tarde, who was one of 
the first to theorize the nature of the public, observed that the people 
who comprise publics do not meet in the public street or in the public 
square, but instead “are all sitting in their own homes scattered over a 
vast territory, reading the same newspaper.”156 Although “[t]he public 
could begin to arise only after the first great development in the 
invention of printing, in the sixteenth century . . . . [t]he true advent . . . 
of the public” occurred with the invention of journalism in the 
eighteenth century.157 For the last several centuries, the press has been 
“the public sphere’s preeminent institution.”158 That is why Thomas 
Jefferson observed in 1787 that 
[t]he basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the 
very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to 
decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or 
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to 
prefer the latter.159 
 
CELEBRITY: 1750–1850, at 9 (Lynn Jeffress trans., Polity Press 2017) (2015) (“[The public is] an 
entire group of anonymous readers who all read the same books and, more and more in the 
eighteenth century, the same newspapers. The public is defined not by rational arguments, but by 
sharing the same curiosity . . . .”). 
 156. GABRIEL TARDE, ON COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 278 (Terry N. Clark 
ed., 1969). 
 157. Id. at 279–80. The story of the rise of newspapers is nicely told in ANDREW PETTEGREE, 
THE INVENTION OF NEWS: HOW THE WORLD CAME TO KNOW ABOUT ITSELF (2014). 
 158. HABERMAS, supra note 148, at 181.  
 159. Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787, in 11 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 48, 49 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955). James Madison reached precisely the same 
conclusion. He observed that “[p]ublic opinion sets bounds to every government, and is the real 
sovereign in every free one.” James Madison, Public Opinion, NAT’L GAZETTE, Dec. 19, 1791, at 
59. He then observed that the circulation of newspapers was essential to the formation of public 
opinion:  
  The larger a country, the less easy for its real opinion to be ascertained, and the less 
difficult to be counterfeited; when ascertained or presumed, the more respectable it is 
in the eyes of individuals. – This is favorable to the authority of government. For the 
same reason, the more extensive a country, the more insignificant is each individual in 
his own eyes. – This may be unfavorable to liberty. 
  Whatever facilitates a general intercourse of sentiments, as good roads, domestic 
commerce, a free press, and particularly a circulation of newspapers through the entire 
body of the people, and Representatives going from and returning among every part of 
them, is equivalent to a contraction of territorial limits, and is favorable to liberty, 
where these may be too extensive. 
Id. The Founders understood the implications of Madison’s analysis, enacting in the Postal Act 
of 1792 favored mailing rates for newspapers. See RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: 
THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN TO MORSE 28–42 (1995); id. at 56 (“With the 
passage of the Post Office Act of 1792 . . . the public sphere became disembodied, that is, it became 
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Newspapers offered a continual and current stream of information 
and opinion that provoked widespread interest and so created an ever-
expanding field of shared textuality. Only a newspaper, Alexis de 
Tocqueville wrote, “can succeed in putting the same thought in a 
thousand minds at the same instant.”160 “[T]he newspaper will create 
an immense, abstract, and sovereign crowd which it will name 
opinion.”161 The social psychologist Charles Cooley put it well in 1909: 
In politics communication makes possible public opinion, which, 
when organized, is democracy. The whole growth of this . . . is 
immediately dependent upon the telegraph, the newspaper and the 
fast mail, for there can be no popular mind upon questions of the day, 
over wide areas, except as the people are promptly informed of such 
questions and are enabled to exchange views regarding them.162 
Two centuries ago, the vast majority of newspapers in the United 
States were “organs of political parties.”163 The “party press . . . came 
to be what we know as a ‘journal of opinion,’”164 in which the editor 
and the opinion page were most prominently featured. But in the 1830s 
“a new breed of urban paper, the so called ‘penny press,’ discovered 
that one could make money by printing local news as well as national 
political news, by hawking newspapers on the street and . . . . by 
lowering the price of a copy from 6 cents to a penny or two.”165A fierce 
competition developed for readers and advertisers. This “marked a 
revolution in American journalism,” which “led to the triumph of 
‘news’ over the editorial and ‘facts’ over opinion, a change which was 
shaped by the expansion of democracy and the market.”166 
The penny press expanded newspaper circulation. It did so by 
inventing “the modern concept of ‘news’”: 
For the first time the American newspaper made it a regular practice 
to print political news, not just foreign but domestic, and not just 
 
identified with a process that existed not in a particular place but rather in the imagination of 
millions of people, most of whom would never meet face–to–face.”). 
 160. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 906 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James 
T. Schleifer trans., 2012) (1840).  
 161. TARDE, supra note 156, at 318. 
 162. COOLEY, supra note 146, at 85. 
 163. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, WHY DEMOCRACIES NEED AN UNLOVABLE PRESS 43 (2008). 
 164. Robert E. Park, The Natural History of the Newspaper, in ROBERT E. PARK, ERNEST W. 
BURGESS & RODERICK D. MCKENZIE, THE CITY 80, 88 (Midway reprint 1984) (1925).  
 165. SCHUDSON, supra note 163, at 43.  
 166. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
NEWSPAPERS 14 (1978). 
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national but local; for the first time it printed reports from the police, 
from the courts, from the streets, and from private households. One 
might say that, for the first time, the newspaper reflected not just 
commerce or politics but social life. To be more precise, in the 1830s 
the newspapers began to reflect, not the affairs of an elite in a small 
trading society, but the activities of an increasingly varied, urban, and 
middle-class society of trade, transportation, and manufacturing.167 
Newspapers hired reporters who fanned out across the urban 
environment and inculcated a “democratic attitude toward the 
happenings of the world: any event, no matter how apparently trivial, 
might qualify for print in a newspaper.”168 The collapse of earlier 
structures of hierarchy and deference,169 celebrated in the boisterous 
egalitarian American democracy described by de Tocqueville, found 
apt expression in the expansion of the concept of news, which reached 
out to include whatever might be of interest to the scrambling interests 
of the newly liberated middling classes. 
Newspapers began to compete in the “commodity” of “news, i.e. 
information respecting recent events in which the public takes an 
interest, or in which an interest can be excited.”170 The penny press 
assigned reporters “to the police, the courts, the commercial district, 
the churches, high society, and sports. The penny papers made the 
‘human interest story’ not only an important part of daily journalism 
but its most characteristic feature.”171 Power within newspapers began 
to shift from editors and the editorial page to “the news and the 
reporter.”172 
 
 167. Id. at 22–23. 
 168. Id. at 28. 
 169. ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
17–18, 38–39 (1995). 
 170. James Parton, The New York Herald, 102 N. AM. REV. 373, 418 (1866). 
 171. SCHUDSON, supra note 166, at 27. George Herbert Mead observed that “an intelligent 
newspaper management . . . can never get far away from the form of the news” which the 
“reveries” of its readers “demand.” George H. Mead, The Nature of the Aesthetic Experience, 36 
INT’L J. ETHICS 382, 390 (1926). Mead observed that in “certain limited fields, such as the stock 
market . . . the truth value of news holds absolutely. Outside of these fields, and the farther one 
gets away from them, the more does the enjoyability, the consummatory value, of the news bulk 
in value on the market. The reporter is generally sent out to get a story, not the facts.” Id.  
 172. Park, supra note 164, at 283. As biographer James Parton put it:  
The word newspaper is the exact and complete description of the thing which the true 
journalist aims to produce. The news is his work; editorials are his play. The news is the 
point of rivalry; it is that for which nineteen twentieths of the people buy newspapers; 
it is that which constitutes the power and value of the daily press; it is that which 
determines the rank of every newspaper in every free country. 
Parton, supra note 170, at 376. 
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The devotion of the penny press to the news was denounced as 
sensationalism.173 It was considered unseemly and improper to expose 
the criminal underbelly of urban life or the balls and parties of high 
society. At root, these denunciations were “a cover for class conflict.”174 
Old elites resented a communicative medium designed to satisfy the 
curiosity of upstart plebeians. This conflict intensified as the nineteenth 
century progressed, and as immigrants, both domestic and foreign, 
poured into American cities. These new residents were mystified by 
the spectacle, by the language, by the complex patterns of the urban 
scene. 
To increase circulation and hence advertising revenue, 
newspapers responded by creating photographs and illustrations, 
larger and darker headlines, abbreviated news stories,175 an ever-
widening variety of topics, comic strips, the potpourri that makes up 
the Sunday paper, and so on.176 In the process they created a mass 
audience.177 On the sidewalk, one could observe a “torrent of 
workingmen pouring down town, many of them reading as they go, and 
most of them provided with a newspaper for dinner-time, not less as a 
matter of course than the tin kettle”; on the street was a “long line of 
hackney-coaches on a stand, nearly every driver sitting on his box 
reading his paper.”178 
From a democratic point of view, the commercial success of 
newspapers was all to the good. It swept up the masses into the reading 
public and produced a sense of belonging that cannot be 
overemphasized. “The newspaper is that which connects each 
individual with the general life of mankind, and makes him part and 
 
 173. In the words of Michael Schudson:   
This accusation was substantiated less by the way the penny papers treated the news 
(there were no sensational photographs, of course, no cartoons or drawings, no large 
headlines) than by the fact that the penny papers would print ‘news’—as we understand 
it—at all. It was common for penny papers, covering a murder trial, to take a verbatim 
transcript of the trial and spread it across most, or all, of the front page. What the six-
penny press decried as immoral was that a murder trial should be reported at all. 
SCHUDSON, supra note 166, at 23. 
 174. Id. at 118–19. 
 175. Newspapers were meant to be read “in an age of hurry . . . . The newspaper is not read 
in the secrecy and silence of the closet as is the book. It is picked up at a railway station, hurried 
over in a railway carriage, dropped incontinently when read.” T.P. O’Connor, The New 
Journalism, in 1 THE NEW REVIEW 423, 434 (Archibald Grove ed., 1889). 
 176. For a study of the content of newspapers at this time, see Delos F. Wilcox, The American 
Newspaper: A Study in Social Psychology, 16 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 56 (1900). 
 177. Samantha Barbas, Saving Privacy from History, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 973, 980 (2012). 
 178. Parton, supra note 170, at 377. 
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parcel of the whole; so that we can almost say, that those who neither 
read newspapers nor converse with people who do read them are not 
members of the human family . . . .”179 There was a “craving” for news 
“and lots of it.”180 On days in New York without newspapers (July 5 
and January 2), 
[a] shadow appears to rest on the world . . . . We are separated from 
our brethren, cut off, lost, alone; vague apprehensions of evil creep 
over the mind. We feel, in some degree, as husbands feel who, far 
from wife and children, say to themselves, shuddering, “What things 
may have happened, and I not know it!” Nothing quite dispels the 
gloom until the Evening Post—how eagerly seized—assures us that 
nothing very particular has happened since our last.181 
Reading newspapers brought the masses into the circle of 
conversation that produced public opinion182 and thereby constructed 
public opinion on a broader and more democratic basis. In turn 
newspapers expanded their circulation by reshaping the commodity of 
news to meet the interests of the masses. Newspapermen justified their 
expansion by claiming to supply “what the public wanted—witness 
their growing sales.”183 By the end of the nineteenth century, 
 
 179. Id.  
 180. Richard Watson Gilder, The Newspaper, the Magazine, and the Public: As Interviewed 
by Clifton Johnson, OUTLOOK, Feb. 4, 1899, at 317, 320. 
 181. Parton, supra note 170, at 377. The feelings of New York residents were studied when 
New York delivery-men went on strike for two weeks in July 1945, and analogous apprehensions 
of “feeling completely lost” without newspapers emerged. See Bernard Berelson, What “Missing 
the Newspaper” Means, in COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH 1948–1949, at 111, 111–29 (Paul F. 
Lazarsfeld & Frank N. Stanton eds., 1949).  
 182. Warner, supra note 141, at 56–57 (“Nothing else ever invented has the public attention 
as the newspaper has, or is an influence so constant and universal. It is this large opportunity that 
has given the impression that the newspaper is a public rather than a private enterprise.”). 
 183. Opinion-Moulding, NATION, Aug. 12, 1869, in 9 THE NATION 121, 127 (1872). The 
Commission on Freedom of the Press analogously described the industry and its growth:  
Information and discussion regarding public affairs, carried as a rider on the omnibus 
of mass communication . . . must be shaped so that they will pay their own way by 
attracting the maximum audience.  
. . . . 
Hence the word “news” has come to mean something different from important new 
information. When a journalist says that a certain event is news, he does not mean that 
it is important in itself. Often it is; but about as often it is not. The journalist means by 
news something that has happened within the last few hours which will attract the 
interest of the customers. The criteria of interest are recency or firstness, proximity, 
combat, human interest, and novelty.  
. . . . 
To attract the maximum audience, the press emphasizes the exceptional rather than 
the representative, the sensational rather than the significant.  
THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 54–55 (1947). 
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newspapers were defining news as “everything that occurs, everything 
. . . which is of sufficient importance to arrest and absorb the attention 
of the public or of any considerable part.”184 Successful editors were 
said to possess the “sixth sense” to discern “what is most likely to 
interest the public . . . to tell the day before or at midnight what the 
world will be talking about in the morning.”185 The news became “what 
Charles A. Dana described it to be, ‘something that will make people 
talk.’”186 News promoted these forms of social solidarity because, in the 
words of social theorist George Herbert Mead, it allowed the reader to 
interpret “his experience as the shared experience of the community of 
which he feels himself to be a part.”187 
Packaged “in the form of small, independent communications that 
can be easily and rapidly comprehended,” news began to perform 
the same functions for the public that perception does for the 
individual man; that is to say, it does not so much inform as orient the 
public, giving each and all notice as to what is going on. It does this 
without any effort of the reporter to interpret the events he reports, 
except in so far as to make them comprehensible and interesting.188 
Because “[i]t is upon the interpretation of present events, i.e., news, 
that public opinion rests,”189 it can be said that “[t]he extent to which 
 
 184. CHARLES A. DANA, THE ART OF NEWSPAPER MAKING 12 (1895). Dana continued:  
There is a great disposition in some quarters to say that the newspapers ought to limit 
the amount of news that they print; that certain kinds of news ought not to be published. 
I do not know how that is. I am not prepared to maintain any abstract proposition in 
that line; but I have always felt that whatever the Divine Providence permitted to occur 
I was not too proud to report.  
Id. Compare this to the contemporaneous credo of the literary realist set forth by William Dean 
Howells: “In life he finds nothing insignificant; all tells for destiny and character; nothing that 
God has made is contemptible. He cannot look upon human life and declare this thing or that 
thing unworthy of notice . . . .” W.D. HOWELLS, CRITICISM AND FICTION AND OTHER ESSAYS 15 
(Clara Marburg Kirk & Rudolf Kirk eds., 1959). 
 185. Warner, supra note 141, at 56. 
 186. Robert E. Park, News as a Form of Knowledge: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge, 
45 AM. J. SOC. 669, 678–79 (1940). 
 187. Mead, supra note 171, at 390. 
 188. Park, supra note 186, at 677. Park continued:  
A news item, as every newspaperman knows, is read in inverse ratio to its length. The 
ordinary reader will read a column and a half of two- or three-line items about men and 
things in the home town before he will read a column article, no matter how advertised 
in the headlines, unless it turns out to be not merely news but a story, i.e., something 
that has what is called technically “human interest.” 
Id. 
 189. Id. Describing the formation of public opinion, the sociologist Carroll Clark noted: 
[T]he human-interest and sensational material on which is centered so largely the 
public’s attention presents exactly those “extraordinary occurrences” that set in motion 
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news circulates within a . . . political society, determines the extent to 
which the members of such a society may be said to participate . . . in 
its political acts.”190 By 1920, Walter Lippmann could write with 
assurance that “democracy is unworkable” and “[p]ublic opinion is 
blockaded . . . if there is no steady supply of trustworthy and relevant 
news.”191 Those excluded from the news could not fully take part in the 
formation “of that public opinion which is the final source of 
government in a democratic state.”192 
Many American elites, however, found the mass appeal of 
newspapers degrading and vulgar. Charles Eliot Norton, the 
aristocratic president of Harvard, sniffed that popular newspapers 
were “largely addressed to a horde of readers who seek in them not 
only the news of the day, but the gratification of a vicious taste for 
strong sensations; who enjoy the coarse stimulants of personalities and 
scandal, and have no appetite for any sort of proper intellectual 
nourishment.”193 Condé Benoist Pallen, the editor of Catholic World, 
recoiled from news columns as “spiced and fetid with all the filth of a 
degraded morale and an infamous taste, designed to cater to the 
morbid imagination of the masses,” and serving up “the record of the 
murders, rapes, hangings, poisonings, incendiarisms, suicides, divorces, 
thefts, burglaries, incests, lusts, and all other abominations perpetrated 
by perverted humanity.”194 The Reverend George T. Rider condemned 
 
the processes of social opinion and provide data for the formation of moral judgments. 
The communications of the general public, then, turn out to be largely concerned with 
getting a basis for a larger common understanding, with funding diverse experiences 
into intelligible wholes,—in short, with establishing a wider consensus and a moral 
order. 
Carroll D. Clark, The Concept of the Public, 13 SW. SOC. SCI. Q. 311, 319 (1933). 
 190. Park, supra note 186, at 677. News is “the stuff which makes political action, as 
distinguished from other forms of collective behavior, possible.” Id. at 678. Hence “[a] man 
without a newspaper is half-clad, and imperfectly furnished for the battle of life.” W.T. Stead, The 
Future of Journalism, 50 CONTEMP. REV. 663, 663 (1886). 
 191. WALTER LIPPMANN, LIBERTY AND THE NEWS 13–14 (Transaction Publishers 1995) 
(1920). He continued:  
It may be bad to suppress a particular opinion, but the really deadly thing is to suppress 
the news. . . . When freedom of opinion is revealed as freedom of error, illusion, and 
misinterpretation, it is virtually impossible to stir up much interest in its behalf. It is the 
thinnest of all abstractions and an over-refinement of mere intellectualism. But people, 
wide circles of people, are aroused when their curiosity is baulked. The desire to 
know . . . is a really powerful motive, and it is that motive that can best be enlisted in 
the cause of freedom. 
Id. at 58–59. 
 192. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 193. Charles Eliot Norton, The Intellectual Life of America, 6 NEW PRINCETON REV. 312, 318 
(1888). 
 194. Condé Benoist Pallen, Newspaperism, 38 LIPPINCOTT’S MONTHLY MAGAZINE 470, 473 
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the Sunday paper as “avowedly and offensively secular,” a “direct and 
deliberate bid for the popular eye and ear in competition with the 
pulpit.”195 
No one more brilliantly expressed the shock and horror of 
newspapers than Henry James, who was appalled at the very thought 
of women reading newspapers at breakfast, wearing that “newspaper 
face, with its mere monstrosity and deformity of feature and the vast 
open mouth, adjusted as to the chatter of Bedlam, that flings the flood-
gates of vulgarity further back than anywhere else on earth.”196 “What 
would be the natural effect,” James, asked, “of all the unashamed 
grossness and blatancy and illiteracy and impudence, what that of the 
perpetual vision of head-lines elongated as to the scream of the 
locomotive[?]”197 
We might dismiss such complaints as the mere grumblings of a 
displaced elite, were it not for the fact that the triumph of news caused 
profound changes in American social and political life that we associate 
with the arrival of modernity, as James’s metaphor of the locomotive 
 
(1886) (emphasis in original). Pallen feared that readers would become acculturated to crime and 
moral iniquity: 
No vicious picture can be moral; and the result of this constant mirroring of vice to the 
public mind is so to habituate and familiarize it with crime and sin that the horror and 
repugnance to which they at first naturally give rise degenerate into an endurance, then 
a pity, and at last, by insensible degrees, into that diseased condition of the imagination 
which does not hesitate to embrace the monster. We hear so much of murder, rape, 
incest, burglary, and the entire catalogue of human atrocities, that we begin to regard 
them as matters of course. 
Id. at 474. 
 195. George T. Rider, The Pretensions of Journalism, 135 N. AM. REV. 471, 479 (1882). 
According to Rider, the Sunday paper 
creeps into houses before breakfast, and spins well its web of thrall and glamour before 
morning service. . . . Theaters and drinking-saloons, with most places of traffic and 
industry, are closed on Sunday. It remains for journalism alone to resist the unanimous 
conclusions of Christian people and profane the Lord’s day in its greed of gain. 
Id. at 480.  
 On the deep tension between the press and traditional forms of authority, see V.S. 
Yarros, The Press and Public Opinion, 5 AM. J. SOC. 372, 375 (1899). As Yarros notes:  
Authority is something totally unknown to the newspaper. The editorial ‘we’ is above 
all. The editor is glad to have the support of authority, but he is not daunted or 
disturbed at finding recognized authority against his position. The mature opinions of 
scholars and experts he treats with a flippancy and contempt which the slightest degree 
of responsibility would render impossible. But the editor is irresponsible. The judicious 
and competent few may laugh at his ignorance and presumption, but the cheap 
applause of the many who mistake smartness for wit and loud assertion for knowledge 
affords abundant compensation. 
Id. at 375. 
 196. Henry James, The Manners of American Women, HARPER’S BAZAR 453, 465 (1907).  
 197. Id. 
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whistle unerringly suggests. Journalism and the news became “the 
sense-making practice of modernity . . . a product and promotor of 
modern life . . . unknown in traditional societies.”198 In the context of 
Google Spain, it is important to stress four ways in which journalism 
helped to produce the distinctively modern public sphere that we now 
take for granted.  
First, the shift from journals of opinion to newspapers undermined 
the influence of cultural elites, who had previously exerted great 
cultural influence through their control of editorial pages. As the 
prestige of editorials in American newspapers “declined”199—far more 
so than in the European press200—it became clear that “editorials 
neither make nor mar a daily paper, that they do not much influence 
the public mind, nor change many votes, and that the power and 
success of a newspaper depend wholly and absolutely upon its success 
in getting and its skill in exhibiting the news.”201 
Insofar as newspapers were significant players in “shaping the 
social and political world,”202 this shift in authority from editorials to 
news undercut elite control over the interpretation of current events. 
 
 198. JOHN HARTLEY, POPULAR REALITY: JOURNALISM, MODERNITY, POPULAR CULTURE 
33 (1996). 
 199. “The news-gathering function, which the American press was the first to bring into 
prominence, has become the most important one, and the critical function has relatively 
declined.” E.L. Godkin, Newspapers Here and Abroad, 150 N. AM. REV. 197, 197–98 (1890); see 
Gilder, supra note 180, at 318 (“The editorial opinion on political movements as expressed in the 
papers doesn’t have the weight with readers it once did. Journalism’s greatest power to-day lies 
in the dissemination of fact rather than in the advocacy of policy . . . .”). 
 200. Godkin, supra note 199, at 198. Commenting on the difference between American and 
European newspapers, Godkin states, 
[a]s a general rule, the American publisher devoted himself to news, and the European 
to criticism or comment. The former found a much larger public which wanted news, 
and cared comparatively little for criticism or literary form; the latter found his account 
in catering for a smaller public, and one more exacting in the matter of taste. 
 Id. at 198. He also adds that 
[t]he stories which Parisian journalists tell each other in their cafés are not of their 
prowess as reporters, but of the sensations they have made and the increase in 
circulation they have achieved by some sort of editorial comment or critique; the 
American passion for and glory in ‘beats’—meaning superiority over rivals in getting 
hold of news—they do not understand, or thoroughly despise. 
Id. at 198, 200; see DANA, supra note 184, at 11. 
 201. Parton, supra note 170, at 376. “The editorial page, once the forum where public opinion 
was expressed,—where the voice of the people was ably crystallized into forcible phrases,—has 
become a little-read and insignificant part of the average paper.” John Henderson Garnsey, The 
Demand for Sensational Journals, 18 ARENA 681, 682 (1897).  
 202. Godkin, supra note 199, at 202. Godkin went so far as to say that newspapers “are, and 
have been for the last half-century, exerting more influence on the popular mind and the popular 
morals than either the pulpit or the book press has exerted in five hundred years.” Id.  
POST IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2018 10:44 AM 
1028  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:981 
Editorials are “for the intellectuals,” sociologist Robert E. Park wrote 
in 1941, but “[t]he news . . . is for the great mass of mankind.”  
[P]ublic opinion formed on the basis of the news represents the 
interpretation of events which each individual makes for himself in 
accordance with his individual interests, prejudices, and predilections, 
qualified by the interpretation which other individuals with whom he 
has discussed the matter have made of the same events. . . . 
[T]he effect of news on public opinion is just the opposite of that of 
the editorial, which seeks to focus attention on a principle or program 
for political action. As a matter of fact, news tends to disintegrate 
political principles, doctrines, and dogmas that have been necessarily 
formulated out of the experience of an earlier time. . . . [W]hen great 
and rapid changes are taking place, it is difficult for editorial programs 
and political policies to keep pace with events. In such periods it is the 
interpretation which the great mass of the readers finally agrees to 
put upon events that makes public opinion.203 
This shift was essentially democratic, because it allowed public 
opinion to be influenced from the bottom up, from the innumerable 
conversations provoked by the innumerable readers of the day’s news. 
“The efficient mechanics of the modern press make it possible for sixty 
million people to read of any important event at the same moment and 
in the same amazing detail,” observed the great New York Times editor 
Charles Merz in 1928.204 The natural corollary was that “[w]hen it 
comes to focusing the attention of the whole nation searchingly upon a 
single subject, and giving it a single set of facts on which to test its moral 
values, it is doubtful whether anything really unifies the country like its 
murders.”205 
By presenting the news in disjunct and parataxic fashion, 
newspapers effectively “trained their readers in the apprehension of 
 
 203. Robert E. Park, News and the Power of the Press, 47 AM. J. SOC. 1, 10–11 (1941). Of 
course newspapers quickly learned the art of seeking to influence public opinion by manipulating 
their presentation of the news:  
The editor does not expect to form public opinion so much by arguments and appeals 
as by the news he presents, and his manner of presenting it; by the iteration of an idea 
until it becomes familiar; by the reading matter selected, and by the quotations of 
opinions as news, and not professedly to influence the reader. And this influence is all 
the more potent because it is indirect and not perceived by the reader. 
Warner, supra note 141, at 66; see Opinion-Moulding, supra note 183, at 126 (“In fact, though 
they make no comments whatever, they are able, by their mode of reporting the events of the day, 
to mould public opinion completely.”). 
 204. CHARLES MERZ, THE GREAT AMERICAN BAND WAGON 71 (1928). 
 205. Id.  
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detached, independent, reified, decontextualized ‘articles’” that 
normalized “the apparently irreducible fragmentation of daily 
experience.”206 This fragmentation embodied the disintegration of 
traditional cultural narratives and unsettled old elites. They 
experienced journalism as “the parent of anarchy, destructive of free 
institutions and of social order” because productive of a “readiness to 
question and to resist the exercise of authority” by those entitled to 
lead due to their “superior character, intelligence, and education.”207 
From the perspective of those accustomed to controlling the standards 
and principles of society, newspapers missed “the really serious 
happenings” and instead concentrated on “sensations, crimes, scandals 
or gossip” designed “to amuse, entertain and excite” the great mass of 
readers, and so lead the public “not only into the regions of disjointed 
thinking but into absolutely wrong thinking.”208 
Second, the triumph of news created a public sphere of enormous 
and irresistible social significance and appeal. To be cut off from the 
circulation of news was to be thrown outside of current events; it was 
to be excommunicated from the formation of common sentiments and 
attitudes and the shared interpretation of common experience. Hence 
the startling emergence of “an inordinate hunger and thirst for” 
news,209 which was in fact a craving for the texts of newspapers. In fact 
the enticement of public texts began to compete with the pull of 
ordinary embodied life. Consider, for example, Charles Cooley’s 
comment on the “strange practice, . . . . when you think of it, that a man 
should sit down to his breakfast table and, instead of conversing with 
his wife, and children, hold before his face a sort of screen on which is 
inscribed a world-wide gossip!”210 
As attention to the public sphere grew, so did the demand that 
public texts offer vivid, vicarious experience. The lure of the public 
sphere was enhanced by the spectacular growth of visual 
representations. By the end of the nineteenth century, there was a large 
and insatiable demand for illustrations and photographs, which were 
felt to provide a more accessible and immediate access to the events 
and persons described in the news. It was believed, for example, that 
 
 206. RICHARD TERDIMAN, DISCOURSE/COUNTER-DISCOURSE: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF SYMBOLIC RESISTANCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 122, 125 (1985). 
 207. Charles Eliot Norton, Some Aspects of Civilization in America, 20 FORUM 641, 647, 650 
(1896). 
 208. Jno. Gilmer Speed, Do Newspapers Now Give the News?, 15 FORUM 705, 709–11 (1893). 
 209. Rider, supra note 195, at 478. 
 210. COOLEY, supra note 146, at 83. 
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“[t]he physiognomy of a candidate for office is an important object for 
public scrutiny as it betokens character. . . .”211 The pressure for new 
and expanded forms of visibility importantly modified existing norms 
of reticence.212 Earlier in the century the use of unauthorized portraits 
would have been condemned as “invasions of the right of privacy.”213 
But by the end of the nineteenth century unauthorized visual 
representations of public figures became acceptable.214  
When a bill was introduced into the New York legislature to make 
it a crime “to print or publish in any newspaper, periodical, pamphlet 
or book ‘any portrait or alleged portrait of any person or individual 
living in this State without have first obtained his or her written 
consent,’” the pro-privacy New York Times applauded the intent to 
suppress “the outrageous invasion of private rights which has become 
so common in publishing portraits of persons who have no relation to 
 
 211. Wilbur Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 694, 701 (1912). 
 212. For a brilliant study of this topic, see generally ROCHELLE GURSTEIN, THE REPEAL OF 
RETICENCE: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S CULTURAL AND LEGAL STRUGGLES OVER FREE 
SPEECH, OBSCENITY, SEXUAL LIBERATION, AND MODERN ART (1996). “[T]he dominance of the 
visual image in contemporary culture and the technology that makes it possible to capture and, in 
an instant, universally disseminate a picture or sound allows us, and leads us to expect, to see and 
hear what our great-grandparents could have known only through written description.” Shulman 
v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 473–74 (Cal. 1998). 
 213. John Gilmer Speed, The Right of Privacy, 163 N. AM. REV. 64, 73 (1896). Even now 
“[t]he image, a constitutive element of the person, occupies a privileged position in the protection 
of privacy in French law in reference to the ‘moral interests of the person.’ . . . French law 
mandates explicit consent of a person for any publication of her image: the publication of pictures 
taken without a person’s knowing is held to be a violation of ‘right upon one’s image,’ whether 
she is in a public or in a private place and whether the person is a public figure or not.” Ioanna 
Tourkochoriti, Speech, Privacy and Dignity in France and in the U.S.A.: A Comparative Analysis, 
38 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 244 (2016). On the changes wrought by “the visual 
culture of celebrity,” see LILTI, supra note 155, at 261–66. 
 214. According to W. Archibald McClean: 
There is a distinction, however, between a public and private character. A private 
individual should be protected against the publication of any portraiture of himself, but 
where an individual becomes a public character, the case is different. A statesman, 
author, artist, or inventor who asks for and desires public recognition, may be said to 
have surrendered his right to the public. When anyone obtains a picture or photograph 
of such a person and there is no breach of contract or violation of confidence in the 
method by which it was obtained he has the right to reproduce it, whether in 
newspaper, magazine or book. It would be extending this right of protection too far to 
say that the general public can be prohibited from knowing the personal appearance of 
great public characters. Such characters may be said of their own volition to have 
dedicated to the public, the right of any fair portraiture of themselves. 
The Right of Privacy, 15 GREEN BAG 494, 495 (1903). In Great Britain “Queen Victoria 
inaugurated an era in which images of leaders were widely distributed, thanks to numerous kinds 
of media, aimed at the governed. Therefore, the image of incarnated power became both more 
banal, because it was an object of cheap consummation, and more powerful, capable of 
profoundly affecting feelings of loyalty or repudiation.” LILTI, supra note 155, at 249. 
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the public that makes them proper subjects of representation in the 
public prints.”215 But the Times nevertheless criticized the statute in 
part because it failed to penalize representations of private persons in 
print.216 “The invasion of privacy may be perpetrated quite as 
offensively in language as in portraiture,” the Times asserted. “To 
describe the looks, peculiarities, manners, dress, and conduct of 
persons in their private relations . . . and to parade these details in print 
without the consent and against the wishes of such persons, is just as 
offensive as printing their portraits or alleged portraits, and may be 
made much more so, since the pictorial facility of the pen is greater 
than that of the pencil.”217  
The objection well illustrates the continuity of graphic and 
linguistic forms of representation.218 Both are texts that circulate in the 
public sphere. The Times conceded in its discussion of the bill that it 
was appropriate to publish the portraits of public figures because such 
illustrations were responsive to the expectations of readers that the 
public sphere, properly defined, reproduce an immediacy and intimacy 
 
 215. The Protection of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 1897), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/ 
archive-free/pdf?res=9F04E4D61F31E132A25757C1A9659C94669ED7CF [https://perma.cc/88
TP-9U76].  
 216. The Times also criticized the proposed New York statute because it failed to distinguish 
between private persons and truly public persons, whose status made them a fit object of 
portraiture. Id. For examples of the Times affirming the rights of private persons to prevent 
graphic forms of representation, see The Right to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1891, p. 4; The 
Right to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1895, p. 4; The Right to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1903, 
p. 6 (approving the horsewhipping by socialite Reggie Vanderbilt “of a ‘yellow gent’ with a 
camera who, he imagined, had placed himself at the side of the road which MR. REGGIE and the 
young lady to whom he is about to be married were apparently about to traverse,” but contrasting 
Vanderbilt to “the President of the United States” who “is, ex officio, a public and kodakable 
character. The public has rights in him.”). 
 217. The Protection of Privacy, supra note 215; see McClean, supra note 214, at 497 (“Will not 
a pen picture as vividly portray the subject and invade privacy? May not a pen portrait offend the 
feelings and distress the subject more acutely than any other reproduction of a likeness? If so, 
why should it not be restrained as a violation of the right of privacy?”); Samuel D. Warren & 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213–14 (1890) (“The right of one 
who has remained a private individual, to prevent his public portraiture, presents the simplest 
case [for a right to privacy;] the right to protect one’s self from pen portraiture, from a discussion 
by the press of one’s private affairs, would be a more important and far-reaching one.”). There 
are some reasons to believe that Brandeis later changed his position about the relative importance 
of protecting civility and protecting freedom of expression. See, e.g., NEIL RICHARDS, 
INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 30–33 (2015). 
 218. But see Portraiture and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 1897), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
abstract.html?res=9406E4DB1E39E433A25750C0A9609C94669ED7CF&legacy=true [https:// 
perma.cc/TC4N-KAPH] (“It is true that the impertinence of a detailed description of the 
appearance and dress of a private person may be as impertinent as the unauthorized publication 
of the pretended portrait of such a person. But it does not produce the same effect.”). 
POST IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2018 10:44 AM 
1032  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:981 
associated with everyday face-to-face, nontextual life.219 In our own 
time, this expectation has blossomed into the plethora of “reality” TV 
programs in which the public sphere weirdly mirrors the quotidian 
events of our own lives in the form of publicly circulating audiovisual 
texts. 
Third, the increasingly pervasive dimensions of the mass public 
sphere produced the experience that it was more influential, more 
important, more real than the day-to-day interactions of everyday 
life,220 which were conducted on a far smaller scale.221 As a result there 
arose what James called “that mania for publicity which is one of the 
most striking signs of our times.”222 Contemporaries were impressed by 
how “the passion for notoriety of any kind has been fostered to such 
an extent by this wide diffusion of printed gossip, that there is a large 
number of people who do not dislike it, but on the contrary put 
themselves in the way of having their private life explored by the 
press.”223 They found it remarkable that “[m]ost people crave to be 
lifted out of the morass of anonymity. Any public attention, no matter 
how foolish it makes them look, is better than none.”224 The triumph of 
 
 219. See The Protection of Privacy, supra note 215; see also Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 
441, 444–45 (Cal. 1953); H.L. Smith, The News Camera on Trial, 98 FORUM & CENTURY 267 
(1937).  
 220. As the character of Howard Beale (played by Peter Finch) chides his TV audience in the 
film NETWORK (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1976), “You’re beginning to think that the tube is reality 
and that your own lives are unreal.” 
 221. SCHUDSON, supra note 154, at 19–20. 
 222. JAMES, supra note 145, at 82. See generally RICHARD SALMON, HENRY JAMES AND THE 
CULTURE OF PUBLICITY (1997) (exploring the concept of publicity in the writings of Henry 
James). 
 223. E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen. IV.—To His Own Reputation, 8 SCRIBNER’S 
MAGAZINE 58, 66 (1890). Charles Dudley Warner, commenting on “the mania in this age, and 
especially in America, for notoriety, in social life as well as in politics,” remarked: 
Almost everybody talks about the violation of decency and the sanctity of private life 
by the newspaper in the publication of personalities and the gossip of society. And the 
very people who make these strictures are often those who regard the paper as without 
enterprise and dull if it does not report in detail their weddings, their balls and parties, 
the distinguished persons present, the dress of the ladies, the sumptuousness of the 
entertainment, if it does not celebrate their church services and festivities, their social 
meetings, their new house, their distinguished arrivals at this or that watering-place. 
Warner, supra note 141, at 61–62. 
 224. Mitchell Dawson, Law and the Right of Privacy, 67 AM. MERCURY 397, 404 (1948) 
[hereinafter Dawson, Law]. “The average newspaper reader would give what passes for his soul 
to strut just once across the headlines in any role, no matter how ignominious. . . . [T]he 
majority . . . step eagerly into the range of every newspaper and movie camera, and send in their 
names by the thousand to have them announced over the radio. In this way, or by the more 
arduous means of marathon dancing or flagpole sitting, every undistinguished ego may escape 
anonymity for at least a few brief ecstatic moments.” Mitchell Dawson, Paul Pry and Privacy, 150 
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news made people hunger not only to read the news, but also to enter 
the textual world of media by becoming news.225 
As news became “a dominant force in the public construction of 
common experience,” it also became an arbiter of the “popular sense 
of what is real and important.”226 Thus “some people think that no 
pleasure is fully enjoyed until an account of it is published.”227 To such 
persons “the journalist is the man who holds the key of their paradise,” 
and they will voluntarily cede to him elaborate accounts of their own 
private entertainments—“that Mrs. A. wore a dress made en train, and 
Mrs. B. one with a waist cut a la Pompadour, and Miss C. carried a 
panier, and Miss D. something fichu.”228 “The people whose names are 
printed are shocked . . . they declare . . . that they are disgusted with 
the prying, vulgar newspaper that contains them; but they want to see 
the paper, and they run their eyes down the column in search of the 
names of their friends.”229 In this way, the triumph of news not only 
undermined traditional elite etiquette from within, but it also brought 
public attention and significance to the “unimportant persons” singled 
 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 385, 387 (1932); see Meyer Berger, Surrender of Privacy, SCRIBNER’S 
MAG., Apr. 1939, at 16. 
 225. “[T]he passion for notoriety on the part of obscure people” is “one of the strongest of 
social forces today.” The Right to Privacy, 51 NATION 496, 497 (1890).  
 226. SCHUDSON, supra note 163, at 13. Schudson describes the role of a news story in 
validating public attention: 
A news story is an announcement of a special kind. It is not like an advertisement, the 
self-interested purpose of which one can presume. It is not like a public relations event, 
which is suspect on its face. It is a declaration by a familiar commercial or state agency, 
staffed by news professionals, that an event is noteworthy. It announces to audiences 
that a topic deserves public attention. 
Id. at 31; see Richard Grant White, The Pest of the Period: A Chapter of the Morals and Manners 
of Journalism, 9 THE GALAXY: AN ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINE OF ENTERTAINING READING 102, 
107 (1870) (“The mere mention of a man in connection with public affairs by a newspaper of any 
position gives him a certain importance, or at least the notoriety which it is his object to attain.”). 
 227. White, supra note 226, at 106. 
 228. Id.  
 229. Charles Dudley Warner, Newspapers and the Public, 9 FORUM 198, 204 (1890). It was for 
this reason difficult “to persuade the people who publish these things that the people about whom 
they are published really dislike them.” The Right to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 1889), http:// 
query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B05E3DA163BE033A25756C1A9659C94689F 
D7CF [https://perma.cc/55MK-HDQY]. This was especially true because 
[e]xperience leads them to the contrary conclusion—that the subjects enjoy and take a 
pride in elaborate descriptions of themselves and their belongings so long as the 
description is admiring and not satirical. This is so far true that most women who take 
part in social ‘functions’ of which descriptions appear in the newspapers would 
probably regard themselves as rather slighted than honored if the dresses of their 
neighbors were described and their own were omitted. 
Id. 
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out for attention by reporters, thereby disrupting traditional standards 
of merit.230 
Finally, the triumph of news created not only the urgent need to 
become visible by being the object of press attention,231 but also the 
irresistible urge to see, to shine “[t]he white light of publicity”232 
wherever public curiosity might be aroused. James had it exactly right 
when he observed that “[o]ne sketches one’s age but imperfectly if one 
doesn’t touch on that particular matter: the invasion, the impudence 
and shamelessness, of the newspaper and the interviewer, the 
devouring publicity of life, the extinction of all sense between public 
and private. It is the highest expression of the note of ‘familiarity,’ the 
sinking of manners, in so many ways, which the democratization of the 
world brings with it.”233 
The press was shameless because it refused to be bound by the 
“manners” that defined elite society.234 The press was accused of 
“overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and 
of decency.”235 It overstepped by unleashing a “flood of journalistic 
filth issuing from the great cities”236 that spilled across domestic 
thresholds, puddling on the breakfast table where it spoke of things 
that a man ought not be able to “tell his wife and children face to face. 
 
 230. White, supra note 226, at 106.  
 231. For a discussion of the resulting “struggles for visibility” which have come to dominate 
the public sphere, see THOMPSON, supra note 149, at 245–47. 
 232. McClean, supra note 214, at 494. 
 233. JAMES, supra note 145, at 82. 
 234. On these manners, see Norton, supra note 207, at 645, decrying the “gross[] exhibition of 
boorishness tha[t] was recently displayed by the well-to-do-crowds at the Horse Show in New 
York, in their behavior toward the young Duke and Duchess of Marlborough[]—women and men 
crowding and hustling to get a place from which to stare at the newly-married pair, vying with 
each other in the shameless manifestation of the want of self-respect, as well as of decent regard 
not merely to conventional but to actual propriety.” 
 235. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 217, at 196; see White, supra note 226, at 105 (“This sort 
of journalism is carried beyond the bounds of the commonest decency.”). White continued: 
In regard to persons, the rule of decent journalism is very clear and very easy to be 
followed. It is to respect absolutely the barrier of private life. A man’s public course, 
his speech, his book, his picture, his suit at law, his breach of the public peace, his 
contract with the Government, whatever, in brief, brings him into relations with the 
public, is proper subject of comment with the journalist. But his personal affairs, his 
relations with his family, his friends, acquaintances, clients and customers, no man has 
a right to bring before the public but himself; and for him to do so is a breach of good 
taste which an editor should not permit, except in the way of paid advertisement. For 
the journalist to pass the barrier of private life, whether to praise or to blame, should 
be by law, in itself, a libel. 
White, supra note 226, at 111–12. 
 236. Garnsey, supra note 201. 
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Our ‘dailies’ at present are rarely fit for home-reading without 
thorough expurgation.”237 It overstepped by prying into the details of 
personal life. “[J]ournalism plucks off the roof, and pulls down the 
walls and sheltering partitions, and wantonly lays bare all the 
defilement and consuming lust of poor human nature.”238 It 
overstepped by using its “hungry eyes” to violate “the sanctities of 
domestic life and marriage,” and to “peer into private houses, study 
banquets, balls, teas,—read the tempting menus by this great caterer, 
criticise the ‘decorations’ by that crack florist, note the brands of 
champagne, audit the very sum-total of the outlay . . . .”239 
James was correct that the overstepping of newspapers corroded 
conventional boundaries. Newspapers overstepped “to gratify the 
curiosity”240 of a mass public, and so to increase circulation and 
profit.241 From one point of view, therefore, the commercial market was 
eroding essential conventions of life, conventions that the novelist 
William Dean Howells called the “tissue of hypocrisies, beginning with 
the clothes in which we hide our nakedness” that make up “society, as 
we have it.”242 But from another point of view newspapers were 
responding to a mass public that wanted to understand the society 
around them. Refugees and strangers of all stripes, “[g]reenhorn 
immigrants, women entering a freer life, and recent arrivals from the 
country,”243 all unacquainted with the niceties of social conventions, 
 
 237. Rider, supra note 195, at 476; see Speed, supra note 208, at 708–09. 
 238. Rider, supra note 195, at 477. “A man’s private life is inviolably his own, be he the 
lowliest or the highest in the land, be he the most prominent official or the obscurest citizen. Over 
his own threshold it is lawful for no intruder to put his foot.” Pallen, supra note 194, at 476. 
 239. Rider, supra note 195, at 479. 
 240. White, supra note 226, at 102. White continued: 
The first object of the journalist’s life, in his opinion, is to excite and to gratify the 
curiosity of his readers, at whatever cost. Therefore if he hear a flying report which 
couples the names of a man and a woman, either of whom is distinguished enough or 
rich enough to be talked about by a few hundred people, he announces their 
engagement, in doing which he generally does no greater wrong than the publication 
to the world of what is of no consequence to any person outside of their circle of 
personal acquaintance, in this being guilty of an impertinence for which he should be 
punished. 
Id. at 102–03. 
 241. How is it, American essayist and novelist Charles Dudley Warner asked, “that the 
newspapers most sensational, most vulgar, most chaotically conducted, are precisely those that 
have the largest circulation?” Warner, supra note 229, at 200; see The Right to Privacy, supra note 
225, at 497 (noting “the great commercial demand for scandal and gossip” and observing that 
newspapers featuring such content generated “the very greatest and most rapid commercial 
successes of our day” in proportion to how “plentifully” they could “supply this demand”).  
 242. HOWELLS, supra note 184, at 280. 
 243. Helen MacGill Hughes, Human Interest Stories and Democracy, 1 PUB. OPINION Q. 73, 
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were curious about every aspect of urban life. They wanted to make 
sense of the richness and wonder of their own experience. 
Seen from this angle, James was also accurate to connect the loss 
of privacy to “the democratization of the world.” The privacy devoured 
by newspapers, like the privacy at issue in Article 7 of the Charter, 
exists only as it is defined and constituted by customs and mores. 
Customs and mores are always relative to a given group or class. As 
The Nation observed, “privacy has a different meaning to different 
classes or categories of persons; it is, for instance, one thing to a man 
who has always lived in his own house, and another to a man who has 
always lived in a boarding-house.”244 Given “the extremely democratic 
condition of American society,”245 those in boarding houses were not 
inclined to let the scruples of those in mansions frustrate their efforts 
to comprehend their urban environment.246 For their part, elites 
regarded the responsiveness of newspapers to public curiosity as 
“pandering to the baser tastes and dispositions of the community,”247 
to “the taste and standards of judgment of the uneducated and 
unrefined masses, over those of the more enlightened and better-
instructed few.”248 
From this perspective, the responsiveness of newspapers to 
consumer demand was ultimately a political question. The broader the 
public to which newspapers responded, the more democratic was the 
 
82 (1937). 
 244. The Right to Privacy, supra note 225, at 497. 
 245. Godkin, supra note 223, at 67. 
 246. “In all democratic societies to-day the public is disposed either to resent attempts at 
privacy, either of mind or body, or turn them into ridicule. There is nothing democratic societies 
dislike so much to-day as anything which looks like what is called ‘exclusiveness,’ and all regard 
for or precautions about privacy are apt to be considered signs of exclusiveness.” The Right to 
Privacy, supra note 225, at 496–497. 
 247. Norton, supra note 207, at 647. 
 248. Norton, supra note 193, at 321. In explaining the attraction of the news, George Herbert 
Mead stressed the “inchoate phenomenon of the human reverie, which the press and the movie 
have projected before us”: 
We are apt to consider it as a purely private affair with each individual, his desultory 
meanderings of idea and purpose and imagery, perhaps more gruesomely presented in 
James Joyce’s Ulysses, than elsewhere in literature. It is, indeed, infected with privacy 
and therefore subject to disintegration. But it passes into the universal meanings of 
common discourse and co-operative effort . . . . It is that part of the inner life of man 
which cannot be given its implicated meaning because of the incompleteness of social 
organization. It marks man’s isolation within society. We have decried its vulgarity 
when the daily press and the movie films have stripped off its privacy. It is better, 
however, to live with our problems than to ignore them. 
Mead, supra note 171, at 393. 
POST IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2018 10:44 AM 
2018] RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 1037 
public sphere which they created.249 That is why our most thoughtful 
media analysist, Michael Schudson, has concluded that “a media 
system dedicated to democracy” should aspire to “provide the quantity 
and quality of news that people want; that is, the market should be the 
criterion for the production of news. (In other words, the news media 
should adhere to the rule that many critics insist drives the press toward 
the sensational, the prurient, and the trivial.)”250 Schudson’s conclusion 
expresses the principle that in a democracy the interests of the public 
must set the agenda for government action and not the other way 
around. Were the state on grounds of “taste” and “judgment” to curtail 
the circulation of news interesting to the public, government would in 
effect be setting its own agenda. 
This tension played out in especially stark terms at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Americans were then fascinated with 
“personalities”; they took “an interest in humanity, a lively concern in 
the fortunes of others,” which no doubt was “due to the fluid, changing 
nature of our society, the possibility of its ups and downs, which keeps 
everyone on the qui vive.”251 In politics also “the real interest of the 
voter at our elections is usually in personality. . . . On this shrewd 
judgment of persons the advocate of democracy chiefly grounds his 
faith that the people will be right in the long run.”252 
To provide information about personality, however, was directly 
to challenge “the traditional reserve of educated people.”253 Journalists 
nevertheless forthrightly defended their reporting on the details of 
personal life: 
There was a day when any allusion to the personal appearance, the 
habits, the clothes, or the home and social life of any person, would 
have been resented as an impertinence and almost as an 
indecency. . . . But . . . I hold the desire for personal details with regard 
to public men is healthy, rational, and should be yielded to. Statesmen 
are not ciphers without form or blood or passion. Their utterances 
 
 249. It is noteworthy that at about this time American public libraries began to shift their 
sense of mission from providing the public with the best books available for their education, to 
meeting the demand for books that the public wanted to read. ARTHUR E. BOSTWICK, THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC LIBRARY 1–4 (1929); WAYNE BIVENS-TATUM, LIBRARIES AND THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT 133–34 (2012). This shift in function was highly controversial. 
 250. SCHUDSON, supra note 154, at 28–29. 
 251. Warner, supra note 229, at 203. “[A] new society is naturally more interested in the 
details of its evolution than an old and settled society in which fortunes are fixed and changes are 
rare.” Id. at 203–04.  
 252. COOLEY, supra note 146, at 143. 
 253. In Defence of Privacy, 130 SATURDAY REV. 155, 155 (Aug. 21, 1920). 
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and acts are not pure intellectual secretions. If you want to know how 
such and such an act of weakness or folly is intelligible at some crisis 
in the history of a politician, you must have learned something more 
of the politician than you can get from the verbatim report of his 
speeches, or the colourless and dry language of his public documents. 
Behind every speech and every act there is the man—a weak man or 
a strong man, high or low, generous in purpose or base in intrigue. 
You cannot get rid of this background if you want to describe the 
event accurately.254 
The search for “personal details” was particularly urgent because 
of the growing conviction that public actions and professions were 
masks that disguised real or authentic personality, which was thought 
to be revealed only in private where persons were free from “the 
contrived, mannered self-presentation” characteristic of the public 
sphere.255 Public curiosity thus focused ever more sharply on domains 
previously deemed private. Journalists developed techniques to expose 
these domains. A good example is the journalistic “interview,” which 
was at first condemned as an impertinent intrusion,256 but which was 
defended as “the only means by which the public can learn some things 
which it has a distinct right to know and which it is the interest of 
designing persons to conceal.”257 The rapid expansion of photographic 
journalism was another technique to render visible candid views that 
the public would not otherwise be able to see.258 
As a result of these developments, it became clear that by the 
middle of the twentieth century, except in cases of especially heinous 
invasions of privacy, “a man’s life belongs to Demos. The People want 
 
 254. O’Connor, supra note 175, at 423, 428–29. 
 255. CHARLES L. PONCE DE LEON, HUMAN-INTEREST JOURNALISM AND THE EMERGENCE 
OF CELEBRITY IN AMERICA 1890–1940, at 29 (2002). Leon continues: 
By the mid-nineteenth century the residents of cities in the United States, England, and 
many areas of Western Europe had concluded that everyone employed fronts when in 
public, and that all self-presentation in the public sphere was, to one degree or another, 
artificial and unreliable as a guide to a person’s real self. When encounter[ing] a person 
in the public sphere it was safe to assume that she was acting, engaged in the perpetual 
confidence games that had come to shape social and economic relations in cities and 
would eventually become a salient feature of modern life. To glimpse a person’s real 
self it was necessary to see her in private, when she dropped her front and refrained 
from the contrived, mannered self-presentation that she adopted in the public sphere. 
Id. 
 256. O.B. Frothingham, The Interviewer, FORUM, Apr. 1886, at 183. The Abolition of Privacy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 1874), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=990DEED9143 
BEF34BC4C53DFBE66838F669FDE [https://perma.cc/CB8Q-VPR7]. 
 257. The Interview, NEW PRINCETON REV., Jan. 1887, at 127. 
 258. Speed, supra note 213, at 73. 
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to know how he looks, how he lives, how he loves and every other detail 
that reporters and cameramen care to exploit.”259 
III.  GOOGLE AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
The creation of a mass public oriented around the consumption of 
news effaced boundaries that had previously separated private from 
public life. It did so through the medium of newspapers, which 
functioned as agents of a growing public curiosity fueled by an 
emergent mass participation in the public sphere. As the textual world 
of the public sphere came to seem more real and important, its 
demands increasingly came to dominate prior customs and mores, 
which in the United States began to fade into the pale and etiolated 
world of cloistered elites. These developments were self-enforcing. 
One of my favorite Norman Lincoln Rockwell illustrations 
portrays a young girl of about eight or nine in a drab white nightgown, 
gazing wistfully into a full-length mirror in the attic.260 At her feet are 
a comb, brush and opened lipstick; on her lap is a black-and-white 
photograph of a glamorous movie star in a magazine. The girl identifies 
with a celebrity whom she has encountered only through media; she is 
striving to make herself into an image that comes to her only as text 
circulating in the public sphere. She is learning to imagine herself as a 
member of a public. The photograph of the celebrity, even though it is 
without color, has assumed for her an importance and reality that 
eclipses her seemingly dull everyday existence. Her actual life is at risk 
of being displaced by the immense and irresistible force of media 
textuality. 
As the press satisfied the curiosity of ordinary people, ordinary 
people came to identify with the texts circulated in the public sphere 
by the press.261 This cycle of gratification and identification created a 
powerful structure of mutual interdependence that could not be 
interrupted without the exercise of considerable social authority. But 
as norms of privacy inconsistent with the demands of the public sphere 
came to seem increasingly elitist and self-serving, the source of any 
such authority was less and less obvious.262 As a sociological matter, 
 
 259. Dawson, Law, supra note 224, at 397.  
 260. This painting was the cover of the Saturday Evening Post on March 6, 1954. For a black-
and-white reproduction, see infra Appendix. 
 261. See THOMPSON, supra note 151, at 211. 
 262. One may perhaps speculate that norms of privacy have remained much stronger in 
Europe because the prestige of elites has been much less diminished than in the United States. 
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therefore, and quite apart from any constitutional restraints, courts in 
the United States became quite cautious in defining and applying the 
tort of invasion of privacy. 
Of particular interest is the development of New York law. In 
1902, the New York Court of Appeals refused to create a common law 
tort of invasion of privacy.263 The decision provoked a storm of 
controversy,264 and the New York legislature responded by enacting 
Section 50 of the New York Civil Rights Law “forbidding the use of a 
person’s name, picture or portrait for advertising purposes or purposes 
of trade, without his written consent first being obtained.”265 In 
interpreting the law, however, New York courts were careful to hold 
that the statute did not apply to the publication of photographs in a 
newspaper “in connection with an article of current news or immediate 
public interest.”266 New York courts refused to classify newspapers as 
publishing “for purposes of trade” when they were reporting the 
news.267 
New York courts were aware the newspapers were commercial 
enterprises that sold news for a profit. But they believed that the literal 
terms of the statute could not be applied to newspapers selling news 
without damaging the “free press” necessary for “fundamental 
democratic institutions.”268 This interpretation of the statute is striking 
for its explicit recognition that the commercial press is indispensable 
for the formation of a public sphere and hence for the formation of 
public opinion. It understands that the press as an institution is the 
vehicle for a general public interest in maintaining public discourse. 
The public interest in maintaining public discourse does not depend 
upon the contents of any specific article, but instead on the structural 
properties of the press as a medium for the dissemination of news.269 
This approach stands in stark contrast to Google Spain, which 
holds that Google as a commercial company can assert only its own 
 
This prestige creates an aristocratic counterforce to the demands of mass curiosity.  
 263. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (1902).  
 264. Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century’s Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 
526, 532–33, 538 (1941). 
 265. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 382, 384 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937). 
 266.  Id. 
 267. Id. at 387–89; see also Kline v. Robert M. McBride & Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 674, 679 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1939). 
 268. Lahiri, 295 N.Y.S. at 388. 
 269. In terms of American constitutional law, the press constitutes a “medium for the 
communication of ideas.” See Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 1249, 1250–60 (1995) (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)). 
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economic interests and that any public interest in circumscribing the 
application of the Directive is confined to websites that contain specific 
kinds of information as, for example, personal information about a 
data subject who has played a prominent role in public life. The 
reasoning of Google Spain misses what we can learn from the history 
of newspapers: there is a strong public interest in maintaining a 
vigorous press, regardless of whether the press is run for commercial 
reasons and regardless of the exact contents of any particular items in 
the press. This interest exists because the press, by appealing to broad 
swatches of public curiosity, sustains the very possibility of a “public,” 
without which the emergence of public opinion is impossible. 
The Directive seems to acknowledge these points when it 
authorizes a derogation for “the processing of personal data carried out 
solely for journalistic purposes” insofar as such a derogation is 
“necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing 
freedom of expression.”270 The GDPR analogously provides that 
“Member States shall by law reconcile the right to the protection of 
personal data . . . with the right to freedom of expression and 
information, including processing for journalistic purposes.”271 And, of 
course, Article 11 of the Charter provides that “[t]he freedom and 
pluralism of the media shall be respected.”272 
These provisions point to the essential question of whether we 
should regard Google as serving journalistic purposes. It is noteworthy 
that the CJEU denies that search engines like Google can serve 
journalistic purposes; it concludes that Google can claim only the 
economic interests of a private commercial company. But the rise of 
the modern American press has much to teach us about the legal 
characterization that ought to be applied to Google. 
The nineteenth-century American reader believed that the 
newspaper gave “him the daily history of the world (and most of the 
ideas that he uses in conversation).”273 Newspapers scoured the world 
to bring readers an enormous catchment of information that was far 
larger than any individual reader could gather for herself. Newspapers 
brought these texts to readers in ways designed to attract their 
attention—through headlines, illustrations, human interest stories, or 
short, punchy prose. Newspapers also created their own news by 
 
 270. Directive, supra note 5, art. 9. 
 271. GDPR, supra note 17, art. 85. 
 272. Charter, supra note 9, art. 11.  
 273. Warner, supra note 229, at 206. 
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muckraking investigations, interviews, and so on. They shifted the 
balance of the demos’ identification away from the embodied, face-to-
face relationships of everyday life and toward the textually mediated 
connections of the public sphere. They allowed readers to conceive 
themselves as a public and hence as participants in the formation of 
public opinion. And newspapers sought through editorials and other 
means to shape public opinion on issues of the day. 
At first blush, Google could not be less like a newspaper. It is an 
“indexing tool used to locate web sites that correspond to a user’s 
search query.”274 It locates websites with automated web crawlers, not 
reporters. It uses algorithms rather than editors to arrange the 
presentation and priority of these websites. It does not muckrake, or 
investigate, or create human interest stories. It does not publish 
editorials to influence the content of public opinion. If a newspaper 
readily lends itself to characterization as a speaker or author, Google 
does not. Although it is easy to attribute to newspapers the protections 
of freedom of expression that we accord to speakers who participate in 
public discourse, it requires difficult work to characterize Google in 
that way.275 
Our short history of the American press, however, suggests that 
newspapers serve an essential public interest quite apart from their 
being speakers. By continuously circulating texts that engage mass 
readers, newspapers create a public sphere in which readers can 
imagine themselves both as persons who see the world through texts, 
and as persons who are seen by the world as texts. In effect, newspapers 
create the conditions in which readers conceive themselves as a public, 
and hence as implicated in the formation of the public opinion that is 
essential to a democracy. 
Google also serves this essential public interest. The Internet is a 
massive collection of information in which texts circulate online just as 
they do in material form. “[I]n . . . light of its accessibility and its 
 
 274. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *1 
n.1 (W.D. Ok. May 27, 2003). 
 275. Although this has not prevented some from advancing this analogy. Compare Eugene 
Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, 
8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 884–85 (2012), with Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 
1528 (2013), and Heather M. Whitney & Robert Mark Simpson, Search Engines and Free Speech 
Coverage, in FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Susan J. Brison & Kath Gelber eds., 
forthcoming) (manuscript at 11–17). At different times, and in different contexts, Google has 
sometimes sought to characterize itself as a speaker, and sometimes not. Jeffrey Abramson, 
Searching for Reputation: Reconciling Free Speech and the “Right to be Forgotten,” 17 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 34–40 (2015). 
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capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the 
Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access to 
news and facilitating the dissemination of information in general.”276 
But the Internet is opaque unless readers are equipped with tools to 
locate texts that answer to their curiosity. Google provides such tools 
and so brings us our “daily history of the world.” “We use search 
engines to learn about and make sense of the world, to answer our 
questions, and as aids to our thinking.”277 In this sense, “Google and 
similar search engines are . . . increasingly becoming our windows to 
the world.”278 
By the end of the nineteenth century, newspapers were defining 
news as that which interests the public. News enticed and sustained 
mass participation in the formation of public opinion. From this 
perspective, Google is a preeminent portal through which millions of 
readers receive news. Readers use Google to search out texts that 
interest them. By using Google, readers interact with each other and 
become themselves visible as texts. Google is thus an essential 
infrastructure for the modern virtual public sphere. The virtual public 
sphere becomes more democratic as a mass audience is able more 
easily to participate in its construction, and as they are able to acquire 
information responsive to their own interests.279 But the implication of 
 
 276. Case of Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete & Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, App. No. 
22947/13, para. 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 5, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-160314 
[https://perma.cc/MK8F-B4LM]; see Fredrik Neij & Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, App. No. 
40397/12, at 9 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 19, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-117513 [https:// 
perma.cc/E8CG-JF78]. As the U.S. Supreme Court recently affirmed: 
  A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to 
places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once 
more. The Court has sought to protect the right to speak in this spatial context. A basic 
rule, for example, is that a street or a park is a quintessential forum for the exercise of 
First Amendment rights. Even in the modern era, these places are still essential venues 
for public gatherings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply to learn and 
inquire. 
  While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important 
places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is 
cyberspace—the “vast democratic forums of the Internet” in general and social media 
in particular. 
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (citations omitted).  
 277. RICHARDS, supra note 217, at 122. Richards sensibly uses this premise to defend the 
privacy of the data gathered by Google about those who use Google.  
 278. Sylvia de Mars & Patrick O’Callaghan, Privacy and Search Engines: Forgetting or 
Contextualizing, 43 J.L. & SOC. 257, 267 (2016). “Imagine . . . if a library were to tell you that 
information might be found in its vast, unorganized stacks, but that it could not offer an index to 
assist the search for information.” Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 501, 542 (2015). 
 279. As the European Court of Human Rights observed, the “Internet has now become one 
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this social structure is that the virtual public sphere “devours” more 
efficiently than ever before the traditional boundaries that separate 
public from private aspects of life.280 
An important difference between Google and a newspaper is that 
the latter must entice readers to purchase news through devices like 
human interest stories, headlines, and photographs. By contrast, 
Google does not need to solicit readers to seek news. Instead readers 
bring their interests to Google. More than any newspaper, Google 
allows its readers to pursue their own curiosity by searching for news 
that is of interest to them.281 Like a newspaper, Google presents this 
news in a fragmentary, disjointed way, which allows readers to draw 
their own conclusions about the meaning of news. Like a newspaper, 
Google disrupts elite narratives and authority. In the antinomian world 
of the modern Internet, readers would feel disempowered were the 
state to prevent them from accessing texts about which they were 
curious unless those texts were first vetted, researched, referenced and 
composed by professional journalists or scholars.282 
Whether readers obtain their news from a newspaper or from 
Google, they participate in the circulation of texts and so are drawn to 
participate in the formation of the public sphere. The attraction is as 
forceful with Google as it is with newspapers.283 In the context of the 
virtual public sphere, “[t]o die is to be disconnected from access to the 
archives, not jacked-in or not in real-time.”284 Just as New Yorkers felt 
 
of the principal means by which individuals exercise their right to freedom of expression and 
information, providing as it does essential tools for participation in activities and discussions 
concerning political issues and issues of general interest.” Case of Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, 
App. No. 3111/10, para. 54 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 2012).  
 280. Case of Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo & Shtekel v. Ukraine, 2011-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
383, 401. (“The risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise 
and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is 
certainly higher than that posed by the press.”) 
 281. Of course it is true that the algorithms used by Google to determine search outcomes 
will aggregate and display to readers their own interests in particular ways, but at most this is a 
vague echo of the “editorial judgment” that every newspaper has always had to employ. The same 
may be said of Google’s Autocomplete function, which a German court has found can invade a 
person’s personality rights by suggesting untrue associations. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. 
SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1156–57 (5th ed. 2015).  
 282. This would be the consequence of interpreting the Directive and the GDPR to authorize 
derogations for “journalist purposes” only when such purpoes are controlled by professional 
journalists. 
 283. For a good discussion of the compelling attraction of the Internet public sphere, see 
Adrian Mackenzie, The Mortality of the Virtual: Real-time, Archive and Dead-time in Information 
Networks, CONVERGENCE, June 1997, at 59. 
 284. Id. at 66. 
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lost without their daily newspapers, so contemporary persons feel lost 
when their access to the Internet fails. Hardly a day goes by that I do 
not use Google to find texts that interest me online. 
The news I locate on Google, like the news I read in a newspaper, 
orients me to public questions. It allows me to conceive myself as 
participating in the formation of public opinion and hence as 
democratically involved. One can test the robustness of this conclusion 
by imagining what would have happened were former President 
François Hollande to have prohibited Google from linking to sites that 
mentioned former French presidential candidate Marine Le Pen.285 No 
one would doubt that public interests of the highest order would be at 
stake. The analogy to print media is immediate and convincing. The 
ECtHR has stressed “the substantial contribution made by Internet 
archives to preserving and making available news and information. 
Such archives constitute an important source for education and 
historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the 
public and are generally free.”286 The court has even emphasized the 
connection between this contribution and the “function of the press in 
a democracy,” insofar as that function includes “maintaining and 
making available to the public archives containing news which has 
previously been reported. The maintenance of Internet archives is a 
critical aspect of this role.”287 
By establishing the infrastructure that sustains the virtual public 
sphere, Google serves the same essential democratic interests as does 
the traditional press. The fact that it does so for profit no more counts 
against it than it does against the “media” that Article 11 of the Charter 
explicitly protects. Every democratic state extends constitutional 
protections to the media “not for the benefit of the press so much as 
for the benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press 
assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society.”288 
The unusual market dominance of Google as a search engine may 
indeed raise legitimate concerns, but these concerns ultimately sound 
in antitrust law and do not undermine the conclusion that search 
engines in general serve the same public interest as does the press. Just 
as antitrust standards may, with appropriate safeguards, be applied to 
 
 285. I am grateful to Dan Solove for this hypothetical. 
 286. Case of Węgrzynowski & Smolczewski v. Poland, App. No. 33846/07, para. 59 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. July 16, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122365 [https://perma.cc/GQ2J-8K8Z]. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).  
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traditional media outlets, so they may be applied to Google.289 
Google Spain failed to acknowledge the public interests served by 
Google. It was not curious about the structure of communication that 
might be necessary for democracy to function. It did not raise the 
possibility that Google might share some of the “journalistic purposes” 
for which the Directive explicitly authorizes a derogation. This may be 
because Europeans have always been primarily focused on journals of 
opinion, so that they cannot even imagine the exercise of “journalistic 
purposes” without the concomitant exercise of authorial voice.290 It 
may also be because the CJEU could not perceive in Google the 
exercise of that independent professional judgment which in the past 
has been exercised by journalists who selected, authored, and 
presented the news.291 
The history of newspapers in Part II, however, suggests that 
democracies require a vigorous press in order to create a 
communicative infrastructure for the public sphere. The media 
circulate information that incites the common attention of strangers, 
and thus establish a public. Google unquestionably serves this purpose 
in an Internet age, even though Google does not itself speak in the 
traditional journalistic way. Google helps to create a “public” in the 
same manner as did the nineteenth- and twentieth-century press. For 
that reason, it implicates the same democratic values of freedom of 
expression as does the traditional press. 
IV.  GOOGLE, THE RTBF, AND THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
Even if it is accepted that Google is invested with a public interest 
of the kind I have just sketched, it does not follow that the privacy 
harms caused by Google are without remedy. What follows is that the 
RTBF, as it is rooted in Article 8 of the Charter and operationalized in 
the GDPR, should not be enforced against Google. The right to be 
forgotten, by contrast, which is rooted in Article 7 of the Charter and 
applied by legal systems in many countries, is specifically designed for 
 
 289. ROBERT MCCHESNEY & JOHN NICHOLS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AMERICAN 
JOURNALISM: THE MEDIA REVOLUTION THAT WILL BEGIN THE WORLD AGAIN 61−64 (2010). 
 290. See Erdos, supra note 69, at 132–38. 
 291. Mantelero, supra note 40, at 235; see SCHUDSON, supra note 154, at 9−14 (discussing the 
professionalism of modern journalism). But see James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 868, 874−75 (2014) (arguing that Google functions (or should function) as a “trusted 
advisor”). On different conceptions of journalism within the EU, see generally DANIEL C. 
HALLIN & PAOLO MANCINI, COMPARING MEDIA SYSTEMS: THREE MODELS OF MEDIA AND 
POLITICS (2004).  
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application to media in the public sphere. Although data privacy is 
incompatible with the public sphere, dignitary privacy has regulated 
press publications for more than a century. 
A. Google and the RTBF 
The GDPR defines the RTBF as the right to have personal data 
erased “without undue delay” if they are “no longer necessary in 
relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise 
processed.”292 This is an intelligible inquiry with respect to large 
organizations that collect and process data for managerial reasons. But 
it is not an intelligible inquiry with respect to much communication of 
personal data within the public sphere. We might ask, for example, 
what purposes a blogger serves when publishing on the Internet an 
account of contemporary events that contains personal data. If the 
purpose is to instruct the mind of the public, when is her processing of 
those data no longer “necessary”? 
It is even less clear what specific purposes are independently 
served by Google. We are now not focused on the data that Google 
gathers on its customers to effect “massive online capturing of 
everydayness,”293 which Harvard Business School Professor Shoshana 
Zuboff has labelled “surveillance capitalism.”294 Such data should 
indeed be governed by the instrumental logic of the Directive, because 
it is almost certainly captured and processed for utilitarian purposes. 
We are speaking instead of information that Google communicates to 
the public sphere in the form of links that enable persons to negotiate 
the worldwide web. When are such Google links “inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive”295 for the purposes for 
which they are created? 
I have often heard it said that the Internet “never forgets.”296 If 
 
 292. GDPR, supra note 17, art. 17; cf. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 94 (“[I]nformation 
appears . . . to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the 
purposes of the processing at issue carried out by the operator of the search engine, the 
information . . . must be erased.”).  
 293. Ionna D. Constantiou & Jannis Kallinnikos, New Games, New Rules: Big Data and the 
Changing Context of Strategy, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 44, 55 (2015).  
 294. Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information 
Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 75 (2015).  
 295. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 94.  
 296. Nick Miller, The Internet Never Forgets, SIDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 23, 2013), 
http://www.smh.com.au/technology/the-internet-never-forgets-20130322-2gle7.html [https:// 
perma.cc/F6YA-EMUF]; Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE (July 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html? 
POST IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2018 10:44 AM 
1048  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:981 
newspapers are “cheap, quotidi[a]n, throw-away” objects,297 largely 
written to be read and discarded, Google is designed to create usable 
access to whatever texts are available for circulation in the public 
sphere of the Internet.298 The digital world of the web is “unforgiving” 
and comprehensive.299 In effect, Google creates a moving archive that 
corresponds to the Internet itself.300 The purpose of such an archive is 
in some respects comparable to the purpose of library archives, which 
are dedicated to providing “the public the means of acquiring 
information, knowledge, education, aesthetic experience, and 
entertainment.”301 
Like Google, libraries “organize” available texts—“factual, 
imaginative, scientific, and humanistic”—through “an effective 
network” that permits “access . . . from a myriad of directions.”302 
Libraries seek to provide information adequate to satisfy the “curiosity 
and aspiration and appreciation that characterize[] the alert, sensitive, 
adventurous human being.”303 Libraries strive “to provide all people 
with access to the information they want.”304 As libraries become 
 
pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/5N6Y-PPED]; David Siesage, The Internet Never Forgets, So 
Be Careful What You Put on It, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
student/istudents/the-internet-never-forgets-so-be-careful-what-you-put-on-it-8787706.html 
[https://perma.cc/4QSR-HX9K]. 
 297. SCHUDSON, supra note 154, at 33. 
 298. See Emily B. Laidlaw, Private Power, Public Interest: An Examination of Search Engine 
Accountability, 17 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 113, 116 (2009) (“[S]earch engines are websites that 
help users find information on other websites.”). 
 299. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 46, at 126  (noting that digital memory is “easy to 
use and comprehensive” with “too strict and unforgiving a link to our past”). 
 300. In Case of Times Newspapers Ltd. (Nos. 1 and 2) v. The United Kingdom, 2009-1 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 377, the ECtHR acknowledged  
the substantial contribution made by Internet archives to preserving and making 
available news and information. Such archives constitute an important source for 
education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the 
public and are generally free. The Court therefore considers that, while the primary 
function of the press in a democracy is to act as a “public watchdog”, it has a valuable 
secondary role in maintaining and making available to the public archives containing 
news which has previously been reported. 
Id. at 392–93, para. 45. 
 301. REDMOND KATHLEEN MOLZ & PHYLLIS DAIN, CIVIC SPACE/CYBERSPACE: THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC LIBRARY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2 (1999); see TOM GLYNN, READING 
PUBLICS: NEW YORK CITY’S PUBLIC LIBRARIES, 1754−1911, at 3 (2015); W.J. MURISON, THE 
PUBLIC LIBRARY: ITS ORIGINS, PURPOSE, AND SIGNIFICANCE 77 (3d ed. 1988).  
 302. ALA’s Pub. Library Ass’n Goals, Guidelines & Standards Comm., A Mission Statement 
for Public Libraries: Guidelines for Public Library Service: Part 1, 8 AM. LIBR. 615, 619 (1977). 
 303. Lowell A. Martin, The Public Library: Middle-age Crisis or Old Age, 108 LIBR. J. 17, 22 
(1983).  
 304. Alex Byrne, Freedom of Access to Information and Freedom of Expression in a Pluralist 
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digital305 and aim for open access, the priority of physical collections 
diminishes, and libraries become more and more like Google itself—
institutions dedicated to organizing and presenting online texts.306 
All agree that library archives serve to sustain “democratic” 
culture307 by “recapturing and extending democratic processes and 
potential” and linking persons to “the public sphere.”308 The “allure of 
the archives,” writes French historian Arlette Farge, is the anticipation 
of a “roaming voyage through the words of others,” so that we might 
“enter into an unending conversation about humanity” and about “the 
debates that surround us.”309 When might it be said that the data 
processing required to produce archives for such purposes is no longer 
 
World, 25 INT’L FED’N LIBR. ASS’N J. 223, 225 (1999); see MOLZ & DAIN, supra note 301, at 43; 
Stephen A. Roberts, World Librarianship and the New Europe: An Exploratory Essay, 4 INT’L J. 
INFO. & LIBR. RES. 19, 23 (1992). 
 305. LEONARDO CANDELA, DONATELLA CASTELLI & PASQUALE PAGANO, History, 
Evolution and Impact of Digital Libraries, in E-PUBLISHING AND DIGITAL LIBRARIES: LEGAL 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 1, 1 (Ioannis Iglezakis, Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou & Sarantos 
Kapidakis eds., 2011). 
 306. See, e.g., WILLIAM Y. ARMS, DIGITAL LIBRARIES, at ix (2000); William Y. Arms, The 
Web as an Open Access Digital Library (Oct. 21. 2000), www.cs.cornell.edu/wya/papers/Kyoto-
2000.doc [https://perma.cc/VVM4-VFSR]. “Public libraries are not only providing Internet and 
other electronic resources they are joining the Internet themselves.” MOLZ & DAIN, supra note 
301, at 187; see PAUL GILSTER, DIGITAL LITERACY 155−228 (1997). These developments, of 
course, need to be placed in the context of the online appearance of digital collections of texts 
and news like, for example, the ProQuest Historical Newspapers database. See Paul M. Schwartz, 
From Victorian Secrets to Cyberspace Shaming, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1407, 1414−18 (2009). 
 307. The 1979 White House Conference on Library and Information Services affirmed that 
“publicly supported libraries are institutions of education for democratic living.” RESOLUTIONS 
OF THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON LIBRARY AND INFORMATION SERVICES 1979, at 46 
(1980); see ALFRED HESSEL, A HISTORY OF LIBRARIES 99−107 (Reuben Peiss trans., 1955); 
Arthur W. Hafner & Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Democratic Ideals and the American Public 
Library, in DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC LIBRARY: ESSAYS ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 9, 19 
(Arthur W. Hafner ed., 1993); Frederick Stielow, Reconsidering Arsenals of a Democratic Culture, 
in LIBRARIES & DEMOCRACY: THE CORNERSTONES OF LIBERTY 3, 4−5 (Nancy Kranich ed., 
2001); Grace O. Kelley, The Democratic Function of Public Libraries, 4 LIB. Q. 1, 1 (1934). The 
White House Conference resolved that because “information in a free society is a basic right of 
any individual, essential for all persons . . . and all economic and social levels,” that “all persons 
should have free access, without charge or fee to the individual, to information in public and 
publicly supported libraries.” RESOLUTIONS OF THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON LIBRARY 
AND INFORMATION SERVICES 1979, at 46 (1980).  
 308. JOHN E. BUSCHMAN, DISMANTLING THE PUBLIC SPHERE: SITUATING AND SUSTAINING 
LIBRARIANSHIP IN THE AGE OF THE NEW PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 37 (2003); see id. at 46−48, 175; 
see also JAMES H. BILLINGTON, The Modern Library and Global Democracy, in THE MEANING 
OF THE LIBRARY: A CULTURAL HISTORY 254, 254 (Alice Crawford ed., 2015) (“[L]ibraries . . . 
have a key role to play in building and sustaining participatory and accountable democratic 
societies.”). 
 309. ARLETTE FARGE, THE ALLURE OF THE ARCHIVES 123−24 (Thomas Scott-Railton 
trans., 2013). 
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necessary?310 
There is no answer to this question, which is no doubt why the 
GDPR explicitly provides that the RTBF should not apply “for 
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes” insofar as the RTBF “is likely to render impossible 
or seriously impair the achievement of the objectives of that 
processing.”311 It is striking that the GDPR does not include library 
archives in the derogation for “the right to freedom of expression and 
information, including processing for journalistic purposes and the 
purposes of academic, artistic or literary expression.”312 This is 
probably because it conceptualizes libraries as containing data to which 
the public is given access, rather than as institutions that actively 
communicate data to the public. 
My intuition is that the CJEU will not interpret the GDPR to hold 
that Google is an archive assembled in the “public interest” or for 
“historical research purposes.” Google’s popularity, its 
commercialization, its hunger for the personal data of its users,313 all 
combine to make it seem far removed from the demure passivity 
associated with library archives. If libraries are conceptualized as 
making data available for public access, Google is much more easily 
imagined as deliberately communicating public information to the 
public. Although the Internet is rapidly fraying this distinction, it 
nevertheless underlies the GDPR’s differentiation between 
derogations for expressive purposes and derogations for archives in the 
public interest. 
The GDPR exempts historical archives because of deep social 
needs for common information. As one of the GDPR’s most passionate 
advocates remarked, data privacy 
is of course not an absolute right. There are cases where there is a 
legitimate and legally justified interest to keep data in a data base. 
The archives of a newspaper are a good example. It is clear that the 
right to be forgotten cannot amount to a right of the total erasure of 
 
 310. For a fascinating if unsuccessful effort to wrestle with this question, see IVAN SZEKELY, 
The Right To Be Forgotten and the New Archival Paradigm, in THE ETHICS OF MEMORY IN A 
DIGITAL AGE: INTERROGATING THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 28, 28−49 (Alessia Ghezzi, 
Ăngela Guimarães Pereira & Lucia Vesnić-Alujević eds., 2014). Cf. supra note 99.  
 311. GDPR, supra note 17, art. 17(3).  
 312. Id. art. 85(1).  
 313. Grimmelmann, supra note 291, at 941−43. 
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history.314 
History is the common property of the public. No individual can be said 
to “control”315 the personal data of history without unraveling the 
fabric of history itself. I cannot prevent you from narrating your 
account of historical events, even if they include information “relating 
to”316 me. Nor can you prevent me from narrating my account of 
historical events, even if they include information “relating to” you. 
History is constructed from the interplay of such perspectives, 
including from the personal data contained within them.317 History 
requires that personal data become, as it were, common property, 
rather than under the “control” of particular data subjects.318 
Democratic communication in the public sphere requires this 
same structure of common information. The public sphere is a field of 
intersubjective communicative action; it would collapse if individuals 
could at will withdraw from circulation information “relating to” 
themselves because they have the right to “control” such personal 
data.319 The public sphere in a democracy also serves the political 
purpose of self-governance. Those who control the circulation of 
 
 314. See Viviane Reding, The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the 
Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age, Address at the Innovation 
Conference Digital, Life, Design (Jan. 22, 2012) (emphasis omitted).  
 315. GDPR, supra note 17, recital 7.  
 316. Directive, supra note 5, art. 2(a); GDPR, supra note 17, art. 4(1). 
 317. By contrast to Google Spain, the CJEU has been quite sensitive to the need for the 
circulation of shared information to preserve the “historical memory” of the actions of joint stock 
and limited liabilities companies as required by the First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 
March 1968, which emphasizes the need to co-ordinate “national provisions concerning 
disclosure” of the obligations of such companies “for the purpose of protecting the interests of 
third parties.” Case C-398/15, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura di 
Leece v. Manni, para. 4 (Mar. 9, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf; 
jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d5da8068b3690a4e3f94169d692c409ec6.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4PaN
iSe0?text=&docid=188750&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid
=1193773 [https://perma.cc/QRF8-ZW9L]; Directive 68/151/EEC of the First Council of the 
European Communities of 9 March 1968, 1968 O.J. (L65) 8. Although the disclosures required by 
Directive 68/151 were inconsistent with the protections of personal data required by Directive 
95/46, the CJEU nevertheless found the disclosures justified by the importance of reducing 
information costs in the interests of promoting marketplace efficiency and reliability. 
 318. Which is no doubt why courts have held that “it is not the role of judicial authorities to 
engage in rewriting history by ordering the removal from the public domain of all traces of” past 
publications. Case of Węgrzynowski & Smolczewski v. Poland, App. No. 33846/07, para. 65 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. July 16, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122365 [https://perma.cc/A7CN-
52L7].  
 319. See, e.g., Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1289−91 (D.D.C. 1981); 
Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767, 2004 WL 119731, at *3, *4 (Mass. Mar. 3, 2004); Anonsen v. 
Donahue, 857 S.W.2d 700, 705−06 (Tex. App. 1993).  
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personal data in the public sphere control the creation of public 
opinion. Because personal data become relevant to public opinion as 
they become responsive to public curiosity, and because public 
curiosity is a variable and unpredictable phenomenon, it is impossible 
to “specify” in advance which personal data will become relevant to 
the formation of public opinion. 
There is thus a fundamental tension between news, which orients 
the public by responding to public curiosity, and fair information 
practices, which demand previously articulated, explicit and specified 
purposes as a precondition for processing personal data. That is why 
both the Directive and the GDPR acknowledge derogations for 
journalistic activity, insofar as is necessary to accommodate freedom of 
expression, without specifying the contents of what constitutes such 
activity.320 
 
 320. The profound tension between fair information practices and news is very much on 
display in the Guidelines on the Implementation of Google Spain published by the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party (“Working Party”). ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, supra 
note 128, at paras. 4, 7. The Working Party was created pursuant to Article 29 of the Directive, 
which requires the creation of an advisory working party composed of representatives of each 
Member State to advise the European Commission on the implementation of the Directive. See 
Directive, supra note 5, art. 29. The Guidelines justify the distinction between the Google link and 
the original La Vanguardia website on the ground that: 
[t]he processing carried out by the operator of a search engine is liable to affect 
significantly the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data 
when the search by means of that engine is carried out on the basis of an individual’s 
name, since that processing enables any internet user to obtain through the list of 
results a structured overview of the information relating to that individual that can be 
found on the internet—information which potentially concerns a vast number of 
aspects of his private life and which, without the search engine, could not have been 
interconnected or could have been only with great difficulty—and thereby to establish 
a more or less detailed profile of him. Furthermore, the effect of the interference with 
those rights of the data subject is heightened on account of the important role played 
by the internet and search engines in modern society, which render the information 
contained in such a list of results ubiquitous. 
ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, supra note 128, para. 4; see id. para. 7 (“The 
respective legal grounds of original publishers and search engines are different. . . . Even when 
(continued) publication by the original publishers is lawful, the universal diffusion and 
accessibility of that information by objects of a search engine, together with other data related to 
the same individual, can be unlawful . . . .”).  
The Working Party correctly observes that using Internet search engines to comb the 
Internet for information based upon the names of data subjects instantly produces a vast amount 
of disparate personal data that is assembled in a single convenient form and costlessly distributed 
throughout the public sphere. From the perspective of a data subject who wishes to control her 
personal data, therefore, search engine results constitute a massive loss of control.  
The reasoning of the Working Party nevertheless stands in stark contrast to the ultimate 
rationale of Google Spain. Google Spain dealt with the delisting of only a single link, which meant 
that it could implicitly incorporate the norms of Article 7 to determine whether the dissemination 
of information about Costeja’s attachment proceedings was more “harmful” than was warranted 
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The CJEU understood this problem in Google Spain, at least 
subconsciously, because it ultimately fashioned a doctrinal approach 
that lay outside the logic of the Directive. In the end, the CJEU 
balanced the seriousness of the Google link’s invasion of privacy 
against the strength of the public’s interest in the publication of the 
link. This is the structure of the right to be forgotten as it is applied by 
the courts of many countries, including the United States.321 This 
structure does not turn on empowering individuals “to maintain 
informational control” of their personal data,322 but instead seeks to 
identify how communications cause harm and how they contribute to 
public discourse. 
Once it had entered the terrain of these questions, the CJEU 
might have concluded that the derogation for journalist purposes 
implied that the Directive did not apply to Google.323 In such 
 
by the public’s interest in the disclosure of that information. Google Spain ultimately authorizes 
decisionmakers to weigh the privacy interests of a person in specific information against the 
public’s interest in that information. But because the Working Party argues that legal harm flows 
from the aggregation of data, rather than from the content of any specific data point, it cannot 
analogously appeal to such context-specific Article 7 norms. The logic of the Working Party thus 
points inevitably to the conclusion that all searches on the names of data subjects are 
presumptively illegal unless overridden by some special public interest in receiving information 
under Article 11 of the Charter. Such public interests in receiving information would not attach 
to specific information, but would have to be abstractly and generically determined. Not only 
would this conclusion withdraw enormous quantities of information from the public sphere, but 
it would subordinate the circulation of such information to specified public interests as 
determined by courts or data protection agencies. This is exactly contrary to the logic of news, 
which provokes and responds to the actual curiosity of the demos and in that way embodies the 
logic of self-governance.  
 The premise of the Working Party that the aggregation of otherwise public data can 
constitute a significant breach of fair information practices is similar to that adopted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in United States v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 
(1989), in which the Court held that privacy concerns should prevent Freedom of Information 
Act requests from compelling the release of “rap sheets.” Id. at 752. Although rap sheets compile 
only public information, consisting of a person’s “history of arrests, charges, convictions, and 
incarcerations,” the Court nevertheless concluded that there was a “distinction, in terms of 
personal privacy, between scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet 
and the revelation of the rap sheet as a whole. . . . Plainly there is a vast difference between the 
public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and 
local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single 
clearinghouse of information.” Id. at 752, 764. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 
however, did not address the suppression of information already circulating in the public sphere; 
it instead theorized criteria for releasing data into the public sphere.  
 321. See supra notes 33−41.  
 322. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 46, at 135. 
 323. To this day many of the fair information practices required by the Directive are not in 
fact applied to Google. See Emmanouil Bougiakiotis, The Enforcement of the Google Spain 
Ruling, 24 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 311, 316−17 (2016); Erdos, supra note 69, at 12−14. This is 
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circumstances, any potential relief available to Costeja would have had 
to be based upon privacy concerns rooted in Article 7 of the Charter.324 
Following this logic would have required the CJEU to adopt a fully 
developed version of the right to be forgotten, which would necessarily 
draw on the elaborate jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
But the CJEU decided to pursue a different path. It concluded 
that although the instrumental logic of the Directive remained 
somehow still applicable to Google, the integrity of the public sphere 
could nevertheless be protected by superimposing on the Directive’s 
narrow bureaucratic focus an abbreviated and rudimentary version of 
the right to be forgotten. This led to an opinion that was ambiguous 
about its sources and principles. It is not clear whether the issue in 
Google Spain was the improper processing of personal data or instead 
the inappropriate communication of potentially harmful information. 
It is not clear whether Google Spain sought to protect data privacy or 
dignitary privacy. 
B. Google Spain and the Right To Be Forgotten 
The difficulty is that the RTBF and the right to be forgotten 
cannot be coherently combined in this manner, for they are structured 
according to fundamentally disparate logics. At the most elementary 
level, the RTBF applies to a different unit of analysis than does the 
right to be forgotten. The RTBF focuses on data; the right to be 
forgotten focuses on discrete communicative acts. From the 
perspective of the right to be forgotten, harm to individuals does not 
come from the processing of personal data abstractly considered, but 
from communications that violate prevailing community customs and 
mores. The identical information can be communicated in ways that 
 
especially true with respect to what the Directive and the GDPR designate as “special categories 
of data,” see Directive, supra note 5, art. 8; GDPR, supra note 17, art. 9, which cannot be processed 
without consent, subject to certain explicit exceptions. Such data includes information regarding 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, sexuality, and health. Whenever search 
engines produce results that process sensitive data, as they routinely do, their operations are 
presumptively illegal. Kulk & Borgesius, supra note 6, at 27. “After the Google Spain judgment, 
Google, Data Protection Authorities, and courts have solved the sensitive data problem by 
ignoring it.” Id. at 27–28. Just recently, however, the French Conseil d’Etat has referred to the 
CJEU a whole series of fundamental questions about the legality of Google links that reveal 
sensitive data. See DLA Piper, France’s Highest Administrative Court Requests a Preliminary 
Ruling from the CJEU on the Right To Be Forgotten, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 13, 2017), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=612b3b77-9e65-42c9-a01b-e040d323afee [https://
perma.cc/6RV5-PSEH].  
 324. For an example of how this might be operationalized, see de Mars & O’Callaghan, supra 
note 278, at 270−76. 
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are perfectly acceptable or in ways that are shocking and harmful.325 It 
may be humiliating to reveal the CT scan of a private person to the 
general public, but unobjectionable to provide it to a doctor for 
evaluation.326 In the context of the right to be forgotten, what matters 
is not the content of information, but the context and meaning of 
particular communicative acts.327 
The RTBF and the right to be forgotten are accordingly composed 
of different elements. Discrete communicative acts, which are essential 
to the right to be forgotten, are irrelevant to the RTBF. The processing 
of personal data, which is essential to the RTBF, is not determinative 
for the right to be forgotten. The scope of the RTBF is defined by the 
managerial need to ensure the accuracy and relevance of personal data 
for the specific purposes for which they have been gathered. The scope 
of the right to be forgotten is defined by the contextual propriety of 
discrete communicative acts. Whereas the RTBF follows an 
instrumental logic of means and ends, the right to be forgotten follows 
a hermeneutic logic of social norms. Harm to personality is irrelevant 
to the application of the RTBF but is essential to the right to be 
forgotten. 
The RTBF and the right to be forgotten flow from distinct 
perspectives on human sociality. The former is indifferent to social 
meaning; the latter turns on interpretations of social meaning. The 
former instantiates an abstract need for control; the latter seeks to 
maintain thick social practices and customs. The former imagines 
human beings as autonomous manipulators of data; the latter 
conceives human beings as socially constructed and dependent upon 
the observance of civil norms of respect. The former ignores the 
legitimate interests of the public; the latter seeks to identify and protect 
 
 325. NISSENBAUM, supra note 108, at 103–28; Post, supra note 106, at 978–87.  
 326. See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 589−90 (D.C. 1985).  
 327. That is why the right to be forgotten assumes that communicating information to the 
public may be acceptable at time T1, but may nevertheless become problematic at a subsequent 
time T2. Although the content of the communicated information may remain unchanged, the 
propriety of communicating that information may alter in the dimension of time. The importance 
of time was made explicit in 1939 in the comments to the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (AM. 
LAW. INST. 1939), which affirmed that persons who at T1 are deemed “objects of legitimate public 
interest” because of “the privileges which publishers have to satisfy the curiosity of the public as 
to their leaders, heroes, villains and victims,” may, when “they have reverted to the lawful and 
unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community,” no longer be objects of legitimate public 
interest. Id. § 867 cmt. c. As one court put it, “there are timeliness or relatedness boundaries that 
circumscribe the breadth of public scrutiny to the incident of public interest.” Toffoloni v. LFP 
Publ’g Grp., 534 F.3d 1201, 1210 (11th Cir. 2009). 
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those interests. By seeking to layer these perspectives, one on top of 
the other, the CJEU created an opaque and indecipherable opinion.328 
Let us assume, however, that despite the CJEU’s long disquisition 
on the Directive, which seems to have misled many commentators,329 
liability under Google Spain ultimately turns on some version of the 
right to be forgotten. In the end, the CJEU concluded that the harm to 
privacy caused by the Google link must be balanced against the public’s 
interest in maintaining that link. On this assumption, what is most 
striking is the startling contrast between the CJEU’s rudimentary 
description of this balance and the relatively sophisticated exposition 
of this same balance which may be found in the precedents of the 
ECtHR.330 The latter ought to have been pertinent to Google Spain 
because Article 7 of the Charter directly references Article 8 of the 
Convention. At a minimum, therefore, we may conclude that the 
CJEU did not fully appreciate the relevance of Article 7 to its own 
reasoning.331  
It must be acknowledged that the CJEU did find its own way of 
recognizing both the harm to privacy caused by a particular 
communication and the public interest in allowing that 
communication, which constitute the two essential elements of the 
ECtHR’s approach to the right to be forgotten. These two elements 
are also at the heart of the jurisprudence followed by American courts. 
 
 328. See EUROPEAN UNION COMM., supra note 26, at 21 (noting that the right to be forgotten 
created by Google Spain “is as elusive as the name is misleading”). 
 329. See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 275, at 46 n.249; de Mars & O’Callaghan, supra note 278, 
at 260; Internet Law—Protection of Personal Data—Court of Justice of the European Union 
Creates Presumption That Google Must Remove Links to Personal Data Upon Request, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 735, 739 (2014) (“[T]he decision was a reasonable interpretation of the Directive’s 
text and the deeply held privacy values manifested therein.”); see also supra notes 62, 124 and 
accompanying text. 
 330. See, e.g., Case of Fürst-Pfeifer v. Austria, App. Nos. 33677/10, 52340/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
May 17, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-162864 [https://perma.cc/MCM6-VU36]; Case 
of Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy & Satamedia Oy v. Finland, App. No. 931/13 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
July 21, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-156272 [https://perma.cc/P9JC-ZPE9]; Axel 
Springer AG v. Germany, App. No. 39954/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012), http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109034 [https://perma.cc/7F37-MUYA]; Eleni Frantziou, Further 
Developments in the Right To Be Forgotten: The European Court of Justice’s Judgment in Case C-
131/12, Google Spain, SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 14 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 761, 772−75 (2014); Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Freedom of 
Expression and ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Cases in the Netherlands After Google Spain, 1 EUR. DATA 
PROT. L. REV. 113, 123 (2015). 
 331. See, e.g., Kulk & Borgesius, supra note 6, at 21 (“[Google Spain] mainly applied the Data 
Protection Directive, and gave little attention to the extensive case law on balancing privacy and 
freedom of expression of the European Court of Human Rights.”).  
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Thus, the influential Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of 
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, 
if the matter publicized is of a kind that 
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.332 
Following the Restatement, all American courts wrestling with the right 
to be forgotten evaluate both the offensiveness of a communication 
and its contribution to public discourse. 
Well-socialized persons possess a more or less intuitive sense of 
when communications are offensive and threaten privacy, for they 
have internalized the social norms by which we judge such things.333 
But it is methodologically puzzling how a court should determine 
whether a communication is “of legitimate concern to the public.” 
American courts have sought to deflect this puzzle by interpreting the 
criterion of “legitimate concern to the public” in terms of the 
“newsworthiness” of a relevant communication.334 
The criterion of “newsworthiness” invokes the history discussed 
in Part II of this Article. The story of news in the United States is that 
of a mass public successfully demanding the freedom to pursue its own 
curiosity rather than remaining under the tutelage of elite instruction. 
It also invokes the importance of news to maintaining the democratic 
public sphere, not because of the contents of any particular article, but 
because news as such incites and sustains widespread popular interest 
in common texts.335 These resonances render the criterion of 
“newsworthiness” so encompassing and so vague that it can frequently 
mean nothing more than what answers to the sheer curiosity of the 
public as determined by the very media outlets publishing the 
offending communication.336 American courts typically cede 
 
 332. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 333. See Post, supra note 106, at 962−64.  
 334. Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, P.C., 367 P.3d 1006, 1012–13 (Utah 2016); Shulman v. Grp. 
W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478−79 (Cal. 1998); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 
70, 83 (W. Va. 1983).  
 335. The concept of “legitimate public concern” in American law has long been ambiguous, 
sometimes referring to what the public ought to know as informed democratic citizens, at other 
times referring to what the public in fact wishes to know, and yet at other times referring to the 
widely circulated information that constitutes the public as such. See Post, supra note 113, at 
667−78.  
 336. “The courts have recognized that public curiosity is a mysterious thing and frequently 
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“considerable deference to reporters and editors” in defining 
newsworthiness.337 
From this perspective, the criterion of “newsworthiness” comes 
close to a categorical judgment that whatever the press publishes is of 
legitimate public concern and hence insulated from liability.338 But 
American courts have never entirely relinquished the authority to 
impose “taste” and “judgment” upon the curiosity of the mass public: 
 
concentrates most heavily on those least deserving of attention.” Nizer, supra note 264, at 540. 
American courts are cautious about making judgments about the substantive value of 
communications within the public sphere, holding that “[t]he line between the informing and the 
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right [of freedom of speech]. Everyone 
is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches 
another’s doctrine.” Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Refusing to identify which 
communications serve the public interest, the Court has declared: 
Under our system of government there is an accommodation for the widest varieties of 
tastes and ideas. What is good literature, what has educational value, what is refined 
public information, what is good art, varies with individuals as it does from one 
generation to another. . . . [A] requirement that literature or art conform to some norm 
prescribed by an official smacks of an ideology foreign to our system. . . . From the 
multitude of competing offerings, the public will pick and choose. What seems to one 
to be trash may have for others fleeting or even enduring values. 
Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 157−58 (1946). Drawing on the great American tradition 
of writing the news to invoke human interest and so to appeal to the “reveries” of readers, see 
supra note 171, Judge Hastie in the Third Circuit has drawn by far the most rigorous and eloquent 
conclusion with regard to the legal criterion of newsworthiness:  
For present purposes news need be defined as comprehending no more than relatively 
current events such as in common experience are likely to be of public interest. In the 
verbal and graphic publication of news, it is clear that information and entertainment 
are not mutually exclusive categories. A large part of the matter which appears in 
newspapers and news magazines today is not published or read for the value or 
importance of the information it conveys. Some readers are attracted by shocking news. 
Others are titillated by sex in the news. Still others are entertained by news which has 
an incongruous or ironic aspect. Much news is in various ways amusing and for that 
reason of special interest to many people. Few newspapers or news magazines would 
long survive if they did not publish a substantial amount of news on the basis of 
entertainment value of one kind or another. This may be a disturbing commentary 
upon our civilization, but it is nonetheless a realistic picture of society which courts 
shaping new juristic concepts must take into account. In brief, once the character of an 
item as news is established, it is neither feasible nor desirable for a court to make a 
distinction between news for information and news for entertainment in determining 
the extent to which publication is privileged (footnotes omitted). 
Jenkins v. Dell Pub. Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958). The contrast to the top-down 
determination of the public interest implicit in Google Spain, as well as the Working Party’s 
guidelines, could not be clearer. 
 337. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485; see Diane Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A 
Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 350–62 (1983).  
 338. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 336 (1966). For a well-crafted argument that this judgment is 
unwarranted when the press fails to make expert judgments about what the public ought to know, 
see generally Erin C. Carroll, Making News: Balancing Newsworthiness and Privacy in the Age of 
Algorithms, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming). But see supra note 335. 
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“Is the term ‘newsworthy’ a descriptive predicate, intended to refer 
to the fact there is widespread public interest? Or is it a value 
predicate, intended to indicate that the publication is a meritorious 
contribution and that the public’s interest is praiseworthy?” A 
position at either extreme has unpalatable consequences. If 
“newsworthiness” is completely descriptive—if all coverage that sells 
papers or boosts ratings is deemed newsworthy—it would seem to 
swallow the publication of private facts tort, for “it would be difficult 
to suppose that publishers were in the habit of reporting occurrences 
of little interest.” At the other extreme, if newsworthiness is viewed 
as a purely normative concept, the courts could become to an 
unacceptable degree editors of the news and self-appointed guardians 
of public taste. . . . 
The analysis of newsworthiness does involve courts to some degree in 
a normative assessment of the ‘social value’ of a publication.339 
Because American courts lack authority to decree what the public 
should be interested in knowing, they tend to disguise judgments about 
“the ‘social value’ of a publication” by blending the criterion of 
newsworthiness with that of offensiveness.340 In the words of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account 
must be taken of the customs and conventions of the community; and 
in the last analysis what is proper becomes a matter of community 
mores. The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the 
giving of information to which the public is entitled, and become a 
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with 
which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, 
would say that he had no concern. The limitations, in other words, are 
those of common decency, having due regard to the freedom of the 
press and its reasonable leeway to choose what it will tell the public, 
 
 339. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 481, 483–84 (citation omitted). Because of First Amendment 
concerns, Shulman was later reversed “at least with respect to information a publisher obtains 
from public (i.e. not sealed) official records of judicial proceedings.” Gates v. Discovery 
Commc’ns, 101 P.3d 552, 554–55 (Cal. 2004). On the normative presuppositions underlying 
judgments of newsworthiness, see Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying 
Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1025 (2003). 
 340. “The two criteria, offensiveness and newsworthiness, are related. An individual, and 
more pertinently perhaps the community, is most offended by the publication of intimate personal 
facts when the community has no interest in them beyond the voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the 
wall of privacy that surrounds a stranger.” Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th 
Cir. 1993). Contrast the reasoning of the Working Party, see supra note 320, which jettisons any 
normative concept of harm and seeks to rely exclusively on a data subject’s extensive loss of 
“control” over personal data and on official determinations of legitimate public interest.  
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but also due regard to the feelings of the individual and the harm that 
will be done to him by the exposure.341 
The difference between the right to be forgotten in the United 
States and the right to be forgotten in other legal systems is that 
American courts adopt an exceptionally strong presumption in favor 
of allowing publication. The United States is a uniquely heterogeneous 
and divided nation,342 perennially at odds with its own government.343 
Its law extravagantly protects public discourse in the hope that 
unfettered public discussion may legitimize a vulnerable state in a 
diverse society with weak elites.344 
Because American courts lack robust authority to determine what 
constitutes “legitimate” contributions to public discourse and to 
impose elite values on a mass public, they characteristically regard “the 
interest of the public in the free dissemination of the truth and 
unimpeded access to news” as “so broad, so difficult to define and so 
dangerous to circumscribe,” that they “have been reluctant to make . . . 
factually accurate public disclosures tortious, except where the lack of 
any meritorious public interest in the disclosure is very clear and its 
offensiveness to ordinary sensibilities is equally clear.”345 This is 
enough to make the right to be forgotten a much diminished tort in the 
 
 341. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977). A typical 
judicial formulation is that: 
[i]n determining whether a particular incident is ‘newsworthy’ and thus whether the 
privilege shields its truthful publication from liability, the courts consider a variety of 
factors, including the social value of the facts published, the depth of the article’s 
intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and the extent to which the party voluntarily 
acceded to a position of public notoriety. 
Kapellas v. Kofman, 540 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969). 
 342. In a nation as diverse as the United States, “what is ‘private’ so as to make its publication 
offensive likely differs among communities, between generations, and among ethnic, religious, or 
other social groups, as well as among individuals. Likewise, one reader’s or viewer’s ‘news’ is 
another’s tedium or trivia.” Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Cos., 712 P.2d 803, 809 (Or. 1986). 
 343. One implication of heterogeneity in the United States is that our public sphere is the site 
of continual contest about the appropriate norms that should define privacy. Those who live in 
mansions and those who live in boarding houses differ on this question, see supra notes 240–46 
and accompanying text, so American courts have tended to interpret our First Amendment to 
require neutrality in this “marketplace of communities.” Post, supra note 113, at 632. Sometimes 
when upholding freedom of speech, European courts will also adopt this kind of pluralist idiom. 
See, e.g., Kaperzyński v. Poland, App. No. 43206/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 3, 2012), http:/ 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-110171 [https://perma.cc/M3CW-77AF]. But for the most part 
European courts have much less difficulty subordinating the public sphere to community norms 
that they regard as authoritative. See infra note 350.  
 344. Post, supra note 106, at 989–90.  
 345. Jenkins v. Dell Pub. Co., 251 F.2d 447, 450 (3d Cir. 1958).  
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United States,346 surfacing only in “extreme cases”347 as measured by 
the extraordinary offensiveness of a publication.348 It is possible that 
the tort may not even survive under current First Amendment 
doctrine.349 
Other legal systems construct this balance between privacy and 
freedom of public discussion differently. They are far less deferential 
 
 346. Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A Historical Perspective, 22 
YALE J.L. & HUM. 171, 172–73 (2010); Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy 
Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness, 64 
IOWA L. REV. 185, 186 (1979). The American press “is freer to invade personal privacy than 
perhaps any other in the world.” Samantha Barbas, The Sidis Case and the Origins of Modern 
Privacy Law, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 21, 22 (2012); Neil Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357, 378–79, 382 (2011). But see Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: 
The Turn Towards Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1041–42 
(2009) (purporting to find a modern trend to hold journalists accountable).  
 347. Shulman v. Grp. W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998); see Bennett, supra note 
39, at 171. 
 348. So, for example, in the recent and much publicized case of Bollea v. Gawker, 913 F. Supp. 
2d 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012), in which professional wrestler Hulk Hogan sued for invasion of privacy 
because of Gawker’s airing of a video of him having sex with a friend’s wife, see Complaint at 12–
13, Bollea v. Gawker, 913 F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 12012447-CI-011), a major defense 
witness was forced to concede that elements of the story were not newsworthy. See Letitia Stein, 
Gawker Editor Admits Limit to News Value at Hulk Hogan Sex-Tape Trial, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-people-hulkhogan-idUSKCN0WG1A5 [https://perma. 
cc/C47A-J5E2]. The ultimate verdict of approximately $140 million drove Gawker into 
bankruptcy. See Paul Farhi, Gawker Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection, WASH. POST 
(June 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/gawker-files-for-chapter-11-
bankruptcy-protection/2016/06/10/45ef7420-2f2e-11e6-9b37-42985f6a265c_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/HML7-JC25]; Nick Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million to Gawker’s Bill in Hulk 
Hogan Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/business/ 
media/hulk-hogan-damages-25-million-gawker-case.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/X3ZH-9E97]; 
Peter Sterne, Jury Awards Hulk Hogan $115 Million as Gawker Looks To Appeal, POLITICO 
(Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.politico.com/media/story/2016/03/jury-awards-hulk-hogan-115-
million-as-gawker-looks-to-appeal-004433 [https://perma.cc/7WGQ-QLDC]. 
 349. See Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, 101 P.3d 552, 554–55 (Cal. 2004). But see Wolfe v. 
Schaefer, 619 F.3d 782, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2010); Amy Gajda, The Present of Newsworthiness, 50 
N.E. L. REV. 145 (2016) (147, 163) (noting a trend in modern jurisprudence to hold journalists 
accountable); Amy Gajda, Privacy, Press, and a Right To Be Forgotten in the United States (May 
29, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). I should note that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has been surprisingly careful to impose First Amendment restraints on 
privacy protections in a manner that more or less resolves each case only as it arises “in a discrete 
factual context.” Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989); see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 
514, 524–33 (2001); Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1979) (holding that the 
press cannot be held liable for publishing the identity of a juvenile defendant when that identity 
has been “lawfully obtained, . . . except when necessary to further an interest more substantial 
than is present here.”); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (“Rather than address 
the broader question whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal 
liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . it is appropriate to focus on 
the narrower interface between press and privacy that this case presents.”). 
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to the curiosity of the public350 and far more sympathetic to the value 
of privacy.351 It is not now my concern to determine a single, correct 
solution to this balance. My effort is instead to explore how the 
normative logic presupposed by the right to be forgotten should have 
been applied in Google Spain if the CJEU had been committed to 
balancing Costeja’s privacy interests against the value of public 
discourse. I am interested in how Google Spain might have interpreted 
the right to be forgotten if it had not been mesmerized by some 
ambiguous combination of the RTBF and the right to be forgotten. 
Unlike the RTBF, the right to be forgotten applies strictly to 
communicative acts, and the communicative act at issue in Google 
Spain was the link to the La Vanguardia website. At the simplest level, 
therefore, the CJEU should have asked, first, whether the publication 
of the Google link was harmful and offensive. If the answer to this 
question was affirmative, the CJEU should have asked, second, 
whether the Google link was of legitimate concern to the public. This 
is a pretty flat-footed formulation of the issues underlying the right to 
be forgotten, but it is sufficient to illustrate that the first question is all 
but unintelligible. Google aspires to make all websites available to 
every reader. Any given link is accordingly stripped of the narrative 
properties, the human meaning, that might render it either offensive or 
inoffensive.352 To take offense at a Google link is like being outraged 
 
 350. See, e.g., Case of Aleksey Ovchinnikov v. Russia, App. No. 24061/04, para. 50 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Dec. 16, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-102322 [https://perma.cc/8WMX-4R5V] 
(“The Court reiterates in this connection that in cases of publications relating the details of an 
individual’s private life with the sole purpose of satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership, 
the individual’s right to the effective protection of his or her private life prevails over the 
journalist’s freedom of expression. The Court must therefore determine whether the articles 
authored by the applicant made a contribution to a debate of general interest to society.”); Von 
Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 41, 70 (“[T]he Court considers that the 
publication of the photos and articles in question, the sole purpose of which was to satisfy the 
curiosity of a particular readership regarding the details of the applicant’s private life, cannot be 
deemed to contribute to any debate of general interest to society despite the applicant being 
known to the public.”); A&B v. Ediciones El País SL, S.T.S., Oct. 15, 2015 (R.J., No. 545, ¶ 6) 
(Spain) (distinguishing between curiosity justified by public interest and curiosity aroused by “el 
gusto por el cotilleo y la maledicencia [gossip and evil-speaking]”). 
 351. Case of Biriuk v. Lithuania, App No. 23373/03, para. 38 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 25, 2008), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-89827 [https://perma.cc/G7LL-3735]; Tammer v. Estonia, 
2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 263, 280–81. On the confidence of European courts to balance dignity 
and privacy against freedom of speech, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconciling Privacy and 
Speech in the Era of Big Data: A Comparative Analysis, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1279, 1314–26 
(2015).  
 352. There may be a possible exception in terms of the order in which the link appears in 
response to a Google search. The order may carry narrative meaning, because items that appear 
near the top of the search results may be taken to be more significant. The logic I am advancing 
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by the vacuum cleaner that sweeps up a lost earring. 
The second question seems equally vacuous. Insofar as 
newsworthiness is determined by the “customs and conventions of the 
community,” Google links seem merely blank.353 They are neither 
more nor less “morbid or sensational” than a library card that refers to 
a morbid and sensational novel. If Google links are of legitimate 
concern to the public, it is because of the systemic properties of the 
Google search engine, which, like the media or the press, brings news 
to the contemporary reader. 
By contrast, no such difficulties apply to the La Vanguardia 
website, which contains an article whose propriety and newsworthiness 
can be assessed in the usual manner. It is intelligible to ask whether the 
website offends propriety by continuing to publish the announcement 
of Costeja’s attachment proceedings more than a decade after they had 
transpired. It is intelligible to ask whether the La Vanguardia website 
is about a matter that is now newsworthy or of legitimate concern to 
the public. We may differ in our answers to these inquiries, but at least 
we share some idea what the questions mean. 
The logic of social norms thus points toward evaluating the legality 
of the Google link in light of the propriety of the La Vanguardia 
website.354 The primary source of legal dignitary harm is the La 
Vanguardia website, and therefore legal attention ought primarily be 
directed to that website.355 If it were to be found that the website 
violated the right to be forgotten, remedies might include 
anonymization.356 This seems to be the approach of the Belgium Court 
of Cassation, which in April 2016 decided that the RTBF required the 
anonymization of an article in the archives of Le Soir that had been 
 
in text may also not apply when Google distributes images rather than text. Images may carry a 
far thicker narrative meaning than a link. 
 353. Again, this reasoning may not apply in the case of Google’s distribution of images, as 
distinct from simple links. See supra note 352. 
 354. Google Spain, supra note 12, paras. 82–83; see Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The 
Distinction Between Privacy and Data Protection in the Jurisprudence of the ECJ and the ECtHR, 
in DATA PROTECTION ANNO 2014: HOW TO RESTORE TRUST?: CONTRIBUTIONS IN HONOUR OF 
PETER HUSTINX 90, 93 (Hielke Hijmans & Herke Kraneborg eds., 2014) (“[A]ny potential 
interference with the right to privacy would not result from Google’s service, but from publication 
of the information by the newspaper.”). 
 355. Thus, in the wake of Google Spain, European Data Protection Agencies, “as well as the 
Council of Europe, suggest approaching the source as a useful first step in practice.” Aleksandra 
Kuczerawy & Jef Ausloos, From Notice-and-Takedown to Notice-and-Delist: Implementing 
Google Spain, 14 COL. TECH. L.J. 219, 237 (2016); see supra JONES, note 43, at 151–52. 
 356. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 41 (Cal. 1971). 
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digitized and placed online.357 Remedies might also include the 
mandatory use of robots exclusion standards to prevent search engines 
from indexing a website. Thus the Spanish Supreme Court 
implemented the RTBF established by Google Spain by requiring 
Spain’s national newspaper to use such standards to prevent online 
search engines from indexing an article discussing two individuals’ 
participation in drug crimes during the 1980s.358 
If it were to be found that the La Vanguardia website did not 
violate the right to be forgotten, we should ask whether a Google link 
to the website might nevertheless independently violate the right to be 
forgotten. Google Spain seemingly adopts this option. It does so on the 
ground that a Google link makes access to the underlying website 
“appreciably easier for any internet user making a search in respect of 
the person concerned” and that it therefore “may play a decisive role 
in the dissemination of that information” and “constitute a more 
significant interference with the data subject’s fundamental right to 
privacy than the publication on the web page.”359  
Essentially, the CJEU argues that Costeja was more significantly 
harmed because the Google link more widely circulated the La 
Vanguardia website. But this reasoning makes sense only if we 
 
 357. Hugh Tomlinson, Case Law, Belgium: Olivier G v Le Soir. “Right To Be Forgotten” 
Requires Anonymisation of Online Newspaper Archive, INFORRM’S BLOG, https:// inforrm.
wordpress.com/2016/07/19/case-law-belgium-olivier-g-v-le-soir-right-to-be-forgotten-requires-
anonymisation-of-online-newspaper-archive-hugh-tomlinson-qc [https://perma.cc/ MH9A-
VQAW]. I use the term RTBF rather than “right to be forgotten” because the case was decided 
under Article 8 of the Charter. This has very troubling implications. Although both the Directive 
and the GDPR contain exceptions for journalistic purposes, Article 8 contains no such exemption. 
This cleanly illustrates the contrast between the right to be forgotten and the RTBF. Because the 
RTBF applies to data processing, it equally encompasses newspaper filing systems and newspaper 
digital publications. But because the logic of social norms applies to communication rather than 
to information, the right to be forgotten applies only to newspaper communications. The potential 
application of the fair information practices of Article 8 to newspaper filing systems is a truly 
fearsome possibility. 
 358. A&B v. Ediciones El País SL, S.T.S., Oct. 15, 2015 (R.J., No. 545) (Spain); see 
PHAEDRA II, THE SPANISH SUPREME COURT REQUIRES THE SCOPE OF THE “RIGHT TO 
OBLIVION” AGAINST THE MEDIA (2015), http://www.phaedra-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/ 
PHAEDRA-II_SP_AEPD_Right-to-be-forgotten_UJI_November2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
W7SQ-5VQ3]; Hugh Tomlinson, Case Law, Spain: A and B v Ediciones El País, Newspaper 
Archive To Be Hidden from Internet Searches but No “Re-Writing of History,” INFORRM’S BLOG, 
https://inforrm.wordpress.com/ 2015/11/19/case-law-spain-a-and-b-v-ediciones-el-pais-
newspaper-archive-to-be-hidden-from-internet-searches-but-no-re-writing-of-history-hugh-
tomlinson-qc [https://perma.cc/6U4K-Y2BU]. El País was not required to remove the articles 
from its own internal archive nor to de-index them from their own website’s internal search 
engine. 
 359. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 87. 
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presuppose that the La Vanguardia website itself inflicts a legally 
cognizable dignitary harm, which is contrary to our original 
assumption. No doubt if the La Vanguardia website does inflict a 
legally cognizable harm, we would be justified in curtailing its 
distribution by Google, although a full and complete remedy ought to 
be addressed to the website itself. But if we assume that the website 
does not independently inflict a legally cognizable harm, there is no 
justification for curtailing its circulation by requiring Google to delist 
it.360 
Under the logic of social norms, moreover, it seems highly unlikely 
that the Google link will be found to violate the right to be forgotten 
independently of the La Vanguardia website. Both the Google link and 
the La Vanguardia website contain the same information. Each offers 
that information to the “indefinite number of people”361 that constitute 
the general public in the context of the Internet. Each is of exactly the 
same concern to the public. The very blankness of a Google link means 
that it will almost always assume the normative coloring of the website 
to which it points. If it makes any sense at all to characterize the Google 
link as an inappropriate communication, it must stand or fall together 
with the La Vanguardia website. 
The logic of social norms thus suggests that Google Spain was 
misguided in seeking to separate the Google link from the La 
 
 360. It might be argued that the Google link enables the La Vanguardia website to meet the 
“publicity” condition enunciated by the Second Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 652D cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Unlike the much older torts of libel and slander, the 
tort of invasion of privacy developed—at least in the United States—in response to the intrusions 
of the mass media. As a consequence, the tort imposes liability only when someone gives 
“publicity” to private facts. There is no liability if private information is communicated only to 
small numbers of people. The best explanation for the publicity requirement is that the law aims 
to impose civility within the public sphere without dampening the spontaneous and affective 
communication characteristic of the private sphere. See Post, supra note 106, at 987–95 (discussing 
the publicity requirement and the cases that have applied it). It might be argued that whereas a 
Google link “publicizes” a website, the La Vanguardia website by itself cannot “publicize” 
personal data about Costeja. It would follow from this argument that Google can be required to 
erase the link to the La Vanguardia website, but that the La Vanguardia website need not be 
removed from the Internet. The difficulty with this argument, however, is that there is no doubt 
that under any contemporary understanding of the tort, the La Vanguardia website already gives 
“publicity” to Costeja’s personal data. It is addressed to the public sphere, just as Google is 
addressed to the public sphere. Moreover, using the “publicity requirement” to distinguish 
between Google and the La Vanguardia website does not accomplish the underlying normative 
purpose of the requirement. There is no expectation that insulating the La Vanguardia from the 
reach of tort liability will preserve a realm of spontaneous and affective communication.  
 361. Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971 to I-
13014, para. 47 (2003). 
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Vanguardia website. If the latter violates the right to be forgotten, the 
cleanest and most appropriate remedy is to address the website itself.362 
But if the La Vanguardia website does not violate the right to be 
forgotten, the Google link ought not be liable, and it does not matter 
whether it increases the circulation of the La Vanguardia website. The 
wide circulation of the Google link is irrelevant if the link is deemed 
newsworthy and not offensive, as ought to be the case if the La 
Vanguardia website is found to be newsworthy and not offensive. 
The CJEU’s effort to separate the Google link from the La 
Vanguardia website causes important and undesirable consequences. 
As a result of Google Spain, members of the public can still learn about 
what happened to Costeja, but they must pay a much greater price to 
do so. Google Spain essentially increases the cost of accessing 
information about Costeja’s financial difficulties. Although members 
of the public can no longer search on Costeja’s name, they can still 
learn about his attachment proceedings if they search public records, 
or creatively design new forms of Google searches that do not use his 
name, or inspect printed copies of La Vanguardia’s archive.363 All this 
costs extra time and money. 
The architecture created by Google Spain thus skews the 
distribution of information toward those with resources to spend on 
information acquisition.364 This is surely an odd consequence for a 
society that celebrates open and equal access to information.365 It is one 
thing for a legal system to decide that certain information should not 
be made publicly available; it is quite another deliberately to create a 
system in which that same information is made available only to those 
wealthy enough to obtain it.366 Google Spain does not withdraw 
 
 362. Of course, anonymizing the original website may have more drastic informational effects 
than merely delisting it, but this simply makes apparent the stakes in the decision to delist, because 
“if certain search results are hidden or removed from search results, this has much the same effect 
as deleting the original content.” Letter from Gerald Leitner, Secretary-General of International 
Federation of Library Associations and Institutions, on Application of Right To Be Forgotten 
Rulings: The Library Viewpoint (Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.ifla.org/files/assets/faife/statements/ 
161024_ifla_on_rtbf_case_in_france.pdf [https://perma.cc/AY2A-UQHA]. 
 363. Hoffman et al., supra note 98, at 458 (“The result is . . . much more about obscurity than 
it is about a right to be forgotten. The ruling has the effect of obscuring information from searches 
solely based on a name . . . .”). 
 364. See Pablo Salvador Coderch, Entre Recordar y Olvidar [In Between Remembering and 
Forgetting], EL PAÍS (June 1, 2011), http://elpais.com/diario/2011/06/01/opinion/1306879205_85 
0215.html [https://perma.cc/36ZF-M3NB]. 
 365. See supra note 307.  
 366. I am reminded of the opposition of John Imray of Aberdeen to the creation of a public 
library service in Great Britain on the ground that it would raise “the lower classes too highly by 
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personal data from the public sphere; it taxes those who wish to access 
that data in the public sphere. 
By separating the status of the Google link from that of the La 
Vanguardia website, the CJEU also creates an additional and serious 
problem of institutional design. As best I can make out, the CJEU 
believed that it could enforce the RTBF on the cheap by giving data 
subjects the right to demand from Google as a data controller “the 
rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does 
not comply with the provisions of [the Directive].”367 The CJEU 
apparently believed that a large and wealthy corporation like Google 
could bear the cost of creating the procedures necessary to resolve the 
hundreds of thousands of predictable RTBF claims.368 
The CJEU was correct in its expectations insofar as the vast 
majority of RTBF complaints are presently pending before Google 
itself. But it has been widely observed that this structure of 
enforcement is deeply flawed because it leaves important decisions 
about freedom of expression in the hands of an unaccountable private 
company with strong financial incentives to err on the side of 
censorship.369 If the legal status of Google links were tied to the 
 
giving them information and that it is better to keep them without it.” MURISON, supra note 301, 
at 16. 
 367. Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 70; see Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” Ruling 
(C-131/12), supra note 62.  
 368. The structure of the system created by Google Spain is in some ways analogous to the 
notice and take-down provisions established by the E-Commerce Directive. Council Directive 
2000/31EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 
32000L0031:en:HTML [https://perma.cc/4NF3-QBJF]; see Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen 
Borgesius, Google Spain v. González: Did the Court Forget About Freedom of Expression?, 5 
EUR. J. RISK REG. 389, 492 (2014). 
 369. Bougiakiotis, supra note 323, at 322–24; LoCascio, supra note 41; Daphne Keller, The 
Final Draft of Europe’s “Right to be Forgotten” Law, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Dec. 17, 
2015), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/12/final-draft-europes-right-be-forgotten-law 
[https://perma.cc/4TVL-EF83] (“Intermediaries that do not honor RTBF requests risk crippling 
fines. There are no legal consequences for ‘over-removing’ content targeted by invalid RTBF 
requests.”). Commentators have noted that: 
the court’s guidance in that case is so vague that it leaves much room for interpretation 
about which types of removal requests should be granted, and which should not. This 
puts a heavy responsibility on the companies affected by the ruling to exercise careful 
and difficult balancing acts between one person’s privacy rights and the rights of others 
to receive and impart information. Companies face pressures to minimise costs and 
maximise revenues, and there is a powerful incentive to accommodate too many 
requests, removing too much content, rather than taking on costly and risky lawsuits 
and legal challenges. 
Jens-Henrik Jeppesen & Emma Llansó, EU’s “Right to be Forgotten” Policy Sets Bad Precedent 
for Free Expression Worldwide, CDT (Feb. 11, 2016), https://cdt.org/blog/eus-right-to-be-forgot
ten-policy-sets-bad-precedent-for-free-expression-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/NS9K-5ZQT]. 
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websites to which they refer, however, and if appropriate remedies 
were to be understood as primarily addressed to those websites, there 
would be no justification for privatizing the enforcement of the RTBF 
in this manner. This is because only a public legal system can possess 
the necessary authority to take down or modify original websites.370 
There is no doubt that Google Spain did succeed in fashioning a 
powerful and effective instrument for controlling the circulation of 
information on the web. By targeting the search engines that serve as 
the gateways for that circulation, the CJEU has created a cheap and 
comprehensive method for dampening the flow of personal data. But 
it is not clear what the CJEU has accomplished by controlling the flow 
of data in this way. It has produced a remedy that is comprehensible 
neither within the instrumental logic of the Directive, which does not 
contain concepts of harm or of the public interest, nor within the 
normative logic of the right to be forgotten, which would not separate 
Google from its underlying websites. It is uncertain what the CJEU was 
striving to accomplish by the strange RTBF it has cobbled together. 
By privatizing the enforcement of the RTBF through Google, 
moreover, the CJEU has virtually guaranteed that the axiological 
ambiguity will continue. We know that Google has set up a 
distinguished Advisory Council to propose guidelines for 
implementing the mandate of Google Spain, and we know that the 
Council has proposed an elaborate “balancing test to determine 
 
On the substantial economic penalties imposed by the GDPR for non-compliance, see GDPR, 
supra note 17, arts. 53, 83.  
 370. The Advocate General in Google Spain voiced this very concern, stating: 
[I] would also discourage the Court from concluding that these conflicting interests 
could satisfactorily be balanced in individual cases on a case-by-case basis, with the 
judgment to be left to the internet search engine service provider. Such “notice and 
take down procedures”, if required by the Court, are likely either to lead to the 
automatic withdrawal of links to any objected contents or to an unmanageable number 
of requests handled by the most popular and important internet search engine service 
providers. In this context it is necessary to recall that “notice and take down 
procedures” that appear in the ecommerce Directive 2000/31 relate to unlawful 
content, but in the context of the case at hand we are faced with a request for 
suppressing legitimate and legal information that has entered the public sphere. 
  In particular, internet search engine service providers should not be saddled with 
such an obligation. This would entail an interference with the freedom of expression of 
the publisher of the web page, who would not enjoy adequate legal protection in such 
a situation, any unregulated “notice and take down procedure” being a private matter 
between the data subject and the search engine service provider. It would amount to 
the censuring of his published content by a private party. It is a completely different 
thing that the States have positive obligations to provide an effective remedy against 
the publisher infringing the right to private life, which in the context of internet would 
concern the publisher of the web page.  
See Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos, 2013 E.C.R. 424, paras. 133, 134; JONES, supra note 43, at 179. 
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whether the data protection rights of the data subject are outweighed 
by ‘the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on 
account of inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in 
question.’”371 We know that Google Spain has encouraged massive 
numbers of requests for Google to delist links on the basis of the 
RTBF.372 But because Google’s adjudicative processes remain behind 
closed doors, because we cannot ascertain what tests Google is actually 
applying to what circumstances and in what ways,373 the actual values 
that underlie the RTBF created by Google Spain remain obscure.374 
Eighty Internet scholars evaluating Google’s implementation of 
the RTBF have concluded that “[b]eyond anecdote, we know very little 
about what kind and quantity of information is being delisted from 
search results, what sources are being delisted and on what scale, [and] 
what kinds of requests fail and in what proportion.”375 The experts also 
 
 371. Luciano Floridi et al., ADVISORY COUNCIL TO GOOGLE ON THE RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN 5–6 (Feb. 6, 2015) https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/archive.google.com/ 
en//advisorycouncil/advisement/advisory-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UT7Q-Y64V] . 
 372. See supra note 22. 
 373. Kuczerawy & Ausloos, supra note 355, at 244–46. 
 374. Curiously, European data authorities seem intent to ensure that Google not routinely 
inform webmasters when pages from their sites are removed pursuant to take down requests 
under the Directive. The Working Party said: 
No provision in EU data protection law obliges search engines to communicate to 
original webmasters that results relating to their content have been de-listed. Such a 
communication is in many cases a processing of personal data and, as such, requires a 
proper legal ground in order to be legitimate. No legal ground can be found in Article 
7 of Directive 95/46/EC to routinely communicate de-listing decisions to primary 
controllers.  
On the other hand, it may be legitimate for search engines to contact original publishers 
prior to any decision about a de-listing request, in particularly difficult cases, when it is 
necessary to get a fuller understanding about the circumstances of the case. In those 
cases, search engines should take all necessary measures to properly safeguard the 
rights of the affected data subject. 
ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, supra note 128, para. 23. 
Google has even been penalized for notifying a webmaster about a delisting. See Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos, Resolución: R/02232/2016, http://www.agpd.es/portalweb 
AGPD/resoluciones/procedimientos_sancionadores/ps_2016/common/pdfs/PS-00149-2016_ 
Resolucion-de-fecha-14-09-2016_Art-ii-culo-10-16-LOPD.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJ78-R866]. If 
delisted websites cannot know about Google’s decision to delist them, and hence cannot appeal 
that decision, Google’s application of its right to be forgotten policy will necessarily be skewed in 
favor of delisting. The parameters of the policy will remain publicly uncontested and hence 
opaque. For a superb discussion of an appropriate procedural framework for RTBF requests 
under both the Directive and the GDPR, which takes account of Google’s status as an 
intermediary, see Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the 
2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 37–57), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2914684 [https://
perma.cc/32WN-MRQP]. 
 375. Jef Ausloos et al., Open Letter to Google from 80 Internet Scholars: Release RTBF 
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worried that the public did not know “Google’s guidelines in striking 
the balance between individual privacy and freedom of expression 
interests.”376 
Google Spain has thus stitched together a Frankenstein—a blind 
creation that interferes with the public sphere in unaccountable ways 
to unaccountable ends. It may dampen the circulation of personal data, 
but whether it serves defensible public purposes is an open question. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg created a storm when he was 
understood to announce in 2010 “that privacy was no longer a ‘social 
norm.’”377 What he actually said was far more reasonable: “People have 
really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and 
different kinds, but more openly and with more people. That social 
norm is just something that has evolved over time.”378 What aroused 
anger and distrust was Facebook’s considerable agency in affecting the 
evolution of privacy norms in directions that seem to correspond to 
Facebook’s own financial interests.379 
Privacy norms are in fact unstable and uncertain in a rapidly 
developing digital world.380 There is room for suspicion about how 
influential actors like Facebook seek to shape the development of 
these norms. But this suspicion ought not to blind us to the emergence 
of a virtual public sphere that is of enormous contemporary 
 
Compliance Data, MEDIUM (May 13, 2015), https://medium.com/@ellgood/open-letter-to-google-
from-80-internet-scholars-release-rtbf-compliance-data-cbfc6d59f1bd#.2x79b0bs6 
[https://perma.cc/T2L9-HXT5]. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-
privacy [https://perma.cc/NMN3-SVYJ]; see, e.g., Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook’s Zuckerburg 
Says the Age of Privacy is Over, READWRITE (Jan. 9, 2010), http://readwrite.com/2010/01/ 
09/facebooks_zuckerberg_says_the_age_of_privacy_is_ov [https://perma.cc/B3K6-KR5U]. 
Facebook and Zuckerberg were eventually forced to beat a hasty retreat. See, e.g., Will Oremus, 
Facebook’s Privacy Pivot, SLATE (July 25, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/ 
future_tense/2014/07/facebook_s_privacy_pivot_mark_zuckerberg_s_plan_to_win_back_trust.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/T53R-Q6FT]. 
 378. Ann Cavoukian, Privacy Is Still a Social Norm, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/privacy-is-still-a-social-norm/article1209523/ [https://
perma.cc/3REL-K7DF]. 
 379. Kirkpatrick, supra note 377 (“I don’t buy Zuckerberg’s argument that Facebook is now 
only reflecting the changes that society is undergoing. I think Facebook itself is a major agent of 
social change and by acting otherwise Zuckerberg is being arrogant and condescending.”). 
 380. Schwartz, supra note 306, at 1442–43. 
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significance and that is sustained by an infrastructure of search engines 
like Google. That Google is a profit-making corporation no more 
compromises its role in sustaining this public sphere than it 
compromised the role of profit-seeking, nineteenth-century 
newspapers. 
The point is implicitly acknowledged by the CJEU in Google 
Spain. It seems to understand that the information which Google 
communicates to the public over the Internet cannot be completely 
dominated by instrumental logic, any more than can public discourse. 
And so the CJEU applies a balancing test to Google’s links that it 
would not—and should not—apply to Google’s processing of personal 
data gathered from its own customers.381 
In applying this balancing test, however, the CJEU must navigate 
the Internet as a domain of actual human meaning. It must determine 
which links are offensive and which contribute to the public interest. 
The CJEU in Google Spain seems uncomfortable in this role. Its forays 
into the significance of communication on the Internet are tentative 
and uncertain. This is unfortunate: if a legal system cares about the free 
formation of public opinion, the curtailment of public discourse to 
achieve social goods, like public safety or public order, requires close 
judicial supervision. 
This is no less true when the state seeks to suppress public 
discourse to achieve values that we associate with privacy. A state may 
well believe that public communications that disclose past criminal 
records should be prohibited to achieve the social objective of 
rehabilitation.382 Balancing the need for rehabilitation against freedom 
of expression requires a steady judicial hand. Different legal systems 
may reach different conclusions about how such a balance ought to be 
resolved, but what ought to be beyond controversy is that there can be 
no serious judicial review without a clear grasp of the ends that legal 
regulation seeks to achieve. 
At the most fundamental level, what is missing from Google Spain 
is a firm awareness of the privacy values that the CJEU hopes to realize 
 
 381. See Google Spain, supra note 12, para. 81.  
 382. See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Wikipedia Sued by German Killers in Privacy Claim, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/nov/13/wikipedia-
sued-privacy-claim [https://perma.cc/7HKE-XXCF]; Jennifer Granick, Convicted Murder to 
Wikipedia: Shhh!, ELEC. FRONTEIR FOUND. (Nov. 10, 2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/ 
11/murderer-wikipedia-shhh [https://perma.cc/BRE7-U5DB]; David Kravetz, Convicted Murder 
Sues Wikipedia, Demands Removal of His Name, WIRED (Nov. 11, 2009), https://www.wired. 
com/2009/11/wikipedia_murder [https://perma.cc/6RU7-QQK5]. 
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by the RTBF it has cobbled together. Google Spain follows consistently 
neither the logic of bureaucratic rationality nor the logic of social 
norms. It is uncertain, therefore, what the remedy created by Google 
Spain is meant to accomplish. This ambiguity will likely be bequeathed 
to the far more comprehensive and detailed GDPR, whose 
enforcement is looming in the near future. 
No doubt forcing the question of values to the surface will be 
controversial and difficult, but the responsible construction of public 
law cannot evade this responsibility. In the context of a decision like 
Google Spain, we must decide whether we seek to protect data privacy 
or dignitary privacy. We must create the doctrinal structure 
appropriate for whichever end we choose. 
APPENDIX 
